DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-PHILOSOPHY

SEMESTER-I

WESTERN ETHICS

CORE-101

BLOCK-2

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

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ENLIGHTENMENT TO PERFECTION

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FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

WESTERN ETHICS

BLOCK-1

BLOCK-2

BLOCK-2 WESTERN ETHICS

In this block, we will learn about met ethics in the twentieth century, moral realism and the challenge of scepticism. Also learns about the concept of moral, Socratic dilemma and about religion and ethics. Contemporary challenges to classical ethical theory. Feminist ethics, its concept, justice, care and gender bias. The challenges of determinism to moral responsibilities.

Unit 8 explains about the reason and emotions - the fact/value problem, non-naturalism and concept of emotivism.

Unit 9 explains about the subjectivity of values, Mackie's Error Theory, Moral Nihilism, two forms of ethical scepticism.

Unit 10 explains about the concept of moral, Socratic Dilemma, Morality and advantage and also about later selves and moral principles.

Unit 11 explains about the religion and morality, Postulates of Morality - God and immortality and also about ethics without god.

Unit 12 explains about the contemporary challenges to classical ethical theory. Also about sociobiology, feminism, moral responsibility, evolution and prospects of evolutionary ethics.

Unit 13 explains about the concept of female morality, Justice, Care and Gender bias.

Unit 14 explains about the meaning of moral responsibility, free will, and determinism.

UNIT-8:METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

STRUCTURE

8.0 Objectives

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Reasons and Emotions: The Fact/Value Problem

8.3 Non-Naturalism

8.4 Concept of Emotivism

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8.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on "Metaethics In the Twentieth Century", you can gain knowledge of about the following important topics:

- Reasons and Emotions: The Fact/Value Problem.
- Non-Naturalism.
- Concept of Emotivism.

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The study of the essence of moral thought and judgment is meta-ethics. This covers moral metaphysics, moral epistemology, philosophy of morality, and moral motivation. Forms of moral intuitionism dominated the first forty years of the twentieth century, supplanted by the emotivism of Charles Stevenson and the absolute prescriptivism of Richard Hare. Both reigned in effect until the early 1970s, when a total eclipse occurred to the hegemony of Hare. The situation has been much more complex for the last three decades of the century, with new positions developing, but none of them enjoying the kind of paradigm status intuitionism enjoyed

at the start. This section provides a twentieth-century review of meta-ethics and addresses G. As well as his thoughts on the Open Question Debate, E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903). Metaethics is an empirical philosophy branch that discusses the position, origins, and context of moral values, property, and terms. While the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is ethical, the emphasis of metaethics is on what morality is. Just as two people may disagree with the ethics of, for example, physician-assisted suicide, and agree on the more abstract level of a general normative theory such as utilitarianism, so people who disagree on the level of a general normative theory may still agree on the basic nature and status of morality itself, and vice versa. In this way, metaethics can be viewed as a philosophically highly abstract way of thinking about morality. Thus, differentiate it from the "first-order" stage of normative philosophy, metaethics is also sometimes referred to as "second-order" ethical theorizing. Metaethical positions can be differentiated by how they respond to questions like: What exactly do people do when using moral terms like "good" and "right?"&what is, in the first place, a moral value and are such values identical to other common things, such as objects and properties? &where do moral values come from — what is their origin and source? &Are some things morally correct or wrong at all times for all people, or does morality vary from person to person, situation to context, and culture to culture? Metaethical perspectives address these questions by analysing the grammar of moral debate, the ontology of moral property, the importance of anthropological conflict about moral values and practices, the psychology of how morality affects us as embodied human beings, and the epistemology of how moral values are understood. These different aspects of metaethics are discussed in the following sections. A book that changed the direction of moral thought, G.E., appeared in 1903. Moore's Ethic Theory. The main charge of Moore against previous moral thinkers all but Sedgwick was that they didn't have the problems right. John Stuart Mill had defended his utilitarian theory that the right act was the act which created the most intrinsically good consequences without ever clarifying whether what he proposed was a definition of "wrong" or a declaration of correct actions: if it were a definition of right, one might argue that many acts were considered to be right, even if they do not

produce the best advice possible. Moore makes similar statements in moral philosophy about a whole number of his predecessors. On his part, Moore held that it was great but not strictly "right" to be indefinable. "Excellent" was indefinable, not in the sense that we could not give any synonyms of it such as "wanted", but in the sense that it was a "easy," i.e., an unanalysable word, like red, to which we could not give any verbal instructions in advance that would allow someone to define it. This is contrary to a "technical" term, such as horse, in which we could give certain instructions that would allow somebody to identify something as a horse through the description even if that person had never seen a horse. Moore's book has been immensely influential, and Principia Ethic's first chapter, "The Indefinability of Good," is replicated to this day in nearly all the hundreds of ethics anthologies that have been created in recent decades. Some theorists disagree with Moore, but they have to agree with him. And his book's effect not quite what he intended was to shift the whole thrust of ethical philosophy in the direction of meta-ethics for at least half a century, which is concerned with the sense and definability of ethical concepts rather than normative ethics. Normative ethics involves the analysis of which actions or groups of acts are right or wrong, which acts are breaches of rights, which acts are the activities for which a person should be held normally accountable, the relationship between acts and motives, intentions and characteristics of character, all of which have been the standard topic of ethics since classical Greece. In favour of the opening chapter, the later chapters of Moore's novel, dealing with normative ethics issues, were almost completely neglected. Only in the last two decades has normative ethics come into its own again; but until well after the Second World War, one could search the annual index of the major philosophical magazines Mind, Philosophical Review, Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, and others without finding in any of them more than one or two articles on normative ethics. Stating that something is desired is making a psychological argument about people; stating it is desirable is making a moral statement, namely that it should be desired. Saying that most people approve of something, is making a statement about them; but saying that is correct is saying something quite different, which has an effect if not part of its meaning that they should accept. Naturally,

normative terms occur in disciplines other than ethics for example,' beautiful' in aesthetics; but in ethics there is a variety of normative terms such as' good,'' valuable,'' desirable,'' right,'' wrong,'' thought,'' should,'' just,'' unjust,'' responsible' and others that have been the focus of meta-ethical discussion and an elaborate tracing of their relationships with each other. Nonetheless, the primary question of meta-ethics is how these words are related to non-ethical terms in meaning: how wanted is related to wanted, how calling an act wrong is related to empirical facts about the motives or consequences of the act, how calling a person or purpose, or goal, or outcome good is related to other personal data or the consequence.

8.2 REASONS AND EMOTIONS: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM

The definition of value, and in what sense value is subjective and in what sense objective and the difference between "subjective" and "relative" is explored extensively and systematically in Ralph Barton Perry, General Value Theory, followed by his Realms of Value.9 Several essays have been written on this topic, but it is well summarized in Nicholas Rescher, An Introduction to Value Theory. G. E specifically addresses the idea of intrinsic goodness "good for its own sake" as opposed to instrumental goodness "good for the same thing" together with a defence of a plurality of intrinsic goods. Moore in his Ethics, Chapter.6, and established by Brand Blanshard, in Reason & Goodness, which suggests that the two essential goods are fulfilment and happiness, all others being directly or indirectly reducible to them. Ralph M. Blake best explains in his seminal essay, "Why Not Hedonism?" the hedonistic idea that happiness or fulfilment is the only intrinsic value. "It is well defended by C.A. that the conventional list of intrinsic goods, e.g. enjoyment, satisfaction, intelligence, morality, are not inherent but related to human nature not to individuals, however. Campbell in "Moral and Non-Moral Principles." John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, and Monroe Beardsley in "Intrinsic Value," criticize the entire distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goods. In the first two parts of Bertrand Russell's seminal essay, "The

Principles of Ethics" (1912), it is eloquently argued that goodness and badness are in some sense objective properties of events or circumstances described as good or bad. Once Russell returned to writing again on ethics after a forty-year absence in his similarly eloquent novel, Human Life in Ethics and Politics (1955), he defended the view that goodness and evil define human subjects rather than the entities defined as good and bad. But as a result of this ethical theory over-face, his real decisions on particular moral problems did not change at all. G.H. is an excellent book-length analysis of moral goodness principles. Von Wright, the Goodness Varieties. I will make some comments in the remainder of this paper on the truth and principles of social science interpretation. For one or another particular social science, these remarks do not discuss theories explicitly, but concern certain general epistemological issues in a manner that reflects the metaethical points already made. One of the main points of the discussion so far is that there is an essential respect in which ethical reasoning can allow us to arrive at accurate conceptions of what we might call moral reality. There is such a thing as a correct understanding of moral values and there are substantial discrepancies between sound ethical judgment and unsound, incorrect ethical judgment. It is not as if the universe is morally neutral and morally vacuous including human actions, relationships, structures, and practices, with moral values as an expressive or projective laminate. Moral considerations are not a matter of being expressively or protectively put into some kind of relationship with one another two distinct domains one of reality and one of principles. As in other fields of inquiry and thinking, we often start with a thin understanding of a concept of morality, and then we expand and deepen our understanding with thought and experience and associate it with other elements of understanding. For example, our definition of justice is likely to start with some general rules or one or two key concepts, but we continue to add significant complexity and subtlety to it and gradually understand relationships with, say, integrity, bravery, empathy, kindness, and other moral issues. In our understanding of what it is to be a feline creature or our understanding of what it is to be an iron or a bacterium or a comet, this is not so different from the course of development. Initially, we often acquire a definition of some sort of thing by drawing our attention to an

example or a related paradigm case. Somebody points to the girder, saying, "It's ironed the girder. Anything made from the same material is metal. It may not always look exactly like that, but the constitution will be the same. We learn to distinguish iron from steel, aluminium, and so on; and then maybe learn specifics of its properties and constitution. With the growth of our awareness, the concept has not changed, but our iron theory has evolved. They learn to use the term in more careful, thoughtful ways and understand the multiplicity of relationships it has with other concepts. We're learning a little bit about coal, coke smelting, and other methods, and so on. If we're serious about trying to expand our understanding, whether in a moral or non-moral way, we're educating and broadening our understanding and relationships. That's work; it's not just simply 'happening,' and it's world-guided. We take the facts into account and not paint the universe with thoughts. What does this have to do with social science truth and values? It is important to stress how cautious we need to be in drawing conclusions from the metaethical considerations discussed above before reflecting on this issue. It was restricted to moral value; other types exist. In fact, it did not address the question of how to research ethics as a social phenomenon. Therefore, significant, difficult questions about reality, values, and social sciences remain to be considered. Nonetheless, in the following way the metaethical debate is important. As one thing, it demonstrates that an ambition to objective understanding is perfectly appropriate in at least one very important useful sense. Even though our definition of moral values is never complete given the complexity of moral life, we see that it can be broadened and updated in ways that lead to objective considerations. One reason to believe that it is important to expand and deepen our perception of other kinds of meaning is that moral values are not so cleanly and clearly isolated from other values that their analysis is irrelevant to attempts to understand other aspects of human life and human societies. They also recognize conceptions of human need in knowing moral values, of what it is to live well, conceptions of what is necessary and why, conceptions of what is perceived to be intrinsically valuable and what has functional value, and many other matters. There are many kinds of meaning, many moral facets of the human world, and metaethics debate has shown that it is a mistake to think that if we accept

values, we have reached a space where objectivity cannot be attained. Suppose we are now discussing, instead of metaethics, researching the actual morality of a culture, the values of individuals, behaviours, reasoning methods, and so on, rather than posing questions about the objectivity of moral value. For purpose, a great deal of human activity is conducted and is thought to include different kinds of principles and meaning. Much that human beings do is ultimately moral in character. Practices, procedures, organizational arrangements, organization structures, and so on usually represent motives, and these reasons give the practices normative shape, etc. Which counts as doing X is often a normative matter, and the reason for doing X may be because X is thought to understand a specific value, whether it is a value in the sense of an intent, or a value in the sense of having some sort of meaning or meaning not instrumentally connected to bringing something else about. Rational behaviour is normatively paid, representing various important commitments. If that is the case, then a great deal of social scientific understanding may rely on understanding the norms and values that are central to the intelligibility of human activity even if that intelligibility exposes questionable or faulty reasoning on the part of the studied individuals and activities. Whether or not people behave for the same purposes that we do, and share our values and sense principles, logic makes it possible to consider their motives and their important concepts. In reality, the notion of rationality is universal because it is justifying undertakings to have a justification and to give a reason, no matter how austere the reasoning and how trivial the problem is. Human rationality helps them to conclude, hypothesize, prepare, challenge, question, suggest, accept, justify, refute, and participate in a vast array of normative-dimensional actions and practices. Thought is ultimately normal, and this is one of the most significant differences between thought and hallucinating, or between thinking and daydreaming. In comparison to the realms of other species, including other social creatures such as bees, rats, and wolves, the normativity of thinking may be the key distinguishing feature of the human social system. Human beings may be concerned with justification and may find meaning and assign meaning to all kinds of circumstances, events, and evidence. This does not mean that we fully or entirely sufficiently

understand the moral principles and motives of others. Nor is it that we understand the reasons for that we also see that the reasons are sufficiently justified. But it does say that as moral criteria, different definitions of normativity can be intelligible. Perhaps one of the most basic tasks of social interpretation is to see how to position an action, a cause, a process, a disagreement, an theory and so on in a domain of normativity although poorly rationalized by those involved in it. They can also see how being in an organization or a social world differently can make a difference in how the normative environment is perceived and can be crucial to understanding it. Imagine a maximum-security prison and the diverse viewpoints of inmates, correctional officers, warden, tourists, reporters, and members of the national Congress. In all of this, rationality factors, but rationality does not automatically decide a single way for all of these individuals to perceive the organization. The various viewpoints can demonstrate the importance of a non-relativist understanding of how people socially differently perceive something. It is not as if the normatively neutral facts and then the different valuative viewpoints attached to them are present. I've just listed some social science issues; there's no room to discuss them in depth. This very programmatic beginning, however, is part of a broader view that definitions of value and meaning are rationally intelligible and that assessing these decisions and commitments is a feasible undertaking. They may struggle to understand the values of a very different social system and may be perplexed by their justifications, but those beliefs and explanations for value judgments are not completely inaccessible; a clean break between facts and values does not cut us off sceptically. The difficult yet doable research is to explain how and why certain kinds of factors are regarded as reasons with specific types of normative weight. This is not the view that comprehension requires approval. We can be moral, not critical in terms of relativism. The threat is that our own beliefs and justifications will make us too relaxed. Social sciences, however, can be a source of knowledge that can help to deepen and expand the perception and understanding of the world, both personally and socially. In regard to principles, the social sciences are not limited to offering explanations of different useful concepts without a deeper understanding of them and their meaning and

lack of rationality. Fuller implementation of this view would demonstrate that the distinction between truth and meaning is not something that has been overcome; rather, it was first mistaken to formulate it. The very definition of the actions, behaviours and relations that are being examined also depends on knowing their important or normative aspects and negotiating their rationality. At the same time, generalizations and interpretations of social phenomena are illuminated that use theories that are not part of the observed people's self-understanding. I assume the economic reasoning is often the same. For example, an inquirer might describe behaviour in terms of desires, irrespective of the quality vocabulary aspects which inform the behaviour of the studied people. In some cases, most phenomena can, so to speak, be' assimilated' to a single language of interpretation and explanation, although the people studied think and speak for terms of various kinds of meaning and value not articulated explicitly in the theory of explanation. It would almost certainly be a risk to conclude that the behaviour being observed is really no more than biases and instrumental reasoning, but the generalizations and theories that have arisen could be quite useful. Although it may be possible to describe such forms of phenomena entirely in a basic, restricted conceptual vocabulary, this does not mean that we have achieved a completely adequate understanding or even description of the phenomena. The fact that in purely T-terms we can explain something does not mean that the truth is nothing other than what the T-terms claim. It should also be noted that the economic explanatory approach represents some philosophical commitments on the part of the investigator — commitments relating, for example, to the relationship between preferences and rationality. It is important to be careful not to presume that one's own norms and values are moral or non-moral or the terms of one's chosen philosophy are what morality demands uniquely or that they are necessarily normatively authoritative for humans. That doesn't mean absolute or subjective truth. Supporters of empirical rationality often seem to assume that if such a thing existed, it would yield specific and exhaustive results in relation to anything that could be asked of logic. But what is the foundation on which to say this? Saying human beings are logical doesn't mean they're going to feel the same things

about everything, even though they're thinking carefully. This means at least that human beings can behave for reasons, that they are capable of considering several different kinds of factors as motives, that they can be receptive to considerations of meaning, coherence and justification, and that the evaluation of reasons and the formulation of norms for belief-acceptance can be routine features of thought. Furthermore, humans are capable of poor reasoning, uncritical dogmatism, ignorance, delusion, misconception, self-deception, specious rationalization, and countless other epistemic defects, lapses, and vices.

Human reasoning tells the social world, whether rationally justified or not, through dynamic normative websites. Social scientific interpretation also seeks to explain and express these websites and how they appear in culture, processes, organizations, and claims. At the same time, it is clear that theorizing about social phenomena that require more than appreciating the people studies' opinions, behaviours, and perspectives. Of example, facts concerning geography, health, anatomy, agronomy, and meteorology may be essential. If one tries to explain something about death, the fact that many members of a population suffer from a vitamin deficiency or a genetic condition of which they have never even heard about could be informative key. In another scenario, it may be vital to understand the story of creation and development of the end of the world by the groups in their own words. Everything may rely on the intentions of the inquirer, and the terms and definitions of the inquirer that vary from those used by the persons whose behaviour is to be understood. Thus, attempting to understand the conception of something by culture is a question of one subject trying to comprehend the viewpoint of another subject that does not mean that objectivity does not play a role in the process? Logic may strive to navigate this form of dynamic, textured theoretical terrain without applying a measure of relativistic-remove to each layer of texture, distancing the investigator from the phenomenon.

Perhaps in the social sciences the commitment for objectivity is necessary in ways that do not require a clean break from facts and values. The inquiry may be part of the project of trying to understand the dynamic, varied ways of forming and orienting human action,

relationships, and behaviours in reason. It is part of understanding what good reasons a society takes to be and what has importance, purpose, and significance. It is not a question of exploring various subjectivity fabrics projected onto a value-neutral universe. It is a matter of exploring the forms bearable and unbearable; strongly coherent and less coherent; illuminating and not illuminating, etc. that humans find the world to be rich in multiple ways with meaning of multiple kinds.

Check your Progress-1

1.What does Social scientific interpretation seeks?

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8.3 NON-NATURALISM

Ethical non-naturalism refers to the belief that in non-ethical terms ethical concepts cannot be evaluated without remaining. A supporter of this position may argue that certain or even all ethical terms can be defined by other ethical terms. e.g.' right' can be defined as the' act that creates the most good'; but proponents would further claim that a certain ethical term, at least one, cannot be defined by non-ethical terms without remaining. Therefore, one cannot avoid the moral words ring. In the same way, mathematical terms cannot be described by non-mathematical terms, but definable in terms of each other. The residue of sense is "highly ethical" and cannot be reduced to any mixture of non-ethical or quantitative concepts. In the case of 'good'—at least 'good in itself' or 'intrinsically good' Moore defended this thesis "instrumentally good "could be described as "that which leads to what is inherently good". For example, if someone claims as hedonists do that pleasure or happiness and nothing else is intrinsically good, there is no way to refute him by referring to empirical facts; one cannot argue that this or that empirical aspect is good "because that is the very meaning of the word. "Sedgwick

had defended the same' wrong' argument by saying that this and other basic concepts of ethics are good. This study has been taken up in several papers about the sense of' wrong,' most notably by H.A. In his popular essay, Prichard represented almost as often as Chapter 1 of Moore "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912). Prichard concluded that no deductive or inductive reasoning can establish the truth of an ethical inference, and that a specific act of judgment, along with certain protections, should understand basic ethical truths. In his extremely influential book, The Right and the Good, Sir David Ross refined and systematized this position. In G's view. E. Moore, "Goodness is a clear, indefinable, non-natural property." Calling "non-natural" goodness does not mean it is spiritual or divine. Nevertheless, it does mean that goodness cannot be reduced to human properties such as wants, wishes or pleasures. Moore also claimed that it would be the same to announce their naturalness to reduce moral property to a divine command. This would be an example of what he called "the naturalistic fallacy." Moore believed that goodness is "indefinable," i.e. in no other words can be described. This is the core non-naturalism statement. Therefore, the sense of phrases containing the word "good "cannot be completely explained in terms of phrases not containing the word "good." Terms relating to satisfaction, desires or anything else cannot be substituted in place of "good." Other properties, such as strength, roundness and humidity, are simply natural properties. In the real world, we find them and can experience them. On the other hand, certain properties are not so simple, such as being good and being right. A great novel is considered a good thing; it can be said that excellence is a product of that book. It is generally considered that paying one's debts and telling the truth are right things to do; rightness can be said to be the property of certain human actions. These two property forms are quite different, however. Such natural properties can be interpreted and observed in the real world, such as hardness and roundness. On the other hand, it is not immediately clear how the quality of a book or the validity of an action can be seen, felt or calculated physically. There may be as much theoretical debate as there is about which view is right about how to differentiate naturalism from non-naturalism. Given this common disagreement over the nature of naturalism and non-naturalism, the classification of certain historically

influential philosophical accounts as non-naturalist is considerably accepted. In general, G.E. is widely accepted. Within Principia Ethica, Moore's theory of morality is a paradigm ally non-naturalist narrative. Nonetheless, if a representative sample of contemporary philosophers was asked in meta-ethics to name a non-naturalist then the name of Moore would almost certainly prevail. Moore's analysis of non-naturalism, for good or worse, influenced the meta-ethics of the 20th century profoundly. Thomas Baldwin did not exaggerate much when he said that "British moral theory of the twentieth century was unintelligible without reference to Principia Ethica; its history up to or so 1960 is, in short, that while Moore was taken as refuting 'political naturalism,' Moore's own form of 'ethical non-naturalism' was thought to render inacceptable metaphysical and epistemological demands; Nonetheless, it is not very beneficial for at least three reasons to explicitly define non-naturalism in terms of Moore's view. First, we still need some way to determine the related aspects of resemblance to the views of Moore. This is a generic issue attempting to understand a genus in terms of its particularly prominent members. Furthermore, Moore promoted a number of theses on morality in Principia that were referred to as types of non-naturalism, so we are left with the question as to what these views have in common because they are all forms of non-naturalism. Third, in certain critical ways, Moore's non-naturalist description of goodness in Principia is itself ambiguous. Indeed, Moore himself acknowledged his later "Letter to My Critics" that his attempts at explaining in Principia in what way goodness was a non-natural property were untenable (Moore 1942: 582). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind Moore's account in Principia while attempting to define meta-ethics non-naturalism. For a possible restriction on any such interpretation is that it does not mean that in Principia Moore explicitly did not present a form of non-naturalism. We are able to develop a more general definition of non-naturalism with this restriction in hand. Rather loosely, the belief that moral philosophy is inherently separate from the natural sciences is non-naturalism in meta-ethics. Most specifically, under the heading' non-naturalism' a family of related but distinct doctrines has gone. In some cases,' non-naturalism' signifies the linguistic argument that non-normative study of moral predicates is not feasible. In other cases, 'non-

naturalism' signifies the epistemological argument that it is in every way self-evident to know basic moral principles and value judgments. Nevertheless, this view which would probably be supported by some self-styled naturalists is more commonly and more usefully referred to as' intuitionism' and I will refer to it as such. Most often,' non-naturalism' means in some curious sense of' natural' the philosophical argument that moral properties exist and are not equivalent or reducible to any natural property or property. Nonetheless, in this context, just what sense of 'ordinary' is most appropriate is highly controversial and I will come back to this point early. Understood in this way, non-naturalism is a form of moral realism and contrasts with non-cognitivist positions according to which moral utterances serve to express non-cognitive attitudes rather than beliefs which provide conditions for their validity and are also opposed to error-theoretical positions according to which moral facts do not exist. In addition, each of these different concepts of non-naturalism has fascinating supporting relationships with the others. For example, a prima facie plausible explanation of the supposed protection of moral predicates from non-normative evaluation non-naturalism in the first sense would be that moral predicates represent non-natural properties which in the third sense implies non-naturalism. Perhaps shockingly, in all three of these ways, Moore embraced non-naturalism. Because in the second of these three forms, non-naturalism is much more widely known, I will use 'non-naturalism' with the first of these three terms unless otherwise stated. It is also often stated that non-naturalism is the argument that moral properties are sui generis and irreducible (see, for example, Pigden 1993, and indeed this is one of Moore's most distinctive aspects of goodness narrative. This is not, however, the only way of understanding non-naturalism. For intuitively, it is orthogonal whether a property is normal to whether it is sui generis. We must retain theoretical space for natural and irreducible properties the basic properties of physics may be the least controversial examples, but many would argue that the fundamental properties of psychology and sociology are also irreducible but natural as well as non-natural but reducible properties maybe rightness is reducible. In fact, Moore himself was a non-naturalist about rightness at one point, but nonetheless believed that rightness was reducible to the property of being the action

with the best outcome, although he later abandoned that view. In addition, a number of self-styled contemporary naturalists argue that moral properties are both natural and irreducible for example, Richard Miller and Nicholas Sturgeon and we should try to accommodate their view of this definition. The idea that a property could be both natural and irreducible seems to be frequently overlooked in Principia Moore although not always–he considers the example of yellowness. This has certainly contributed to some confusion in later naturalism and non-naturalism debates. Perhaps the most vexing problem for any general non-naturalism classification is the bewildering array of forms in which the distinction between natural and non-natural properties is made. Natural properties have been defined in different ways as properties that I are the subject of natural sciences (Moore 1903: 40), they are invoked in scientific explanations (Little 1994: 226), they are established by the best scientific theory and can be represented in abstract terms available to a person who has a non-local view of the world (Crisp 1996: 117), it can be described. The first four of these features are epistemological, three of which are specifically set in terms of scientific investigation; the remaining three are metaphysical. Some of these features can easily be put to one foot. For example, the argument that natural properties must be able to exist alone in time seems to make the very notion of a natural property deeply problematic. As C.D. Broad argued (see Broad 1942), it is unclear why, for instance, a penny's roundness and brownness could occur on its own in time. Moore himself eventually abandoned this way of characterizing natural properties in view of this criticism (Moore 1942: 581–582). Considering natural properties as those examined by the natural sciences threatens to make our understanding of the universe implausibly reliant on what happens to be the actual objects of scientific research, as if our actual scientific research has never been discovered in any way. It also leaves this unclear that not one of the sciences is moral philosophy (Baldwin 1985: 26). We may seek to finesse this argument by suggesting that natural properties do not really need to be the object of natural sciences, but that they only need to be suitable for natural sciences investigation, but this definition is simply not very enlightening. Because it cries out for a description of what makes the natural sciences

fit for analysis, and that further characterization seems likely to do all the work to clarify what is involved in a natural property.

So we can narrow down the list of candidate forms to describe the distinction between natural and non-natural. Nevertheless, it would be very difficult and perhaps impossible to decide which of the remaining features of natural property would provide "the" best way to define the gap in meta-ethics between naturalism and non-naturalism. Most probably, each of the remaining taxonomies on offer has advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, the most effective interpretation of the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism can differ depending on the context and indeed on one's more concrete theoretical commitments.

Check your Progress-2

1.For what purpose we must retain theoretical space?

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8.4 CONCEPT OF EMOTIVISM

The third major meta-ethical concept, ethical emotivism, is the view that people use moral words not to apply to their ostensible objects people and actions but to express certain attitudes towards them and to seek to invoke certain attitudes in others. The pure form of the emotional or non-cognitivist theory maintains that ethical words do nothing but that, and no question arises of the truth or falsity of ethical statements because the sentences used to utter them convey no more true or false statements than orders "Shut the door!" or recommendations "Let's get out of here." or questions "What time is it?". It is only one task of sentences to convey propositions i.e., to state what is true or false, and ethical sentences actually belong to commands and suggestions rather than proposals, given the fact that they look grammatically as if they express proposals: "This is square" and "This is good" are grammatically similar, but the

first one states a proposition true or false, whichever is the case. Chapter 6 of A.J provides the classic argument of pure emotional theory. Following a suggestion in an essay by Winston F. Barnes, Ayer's Language, Reality, and Logic (1936) is outlined in Moritz Schlack's The Problems of Ethics. Nevertheless, this progressive emotivism soon changed considerably. Ethical phrases serve as expressors and evokers of behaviours according to the revised emotional theory: when you say "This would be a good thing to do" and I accept it but do nothing, the intended effect of your speech on me has not been achieved. This role of ethical phrases is now almost universally recognized. But ethical phrases often convey information: just as' This is a good wrench' conveys information, so does' this is a good man.' And since ethical phrases have both cognitive informative meaning and emotional significance, the whole problem of naturalism vs. non-naturalism arises again with regard to cognitive meaning. Many updated emotivists are naturalists with respect to the mental element and argue that the reason why ethical sentences are not completely reducible to non-ethical sentences is due to the irreducible existence of the emotional component. "This would be a very fine thing to do" is not the same as "This has qualities A, B, and C". In a C.L. show perfectly transparent and coherent. In his essay, "The Emotional Sense of Ethical Words," Stevenson proposed the concept of modified emotivism, followed by his article, "Persuasive Definitions," and his comprehensive and influential book, Ethics and Language. Some psychological changes were implemented in the literature, and they abounded in the sporadic literature of the late '40s and early' 50s. R.M. Hare's the Moral Language contains a large number of distinctions to explain the problem meaning vs. requirements, definition vs. assessment, commending vs. choice, etc. Nevertheless, the most concise and systematic assertion of this kind of view is found in Patrick Nowell-Smith's Ethics (1954), which provides thorough and informative analyses of "right" in all its main uses, ethical and non-ethical, taping Aristotle's literature to the present day, and also offers a logical account of the meaning of ethical concepts in the light of the many distinctions he has created. This book remains to the present day the most definitive statement of changed emotivism, and its reading makes other treatments of the problem almost superfluous. Within emotivism, the fundamental

reality that moral language is used not only to state facts, but also to convey emotions and convince others has been quite well accepted in the literature and is no longer a subject of controversy. If, except for the emotional component, the language of ethics can be reduced to that of psychology or some other scientific discipline if, for instance, "I should do" is reducible to some formulation such as "I would feel compelled to do. If I knew all the empirical facts of the case, and if I were unbiased, in a logical frame of mind, etc." is still a very controversial subject. But at any rate it is quite clear that no particular theory of normative ethics such as Mill's utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative can be extracted from any naturalistic philosophy by stating, for example, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number is what is better, because after all that is the very meaning of the word." Favourable (unfavourable) moral judgments convey favourable (unfavourable) attitudes towards something. "Lincoln was a good man" means roughly "Yea Lincoln." The apparent concept of political disagreement is thus rejected by emotivism. Suppose you think Stalin was a good man, and I suggest he was a bad man. Unless moral judgments are simply manifestations of beliefs, this could not be a disparity. We can accept that both of you like Stalin and I hate him. Likewise, when you express your fondness for a specific ice cream flavour and I express my dissatisfaction for that same flavour, it is not a dispute. Through defending more complex forms of emotivism, Alfred Ayer (1952) and Charles Stevenson (1944). According to Ayer, making a moral judgment is voicing an opinion with the intention of affecting other people's attitudes or actions: "Lincoln is a good man" means roughly "Yea Lincoln, catch the wave." In cases of moral conflict, each party is trying to alter the other's attitudes. Stevenson suggests that ethical conflict requires difference in attitudes (the parties to the dispute have conflicting attitudes toward something) and that each party is trying to change the other party's attitudes to the matter in question. Stevenson says "is great" means essentially "I agree with; do it as well." These revised forms of emotivism also do not provide a sufficient account of ethical disagreement. In cases of moral conflict, not only do people disagree with their attitudes and seek to get others to accept their attitudes, they say that their own attitudes are right or justified and that the attitudes of those who disagree with them are

incorrect. When two people disagree about whether or not Stalin was a good man, each claim to be confused or immoral in the views of the other regarding Stalin.

Check your Progress-3

1.   Explain the concept of ethical emotivism?

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8.5 LET'S US SUM UP

Metaethics is a framework that specifically illuminates the relationship between facts and values. There are good reasons for a mental, rational understanding of moral value, and some of the elements of that interpretation indicate foundations in social scientific theories for denying the supposed fact / reality distinction. Some of the main objections to the supposed distinction between reality and meaning and verbal representations of moral value were expressed in order to demonstrate more specifically their importance to the understanding of social phenomena. However, the manner in which rationality ultimately includes normativity is addressed as it is a critical factor in terms of understanding the normative implications of the problems that the social sciences seeks to explain. This article addresses some of the questions in the paper of Professor Gorski, focusing primarily on metaethical problems. In the second half of this article, however, I focus more generally on social sciences facts and values. While the arguments in that section are very programmatic and require considerable elaboration, it should be made quite clear in the metaethical discussion why I think the general contours I describe in the second half are defensible. In various ways, including some common epistemological features and explanatory affinities, the philosophically important aspects of these issues and the metaethical issues are interrelated. The discourse of Gorski has a very wide reach, covering a wide range of topics and posing many important

philosophical issues. If only the most important of them were to be followed up, even that would be a very significant undertaking. I sympathize with many of his opinions, though I'm just going to pursue a few thematic points. I agree with Gorski that the most common, popular representations of the distinction between truth and reality are incorrect, and that they have been presented in unrealistic conceptions of ethical values and ethical reasoning. Most of my ethics statement is intended to be Gorski's pleasant while I establish some issues in terms that are not directly found in his treatment of the topics.

8.6 KEYWORDS

1. Comprehensive: Including or dealing with all or nearly all elements or aspects of something.

2. Taxonomies: The branch of science concerned with classification, especially of organisms; systematics.

3. Resemblance: The state of resembling or being alike.

4. Eloquent: Fluent or persuasive in speaking or writing.

5. Epistemological: The distinction between justified belief and opinion.

8.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What is explored extensively and systematically in Ralph Barton Perry's General Value Theory?

2. What is moral reality?

3. How cautious we need to be in drawing conclusions from the metaethical considerations?

4. Explain informative key?

5. Explain Natural properties of Natural Science?

8.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- The main information of moral-non-naturalism got from -
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/
- https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12115-013-9711-8
- https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-
  almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/metaethics
- https://www.dictionary.com/browse/non-naturalism
- Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics The Book

8.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

Social scientific interpretation also seeks to explain and express these websites and how they appear in culture, processes, organizations, and claims. At the same time, it is clear that theorizing about social phenomena that require more than appreciating the people studies' opinions, behaviours, and perspectives.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

We must retain theoretical space for natural and irreducible properties the basic properties of physics may be the least controversial examples, but many would argue that the fundamental properties of psychology and sociology are also irreducible but natural as well as non-natural but reducible properties maybe rightness is reducible.

3. (Answer for Check your Progress-3 Q.1)

Ethical emotivism, is the view that people use moral words not to apply to their ostensible objects people and actions but to express certain attitudes towards them and to seek to invoke certain attitudes in others.

UNIT-9: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM

9.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on "Moral Realism and The Challenge of Skepticism", you can gain knowledge of about the following important topics:

- The Subjectivity of Values.
- Mackie's Error Theory.
- Moral Nihilism.
- Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism.
- Moral Realism.

9.1 INTRODUCTION

There seem to be plausible evolutionary Darwinian interpretations of a number of moral-important psychological anomalies, both conative and cognitive in nature. Consider these moral science phenomena. Such anomalies include the fact that humans continue to evolve and become

willing to express a number of conative states, including desires, thoughts, and emotions that are morally important. For example, there is a propensity to establish ethical habits that encourage cooperation, a tendency for parents to want to look after their children, and a tendency for those who have earned benefits from others to want to reciprocate. Furthermore, the anomalies that I have in mind include a range of cognitive abilities, including those required to form moral beliefs, and a propensity to form those beliefs. And they include the ability to what Allan Gibbard terms 'normative leadership' (1990, 61–80), which likely relies on the ability to feel shame and guilt, the ability to understand social norms, and the ability to understand complex logical reasoning. In what follows, I'll tell you more about these phenomena. For simplify my job, I presume that there is no doubt of the existence of these phenomena. Based on the work of evolutionary biologists, a number of psychologists have suggested that Darwinian forces have had a strong influence on the phenomena of moral psychology, with the consequence that the essence of the phenomenon, including the substance of our moral beliefs, can be understood, at least in part, on the basis of evolutionary theory. For the sake of logic, I believe it's wrong. The Darwinian Theory was consistent with a number of specific suggestions on how the phenomenon are affected by evolutionary pressures. And it is consistent with various views on how profoundly the phenomena are affected by the Darwinian forces. The problem I'm interested in is that, if the Darwinian hypothesis is correct, there is a solid argument against moral realism on this basis, though not a definitive argument. I concentrate on a claim that I think is particularly useful in clarifying the essence of the moral realism problem raised by Darwinism. Sharon Street (2006) is responsible for the claim. Elements are included in Richard Joyce's work (2006), Philip Kitcher's work (2006), and others. Street argues that the Darwinian hypothesis' validity would pose a challenge for moral realism as well as for meaning realism in general. For if evolutionary forces 'played a significant role in shaping the nature of human social behaviour,' realists should explain the relationship between these forces and the moral evidence. The key question is whether or not evolutionary forces have influenced our psychology to be such that our moral convictions fail to follow the truth. If in the negative, she argues, realists

answer this question, they face the cynical outcome that it is impossible that our moral beliefs will be valid. But if they respond in the affirmative, they are committed to the basic Darwinian Theory that 'natural selection favoured ancestors who could understand certain facts.' The evolutionary relation theory does not postulate the nature of moral truths, a more probable explanation of the evolution of the phenomenon of moral psychology. Therefore, Street claims, the Darwinian Theory requires realists to choose between an unpleasable consequence of skepticism and a theoretically unpleasable interpretation of moral psychology phenomena. It is important to reject moral realism to escape the horns of the dilemma. Start by describing the basic idea behind the Darwinian hypothesis. Then explain in more detail the Darwinian paradox and argue that it can be solved by realists. Realists are not required to choose between the outcome of skepticism and the hypothesis of implausibility. The remaining difficulty for realists who embrace the Darwinian Theory is to endorse the plausibility of a human view as evolving and progressing in such a way that their moral beliefs are sensitive to moral evidence. I explain how this image can be helped towards the end of the article. The consequence is that a good case against moral realism cannot be based on the Darwinian dilemma, but instead must be based on more traditional theoretical objections.

9.2 THE SUBJECTIVITY OF VALUES

The term that is often used as an alternative to' social skepticism' is' subjectivism' for the perspective that I am describing. But the sense of this too is more than one. Moral subjectivism, too, could be a first order, moral, view, that is, everyone should really do whatever they think they should. This is obviously a (systematic) view of the first order; it soon ceases to be logical on analysis, but that is beyond the point, as it is quite independent of the present second order thesis. Most confusingly, different views of the second order are vying for the term 'subjectivism.' Many of these are teachings on the definition of moral terms or assertions of ethics. What is often called moral subjectivism is the theory that' this action is wrong,' for example, means 'I approve of this action,' or more broadly that moral judgments are similar to statements of the

speaker's own thoughts or attitudes. But the view that I am presenting now is to be distinguished from any such theory in two critical respects. Second, what I called moral skepticism is a negative doctrine, not a positive doctrine: it says what's not there, not what's there. This says there are no individuals or relationships of any kind, fundamental principles or criteria that many people believe to exist. The moral skeptic can't leave it at that, of course. Unless his argument is to be credible at alJ, he will provide some account of how other people have fallen into what he sees as an error, and this account will have to include some constructive ideas about how values are not true, what has been mistaken for objective values, or what has led to false beliefs about them? But this is going to be a development of his theory, not his heart: the negation is its core. Second, what I have called moral skepticism is an ontological theory, not a philosophical or linguistic thesis. It is not a view of the interpretations of moral words, as the other ideology sometimes called religious subjectivism. No chance, again. If it's possible at all. It will have to give some account of its meaning. But this will also be the theory's growth, not its heart. Sure, those who have adopted the ethical subjectivism that is the theory that moral judgments are comparable to accounts of the speaker's own thoughts or behaviours have traditionally embraced what I call moral skepticism. It is because they concluded that no rational concepts existed that they looked elsewhere for an interpretation of what ethical claims could mean and relied on subjective studies. Yes, if all our moral claims are personal accounts of this kind, it would conclude that there are no objective moral principles, at least as far as we know. We'd tell something about them if we heard about them. These subjectivism in this context includes moral skepticism. But it doesn't carry the converse entailment. The rejection of objective principles does not include one in any particular view of what moral statements mean, and certainly not in the view that they are comparable to subjective articles. No question if moral values are not objective, they are subjective in a very broad sense, which is why I would consider 'social subjectivisms' as an alternative name to' moral skepticism.' But in this broad sense, subjectivism must be differentiated from the particular meaning theory described above. None of the names is entirely satisfactory: we just need to protect against the misinterpretations that

each that imply. Some would condemn the argument of Mackie as morally immoral, others would support it as a platitude, and yet others would argue that the issue of whether there are rational principles is unconstitutional in itself. Mackie's work refers not only to moral values, but to all supposedly objective values. His theory is also a second order rather than a first order argument: it argues that our principles have nothing to do with them, but that anyone who supports this claim is not committed to following any particular attitude towards private behaviour or public policy. One may feel that values are ultimately subjective while still valuing objects, activities, or state of affairs or maybe not valuing much of anything at all because valuing something does not mean that valuing it has an ontological foundation. The work of Mackie should not be mistaken as obliterating differences between various behavioural styles. For example, he may agree that some people are altruistic and others are selfish, that some people try to cheer others up while others try to make them feel bad about themselves; he just thinks that the differences between these types of behaviour do not represent an ontological difference that could explain our different moral assessments of them. First, Mackie tries to distance himself from others who are described as subjectivist as well. His stance does not imply that everyone should do what they believe to be right, nor does it imply that moral judgments simply convey approval or disapproval, because it does not say anything about the nature of ethical judgments or words. In contrasting it to the argument of Immanuel Kant that some imperatives are theoretical and others are categorical, Mackie attempts to explain his point of view. Roughly, a hypothetical imperative directs one to do something, since doing so is a means of obtaining something else one wants, while a categorical imperative directs one to do something regardless of one's desires. Mackie disputes that there is any justification for categorical imperatives. Many would accept that beliefs were merely subjective for Mackie. He does not think his stance should be uncritically acknowledged, however. Most European thinkers have kept principles objective throughout history. However, common sense seems to agree with them, since faith in universal ideals is related to the ways we generally think about and speak about moral issues. This is illustrated by the difficulties faced by moral language theories of both non-cognitivist

and naturalism. A moral judgment reflects the person's emotions, beliefs or opinions, rather than explaining a logical reality about the environment, according to non-cognitivist theories. Moral judgments on naturalist theories do describe the world, but they do not define it as having irreducibly moral characteristics, i.e. characteristics that in sciences such as physics, chemistry or biology could not be defined as well in non-moral terms. For these purposes, the perceived authority of ethical norms does not compensate for both forms of theory. If these ideas are valid, it would be surprising unless our moral beliefs had so much control on our behaviour. Mackie finds an example of someone facing a moral dilemma as to whether they should take up a job involving the development of biological weapons. Their primary concern is, of course, that their choice is right or wrong, not whether, for instance, either they or others would support or endorse their choice, or whether it has a natural characteristic that is intrinsically no more moral than mass or electrical charge. Others feel that life would have no meaning if ideals were not objective because of this desire to objectivize values. While this is not accurate from Mackie's point of view the second-order view that values are not integrated into the universe system has no consequences for our first-order valuations it shows how much some people have been affected by the objectivity presupposition. Mackie argues that the argument that moral values are objective is dedicated to common sense. This dedication is so omnipresent that it is rooted in our moral concepts and our ethical vocabulary's meanings. If all thinkers had to go on studying common sense thought and language, they would conclude that objectivism is valid. Yet objectivism requires independent reasoning, so it needs to be challenged along with the moral concepts and terminology that are related to it. Mackie first goes over a point that brings into question objectivism, namely the concept of moral codes relativity. Moral behavioural standards have varied from time to time and from place to place, both within and between different societies. Many claims that this indicates that moral codes do not represent objective principles. Mackie admits that this is seen, but he feels implicitly it reveals it. Not only is it the fact that different societies disagree with moral norms which cast suspicion on objective moral principles, but people seem to accept the moral norms they do because they follow them rather than

because they approve them. One exception to this claim is that while there are variations in moral codes, the fundamental moral principles that give rise to them still have an underlying consensus. The theory is that there are certain universal moral values that require different types of behaviour in different cultural contexts due to the differences between the cultural contexts to which they refer. I think this idea is demonstrated by the following concern because it has a similar structure, although it does not include social contexts. There is one interpretation of the Golden Rule that says, 'Do to others as you do.' The rule may be universal notwithstanding a few exceptions, one should treat others as they wish to be treated but different people have different needs and desires, so the actions required by this interpretation of the golden rule may vary from person to person. In response to this criticism, Mackie argues that because of their unconscious responses to them, people frequently judge things to be right or wrong, not because they are a specific expression of a general moral concept. In such cases, the various decisions of individuals cannot be regarded as results of general moral laws when applied in specific circumstances, as those rules would then have little effect on the judgments of individuals. Mackie also offers another reason to question the nature of objective moral principles, which is the queerness statement. When formulated by objectivists, moral values would be a special kind of thing, and in order to know them we would need a unique source of knowledge because we could not be sure of them by empirical means. Richard Price raised this point with the following objection. There are many kinds of things we couldn't learn about if other aspects of empiricism were real, including facts, ignorance, personality, and anything else that couldn't be observed. That being so, it appears this facts, persistence, personality, and objective moral principles are all important for such empiricists in the same ship. Mackie believes that we should not believe in them if empiricism lacks knowledge of such things. Nonetheless, he thinks empiricism can account for our understanding of them, but it does not seem to be able to account for our awareness of objective moral principles. Mackie does not simply reject the existence of objective moral principles because we have not been able to verify that they exist. In fact, he thinks the question of whether they exist is important even though in the negative it has to be answered.

He gives their presence three key reasons to doubt. Second, these ideals, regardless of one's interests, would be intrinsically motivating. These would be followed by anyone who cared about such ideals. Second, how a thing's moral meaning would be correlated with its non-moral property is unclear. He assumes this can't be a result of logic or semantics. Suppose Chris gives charity $2,000. If the argument 'Chris did something good' actually applies an objective moral quality to the action of Chris, there should be some link between the donation of money by Chris and the fact that it was good to do so. But this relation cannot be shown to exist by logical or linguistic reasoning, and the connection could not be empirically developed since moral goodness is supposed to be non-natural. It seems more rational to suspend one's conviction in this relation that it is based on a reaction to one's interpretation of some of its natural properties than our ethical assessment of Chris's and similar behaviour. Mackie ends his article with a section where he speculates on possible sources for our faith in objective moral principles in an attempt to explain how many have come to accept what he considers to be a false theory. The human tendency to believe that certain properties of external objects will lead to our emotional reactions to them could be one explanation. I think the basic concept is that seeing something like a dead animal in many people is bound to cause feelings of revulsion, leading them to attribute to it an 'intrinsic iciness.' Similarly, if someone found out that Chris donated $2,000 to charity, they may feel respect for his behaviour and attribute it to 'intrinsic goodness.' We may also project our preferences on external objects, assuming they must be attractive simply because we want them. The fact that we use ethical tests to control the behaviour of each other in society is another possible source. We may praise someone for doing what's right or punish them for doing what's wrong, partially in the way we morally love and hate these acts.

Check your Progress-1

1.For what purpose we use ethical tests?

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9.3 MACKIE'S ERROR THEORY

The theory of moral error is a philosophy characterized by its adherence to two propositions: all moral claims are false, and all moral claims are false. The most well-known philosopher of moral error is J. Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), L. Mackie, who defended the metaethical view in Ethics. Mackie was perceived as giving two reasons for the principle of moral error. The first argument people attribute to Mackie, also called the argument from queerness, suggests that moral arguments imply internality of motivation is the theory that 'it is natural and a priori that any agent who believes that one of his possible acts is morally obligatory will have some defeasible motivation to carry out that action'. The Argument of Relativity (often more aptly referred to as 'the Argument of Disagreement' starts with an empirical observation: that moral views vary enormously, and that moral differences are often marked by an extraordinary degree of intractability. Mackie suggests that these phenomena are best explained by the fact that moral judgments 'represent adherence and involvement in different ways of life' (1977:36). That, at least, is a better explanation than the assumption that some societies have less epistemic access than others to a domain of objective moral truth. The example used by Mackie is of the divergent moral views of two societies on monogamy. Is it really possible, he wonders, that one society enjoys access to the normative facts of marital relationships, while the other refuses access to them? Isn't it much more likely that monogamy evolved in one society, but not in the other for whatever social or anthropological reasons, resulting in the respective moral views? Opposition to the Relativity Argument can take two types, broadly speaking. First, one might dispute the empirical argument, arguing that moral disagreement is not as common as is often believed to be, or at least arguing that much of the conspicuous disagreement hides deeper moral consensus a degree of more fundamental moral principles. In response to this statement, Mackie makes a few brief remarks (1977: 37). Second, one could accept the phenomenon of face value moral disagreement but claim that the best explanation of this supports the

theory of error. All techniques are regularly used side by side. See Brink 1984; Shafer-Landau 1994; Loeb 1998; Tersman 2006; Doris & Plakias 2008 for debate.Queerness's statement has two strands: metaphysical one and epistemological one. The first notes that our concept of moral property is fundamentally one of a very peculiar type of property, so that combating its instantiation allows us to present 'qualities or relationships of a very strange kind in the world, completely different from anything else in the universe' (Mackie 1977:38). The second notes that we would need 'some peculiar faculty of moral awareness or instinct, completely different from our normal ways of knowing everything else' in order to track these odd properties. Such arguments are not independent, as we are required to present strange epistemological equipment only if it has already been identified that the properties in question are odd. So, it's really the Queerness Argument's metaphysical strand that bears the load. The Queerness Claim can be used to refer to the specific version of Mackie or can be interpreted in a generic sense. In the general sense, whenever one argues that morality is fundamental to some theory, and that is insane, ontologically profligate, or just too far-fetched to be taken seriously, etc., then one has put forward some sort of Queerness claim. Moral error theory claims need not take this form; one might actually discover, for example, that X is empirically false. This is universal since it can represent any of the open-ended alternatives. But even interpreting Queerness's claim in a non-generic sense is not a simple matter, as it is not entirely clear what Mackie intends to put in place of Mackie suggests that the presence of 'objective prescriptions would entail the existence of ethical property, and it is obvious that he finds these prescriptions metaphysically queer. He says that he disputes that any 'categorically imperative component is scientifically true' in denying the existence of such prescriptions (1977: 29). A categorical imperative is an imperative that is applied to a subject regardless of the ends of that person. It must be contrasted with a theoretical imperative that relies on the ends of an individual. So 'Go to bed now' is usually understood to be tacitly contingent, based on something like'... if you want a decent night's sleep.' If it turns out that the person lacks this desire or any other desire that promises to be fulfilled by following the advice, then the imperative should be removed. In comparison, the addressee cannot petition the

categorical imperative 'Don't kill kids' to justify that he really enjoys killing kids, that he lacks certain needs that will be fulfilled if the imperative is obeyed; it's not a piece of advice at all. Notice that it does not seem to be categorical imperatives per se that annoy Mackie, but categorical imperatives that claim to be 'objectively true.' However, it remains unclear what he means by this limitation. Mackie offers two clear examples of what he has in mind of what the world should be like in order to instantiate these seemingly odd ethical properties. Next, he discusses Plato's account of the Form of the Good, which is such that the mere awareness of the fact that something is involved in the Form somehow necessarily implies the desire to try that object. To Plato, the Good has developed into it a sort of magical magnetism. Furthermore, Mackie cites Samuel Clarke, who in the early 18th century argued for 'necessary fitness relationships between situations and acts, so that a situation might somehow be transformed into a demand for such and such an action' (1977: 40). It is responsible for at least some of the confusion surrounding the putative origin of queerness that these two examples are slightly but significantly different. The example of Plato suggests that strangeness resides in properties whose awareness causally compels motivation; the example of Clarke suggests that strangeness resides in properties that demand action and therefore motivation. The latter is arguably the more charitable interpretation, and it also seems to fit better with Mackie's remarks about the role of practical reasons in Queerness 'Argument. He argues that 'to claim that objective prescriptions are necessarily action-guiding which is one way that Mackie often explains the queerness whose presence he denies is to suggest that the reasons they give for doing something or not are independent of the interests or intentions of that person'. Then it would make sense for Mackie to simply deny the existence of such 'desire-transcendent' motives such as Williams 1981; but his stance is characteristically more complex than that. He encourages us to use talk of reasons for people who have no desires to be fulfilled by conducting the action in question often legitimately. For example, if some other people suffer and there is some course of action that I can take to mitigate the suffering, then 'it would be normal,' says Mackie, to assert that these sufferings 'constitute some cause... No matter how much I

want to support these other people now '(1977: 78-9). While Mackie does not attempt to discredit appeals for such desire-transcendent purposes, what he focuses on is that speaking about such motives is only made valid by an institution's presence: what makes the transition from 'There is a stranger agonizing before me' to 'I have a reason to help' is a cluster of structural facts, not mere facts. Examples of institutions provided by Mackie include the rules of chess, such as positive social practices, and the thoughts and behaviours associated with the concept of persisting identity of a person over time. These organizations have behavioural laws that direct adherents 'actions and speech, and they condemn transgressions. Importantly, these requirements 'are defined by human thought, actions, emotions, and attitudes' (1977: 81), and thus any such requirements are, in a fundamental sense, mind-dependent. This, perhaps, provides insight into why Mackie objects not to categorical imperatives per se, but to categorical objective imperatives: it is categorical imperatives which claim to transcend all bodies, which purport to rely on 'requirements that are actually there, in the nature of things' (1977: 59), which are defined as erroneous for their validity. As with categorical imperatives, so with reasons: it may not be false to claim that 'anyone has a cause to relieve others 'pain,' but its validity is assured only by referencing a hierarchical way of speaking an institution one may or may not adhere to. Mackie argues that one is not 'logically dedicated' to giving loyalty to an institution. Only when such a purpose appears to transcend all institutions imbued with expectations of objectivity does it surpass the mark. The principle of error emerges in the light of these findings because Mackie thinks moral debate is pervaded with expectations to strong, institution-transcendent prescriptively through and through. To some degree he considers this to be due to a natural human projectivity tendency, but he also argues that the problematic notions of 'what is intrinsically fitting or necessary by the nature of things' are partly the product of institutional thought, and so are the conceptions of importance, duty, and reasons that depend on these notions. This does not suggest, however, that these ideas and principles are in essence institutional; the idea of an organization-transcendent necessity is not shown to be any less false, Mackie claims, when we note

that the idea developed out of a widely accepted institution and remains sponsored by it.

Check your Progress-2

1.What Mackie considers to be due to a natural human projectivity tendency?

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9.4 MORAL NIHILISM

Moral nihilism is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally correct or wrong. Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism, allowing for wrong actions in relation to a particular culture or person. It is also distinct from expressivity, according to which when we make moral statements, 'We do not make an effort to explain how the world is... we vent our feelings, order others to act in some respects, or announce a plan of action' Moral nihilists believe that all arguments such as' murder is morally wrong' are not valid. But there are two ways in which various nihilistic views differ. Some might argue these statements are neither true nor false; others might say they're all fake. In the context of their ideas, nihilists vary. Usually, error theorists argue that it is only clearly moral statements that are false; pragmatic nihilists say that there are no grounds for any kind of action; some nihilists expand this argument to include grounds for belief. Ethical nihilism rejects ethical values and moral principles. Human beings are not considered to be responsible for what they do, so each person is the difference between good and evil. Because the nihilist rejects free will, the moral nihilist cannot be rewarded or criticized for his good or evil behaviour. In short, to determine the truth of right or wrong, logic cannot be trusted. Ethical nihilism chooses to ignore the inescapable moral principles. Yet in every culture, even the most basic ideas of good and evil are present. C.S. Lewis observed, 'Cultures may differ as to whether a person may have one or four wives, but they all know about marriage; they may disagree

as to which acts are most honourable, but none of them classifies cowardice as a virtue.' Ethical nihilism tends to disregard fundamental principles and values imposed upon every heart and mind. Moral nihilism, also known as ethical nihilism, is the belief that nothing is morally or immorally intrinsic in morality. 'Nihilism' means 'zero,' so there is no right or wrong with such nihilists other than what people assign. This would also mean that there are no universal 'goods.' That is, there's nothing anyone should do whether it's ethical, saving a life, helping someone else, not cheating, etc. Moral nihilists also declare 'understandings' when they are instrumental. In other words, if a person wants to live, he will continue to breathe. If a person wants to be treated honestly, an individual must treat people honestly, etc. We are arbitrary, self-determined, and utilitarian in their ethics. Moral nihilism would be consistent with an atheistic, materialistic worldview with no transcendent entity reminding us as a revelation of its nature which is the Christian position about what is right and wrong. Atheism would necessarily require no intrinsic value from moral claims. Morals should be agreed upon, discussed, and formulated where a person or group assigns them; thus, moral nihilism. Moral nihilists do not condemn people being able to 'say' having moral absolutes, but they would deny that there are moral absolutes. Rather, they have values that are concise and represent the cause and effect. Therefore, where someone is burnt by putting his hand in a fire, he must stop doing that so that he is not burned. Rape would be 'morally wrong' because it damages the individual and society as a whole, and we accept that it should be prevented. The philosophical problem with moral nihilism is that it is unable to explain its arbitrary moral judgments, and when it makes moral decisions it does so on the basis of what it is supposed to do; thereby refuting itself. Let me describe it to you. Moral nihilists would say killing should be avoided as the end result is negative as it injures an individual and/or society. We attach a value to the outcome by saying this, in this case, a negative value based on the action's effect: murder. But why should this negative meaning be assigned? When they say it's because it hurts people, they say there's an intrinsic value that doesn't hurt people-and that's incompatible with their stance. When they claim they actually choose to assign a negative value to murder, and yet they also dispute the action's intrinsic value, then they

cannot explain their decision as anything but arbitrary without unwittingly appealing to intrinsic value. When they accept that executing a killer is nothing more than an arbitrary decision, they admit that murdering one is just as defensible because it has no intrinsic value. If the moral nihilist wants to say that the so-called ethical ideals are derived from what enhances peace in society, then they invoke the objective and add meaning to it because there is a 'sought' there; otherwise, in the first place, they would not give it such a value. We accept an inherent value without acknowledging that they do so. We should not attach any importance to any behaviour to be compatible with unethical nihilists, even if it increases or decreases peace within society or personal life.

Check your Progress-3

1.What is Moral nihilism?

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9.5 TWO FORMS OF ETHICAL SKEPTICISM

The two main forms of morality scepticism are cynicism regarding moral truths and scepticism as to why moral principles should be complied with. Such teachings question morality's mental sense and logical authority. Scepticism about moral truths denies that there are or we can know there are true moral propositions that suggest a moral value to something. This form of scepticism tends to suggest that no credence would be provided by rational and informed agents to moral claims. A variety of claims have accompanied this, including concerns of religious conflict. The difficulty in describing the normativity and action-guiding essence of moral claims is a strong reason for it. Non cognitivists attempt to explain the normativity of moral judgments by suggesting that their purpose consists of voicing the speaker's statements and influencing actions rather than making proposals. No cognitivists may accept that

there are no true moral proposals because they argue that moral arguments do not bring forward proposals. Nevertheless, we do not find moral statements to be faulty. According to No cognitivists, one who makes a claim, such as 'Truthfulness is morally necessary,' communicates a moral attitude or recognition of a moral standard (Ayer, [1936] 1946; Gibbered, 1990; cf. Hume, [1739–1740] 1978). Cognitivists argue that it is not possible to understand our moral thinking except on the basis that moral statements represent proposals. Cognitivists should assume that ethical principles are sometimes exemplified in order to avoid skepticism. Because if there is no moral property, or if there is no example, it follows that there are no moral conditions, no moral goods or bad things, no moral virtues or vices. It may conclude, for instance, that there are no honest people, although there may be people who are dishonest. A skeptic might argue that there are moral properties, but that there is no such thing as an example. Nonetheless, this situation appears unpleasable, because if the property of wrongness exists, it would be fantastic if nothing ever was wrong. Alternatively, a skeptic may argue that moral properties do not exist. Nevertheless, the proposition that lying is false, for instance, would attribute property wrongness to acts of deceit, according to widely accepted views on propositions. The land would be the proposal's constituent. Therefore, if there are no moral properties, these propositions views that lead to the conclusion that sentences such as 'Lying is wrong' do not convey any proposition. L. Mackie argued that moral principles do not exist. We conceive of moral properties as intrinsic; if an action is wrong, it is wrong 'as it is in itself.' But we also conceive of moral properties as directing behaviour intrinsically; we can be inspired to behave in an appropriate manner simply by knowing that an action is wrong, irrespective of any previous motivation. However, Mackie thought, it is not understandable that the mere knowledge that the action has the property can motivate an individual is intrinsic to an action having an intrinsic property. The concept of moral property is not intelligible; moral properties would be 'queer' metaphysically. Gilbert Harman argued for an epistemic variant of moral reality skepticism. He argued that there seems to be no good reason to suggest any moral statement, since moral assumptions are never part of any observation's

best explanation. There is always a better explanation for Non morality. Therefore, it is unwarranted to assume that there are true moral propositions. Within secular societies, skepticism about moral truth seems to have a life of its own, irrespective of critical claims. Many people believe that the laws of God are founded on moral truths. Nevertheless, a secular culture may tend to think that all factual facts are empirical or 'natural,' and scientific facts do not seem to be normative in the way in which moral facts are normative. So, it's hard to see how a natural truth might be a moral reality. The second sceptical theory is the argument that moral principles need not be complied with. According to this analysis, when determining how to live their lives, rational agents would not pay attention to moral considerations as such. We may want to live morally, to be sure, and this intention will give us a reason to live morally. And we may be in a situation where morally living is in our interest. Nevertheless, these possibilities do not indicate that there is necessarily a reason to abide by moral considerations (Nielsen, 1974); they do not, for instance, differentiate moral considerations from etiquette considerations. Compliance skepticism is usually motivated by the idea that ethics can involve acts that do not favour the agent. If there are incentives to do something just in case it would be to one's benefit, this notion means that ethics may not be complied with. The two central principles of skepticism are closely related to some ways of thinking. Second, it may seem that we cannot be sure to have reasons to comply with moral considerations unless we have knowledge of moral truths. Second, some form of 'internalist' theory holds that, for reasons, moral facts are 'constituted.' There are no true facts in this view unless there are valid factors. Antiseptically ideas of the internalist try to defeat all ideologies at once. Effectively, Immanuel Kant argued that if a moral imperative corresponds to a fact, it does so because any fully rational person will comply with it. 'Externalist' theories attempt to address moral reality skepticism independently of enforcement skepticism. For example, those who believe that moral principles are rooted in the commands of God may conclude that God actually gives us reasons to obey them. Philosophers who agree usually try to defuse one of the critical doctrines. Rational compliance skeptics may argue that people with ordinary psychologies necessarily have morality enforcement

reasons. Skeptics about moral truth may argue that the practice of judging things morally is nevertheless justified.

9.6 MORAL REALISM

Moral Realism or Moral Objectivism is the meta-ethical view that such things as moral facts or moral values exist and are factual and free of our interpretation of them or of our opinions, emotions or other attitudes towards them. Moral judgments therefore define moral facts that are as certain as scientific facts in their own way. It is a cognitivist view in that it holds that moral sentences represent objective propositions and are thus 'truth-apt,' i.e. they can be true or false, and define the state of the real world. This compares with different types of Moral Anti-Realism, including non-cognitive and descriptive moral decision theories, mistake theories, fictional theories, and constructivist or relativistic theories. Moral realism has the advantage of allowing the normal rules of reasoning to be applied directly to moral statements so that we can assume, for example, that a moral conviction is false or unjustified or inconsistent just as we would be about a factual belief. It also helps moral disputes to be resolved, because if two moral beliefs contradict each other, Moral Realism as opposed to some other meta-ethical systems says they can't both be correct and therefore there should be a way to resolve the problem. Critics have argued that while Moral Realism can clarify how moral disputes can be resolved, it cannot explain how these conflicts occurred in the first place. Others have argued that Moral Realism posits a kind of 'moral fact' that is non-material and non-observable as it is observable as empirical material facts and therefore not open to the scientific method.

There are two major variants: First one is Ethical Naturalism -This theory maintains that there are objective moral characteristics of which we have empirical knowledge, but that these characteristics can be reduced to completely non-ethical. This implies cognitivist which is the belief that ethical sentences represent propositions and can therefore be true or false and that without the use of ethical words, the definitions of these ethical sentences can be represented as natural properties. And Second one is Ethical non-naturalism- This theory whose key apologist is G. E. Moore claims that ethical statements convey in that context it is also cognitive

ideas that cannot be reduced to non-ethical statements e.g.' goodness' is indefinable because it cannot be described in any other terms. Moore believed that any effort to prove an ethical argument through referring to a concept in terms of one or more natural properties e.g.' healthy' cannot be interpreted as' nice,'' more developed,'' wanted,' etc. is committed to a naturalistic fallacy. And Ethical intuitionism is a type of ethical non-naturalism which argues that we are often intuitively aware of moral properties or moral truth

9.7   LET'S US SUM UP

On the Darwinian Theory, Darwinian influences strongly affected the phenomenon of moral psychology, including the nature of our moral beliefs. Street suggests that moral realists are facing a challenge in this regard. On the monitoring bell, we are committed to rejecting the most probable account of Darwinian forces 'work on our moral psychology, the evolutionary relation account. On the non-tracking tail, we have to admit that if our moral beliefs appear to be valid, it's 'sheer chance.' In answer, I argued that realists can understand the dilemma's tracking horn and use the adaptive reference account to illustrate why it holds the quasi-tracking thesis. I proposed the philosophy of morality based on society, a type of naturalistic moral realism. I argued that if their substance were influenced by Darwinian forces as implied by the evolutionary relation account, it could explain how our moral beliefs appeared to quasi-track moral truth. On the theory focused on culture, all things being equal, a tendency to form moral beliefs with content shaped in the manner implied by the account of evolutionary connections would be a tendency to form moral beliefs that are close to the truth. The hypothesis based on society demonstrates, however, that there is no threat to moral realism from the Darwinian test. The case against moral realism must be founded not on the Darwinian dilemma but on more traditional theoretical objections to the philosophy focused on culture and other aspects of realism.

9.8 KEYWORDS

1. Dilemma: A situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two or more alternatives, especially ones that are equally undesirable.

2. Hypothesis: A supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation.

3. Empirical: Based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic.

4. Conviction: A formal declaration by the verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge in a court of law that someone is guilty of a criminal offence.

5. Nihilists: A person who believes that life is meaningless and rejects all religious and moral principles.

9.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Which term that is often used as an alternative to' social skepticism?
2. What is an alternative name to' moral skepticism?
3. What does one interpretation of the Golden Rule say?
4. For what purpose The Queerness Claim can be used?
5. What will Moral nihilists want to say?

9.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- http://www.scholardarity.com/?page_id=2426
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism
- https://carm.org/what-is-moral-nihilism

- Moral Realism: A Defence (The Book)

9.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

We use ethical tests to control the behaviour of each other in society is another possible source. We may praise someone for doing what's right or punish them for doing what's wrong, partially in the way we morally love and hate these acts.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

The principle of error emerges in the light of these findings because Mackie thinks moral debate is pervaded with expectations to strong, institution-transcendent prescriptively through and through. To some degree he considers this to be due to a natural human projectivity tendency, but he also argues that the problematic notions of 'what is intrinsically fitting or necessary by the nature of things' are partly the product of institutional thought, and so are the conceptions of importance, duty, and reasons that depend on these notions.

3. (Answer for Check your Progress-3 Q.1)

Moral nihilism is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally correct or wrong. Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism, allowing for wrong actions in relation to a particular culture or person.

UNIT-10: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES

STRUCTURE

10.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on "Morality, Self-Interest and Future Selves", you can gain knowledge of about the following important topics:

- The concept of Moral.
- Socratic Dilemma.
- Morality and Advantage.
- Later Selves and Moral Principles.

10.1 INTRODUCTION

"Morality," as an abstract word that incorporates several different moral concepts, is obviously a rather fluffy collection, what Wittgenstein would have called a theory of "family resemblance." But if there's a thread that connects the varied ways that "ethical" is and has been used by human thinkers, at least in the modern age, I think it's the basic idea that there's something about other people or living beings, or whatever that gives us individual reasons to handle them in some respects, far apart from anything that might be in it for us. From the same basic foundation

comes a dizzying array of philosophical superstructures: the clear and revolutionary proposition that other people are real. I tried to drive that home with an example that involves a particular, substantive moral judgment: "Torturing others just for fun is wrong" and I doubt that any theoretical framework you could construct to explain that judgment could ever be on a more epistemic basis than judgment itself but my point was not intended to turn our particular revulsion or" outrage "against torture. It was only a particularly dramatic way to highlight the lack of a function I consider to be distinctly moral in Narveson's and similar views on the modern colloquial use of that word. To adapt the example of Miles, suppose I tell you if there is any moral reason why I should not purchase the goods of a particular company. If you tell me your stuff is overpriced, or of shoddy quality, or you're going to expose me to derisive looks from hipsters because they stopped wearing that in Brooklyn in, like, 2008. Then I'll give you a bemused but not outraged look and ask if you know what "morality" implies. These may all be some kind of reasons to avoid the goods of the business, but they are normal prudential reasons, and I asked you for a moral one. If, however, you tell me that I should avoid this business because their products are made by developing-world employees whose salaries seem to you to be unreasonably low, I can disagree with your factual argument, but at least I understand that you make the right kind of statement. Naturally, Narveson insists that we should have a law against torturing people just for fun the fault lies in the factors he finds important, not any outrageously incorrect result. In other words, the underlying "intuition" is not the ethical inference that torturing people is right. It is the argument that one of the aspects important to formulating moral principles regarding torture is how torture feels to the individual being tortured. In particular, self-interest refers to a concentration on one's self's needs or desires interests. The role of self-interest in motivating human action is explored by a variety of theoretical, psychological and economic theories. Emotional theories associated with self-interest include emotional self-interest, the belief that people are always driven by self-interest and narcissism, which is a pathological self-absorption due to self-disruption. Self-interest in business focuses on acts or events that favour an individual or organization. A degree of self-interest is

required for a company or person to survive and grow. If there is too much emphasis on self-interest, the group's gains will diminish widely.

Psychological research on the future self-explores the possible mechanisms and effects of thinking about oneself. People think about their future selves differently to how they think about other people. The degree to which people feel emotionally related e.g., similarity, closeness to their future self affects how well they handle their future self. As people feel connected to their future self, they are more likely to save for retirement, make healthy choices, and resist moral behaviours. Psychological research on the future self also refers to the philosopher Derek Parfit his philosophical foundations. Parfit argued that people would vary in the degree to which they feel similar and related in the future. Under the conceptualization of Parfit, people act rationally by basing their concern for their future on the degree of connection between present and future self. According to Parfit, behaving in ways that disregard the future self is appropriate for people who perceive very little contact to their future self. The subsequent empirical research did not argue equally for the moral view of Parfit, but instead sought to test the explanatory validity of the concept of Parfit.

10.2 THE CONCEPT OF MORAL

The purpose of this study is to gain a theoretical understanding of the morality principle. A series of comparisons dominate contemporary literature;' individual' morality and' personal' morality, a morality of' sensitivity' and' insight' and one of' laws' and' principles,'' formal' as opposed to' material' characteristics. The idea emerges when analysing it that this dualism is structural and relies on some of the concept's more fundamental features. A common point of agreement is that an intimate relationship exists between them. Morality and the human action and operation environment. There are two big intellectual demands on us in this country. In particular situations, there is the need to determine how to behave, and there is the need to see one's actions as being invested with greater significance, as elements in a meaningful pattern. Morality is the response to both demands. It therefore consists of a dimension of action analysis, a domain of pragmatic decision, and a way of understanding its meaning, a mode of vision. Speaking of' moral

evaluation' on the one hand and of' moral understanding' on the other, these elements can be differentiated. Moral comprehension can be defined by the type of interpretation it provides and the types of explanations it can identify. His propensity to slice through traditional categories is a striking feature of the distinction between moral and non-moral modes of interpretation. In the case of religious belief and what can be considered' humanism' simply or provisionally, this can be shown. But it is also possible to find common modes of thinking which belong completely and firmly to each side. If the lesser comparisons are studied in the light of the distinction between comprehension and evaluation, it is found that the claims made for the fundamental sense of that between the 'person 'and the 'personal 'cannot be maintained. There are some residual issues here that include the' form' versus' material 'issue. In addition, this debate dissolves once it is understood that while moral interpretation is unsatisfactory, moral judgment is necessarily linked to some material considerations. The focus on the difference between' sensitivity' and' law' can be interpreted as an oblique way to draw attention to that between comprehension and analysis and, more precisely, to warn against the danger of connecting morality with practical reason. The truth dimension in this is safeguarded by assigning to understanding' sensitivity' talk and the evaluation 'rules.' A general conclusion arising from the analysis of these antitheses concerns the need for moral philosophy to work with a sufficient understanding of what it is to be human, man's philosophical theory. The ultimate challenge is to combine the elements of the basic distinction and thus to demonstrate the consistency of the concept of morality. It is first done by exploring several education-related issues. Throughout philosophical literature, there is a significant trend that can be interpreted as acknowledging the theoretical relation between education and moral understanding. In contrast, the definition of education creates a link between the provisionally defined category of' humanism' and a revised classification from which non-moral elements are removed. What remains is ethical interpretation and evaluation of ethics. The basic link between them is that they form a coherent and systematic approach to a specific area of experience. Using a language that requires careful clarification, morality can be defined as humanism's response to the realistic world's demands.

In the descriptive sense, any definition of "morality" will have to specify which of the codes put forward by a society or group counts as moral. Even in small homogeneous societies with no written language, morality, etiquette, law, and religion are sometimes distinguished. And these distinctions are often marked sharply in larger and more complex societies. Therefore, "morality" cannot be taken to refer to any code of conduct that a society puts forward. "Morality" in the normative sense refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who fulfils certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the rational condition. It is typically expressed by saying that a person meets these conditions by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, it is not enough merely to show that any moral agent would accept a certain code to show that the code is the moral code. Maybe all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this alone would not show that prudence was part of morality. Not all codes put forward by societies or groups are moral codes in the descriptive sense of morality, as we have just seen, and not all codes accepted by all moral agents are moral codes in the normative sense of morality. Thus, any morality definition in either sense will require additional criteria. Nevertheless, each of these two very brief descriptions of codes could be considered to offer certain morality features that would be included in any adequate definition. Thus, in each of its two senses, they could be taken to offer some definitive features of morality. If one has specified enough definitional features to allow one to classify all relevant moral theories as theories of a common subject, then a definition of morality could be taken to have been given. This is in this entry the sense of "definition" at work.

Check your Progress-1

1.In the case of religious belief what can be considered as' humanism'?

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10.3 SOCRATIC DILEMMA

Six years ago, I started teaching in UK higher education. When I began my PhD in history, I knew that if I was to stay in academia, it was critical in a vague way that I acquired some teaching experience. I addressed the convener of the first-year core module of the department, a European History survey since 1500. I was offered two 12-student seminars after a few basic questions about my research background and my desire to gain some teaching experience. I was told the students should do the necessary reading and I should facilitate a discussion on the topic of that week about a pre-selected set of primary sources. I was told I'd be okay. I've come a long way since the hot afternoon of November. Years of seminar practice had sharpened my senses in order to distinguish between lazy and suffering students and to appreciate the balance of directed and open discussion needed to meet the learning outcomes of the course. Yet these seemed necessary but inadequate markers of excellent teaching given strong input from my students. There was a je ne says quoi surrounding excellent lecturers in history; an intangible quality I tried to achieve. Over the past two years, I have been working with new and seasoned lecturers and tutors from across the country indeed, the world to better support and share best practice in teaching history. When I attended conferences and seminars and settled with the latest issue of Higher Education Teaching, I came across an almost disorderly difference of opinion on what was best practice. More specifically, I noticed that, like my Scottish emigrants who were trying to seek an ideal new home, history lecturers are divided between their ideals sharing their passion for history with students and helping to develop well-rounded individuals and their commitments to shifting expectations. It came not only from regulatory bodies, which in fact frequently apply a light touch and are highly welcoming input from professionals on the field, but from society as a whole through political speeches and national media headlines. So, I was left with the question: are our teaching methods being approved by society because they are best practices or are, we defining them as best practices because they are prohibited by society? Finally, as I sifted through the tangential and the extraordinary, I realized that after all, our ambitions and values were not

that divergent. Many of us, students, lecturers and regulators alike, tend to seek excellent teaching because, particularly in times of economic and political uncertainty, we see a strong interest in arts education that should be retained. I therefore devote this blog to the promotion of excellence in teaching and to the person who inspires my own philosophy of teaching. Here's your Socrates here. In our quest for knowledge, may we never stop questioning?

Check your Progress-2

1.Why many of us, students, lecturers and regulators alike, tend to seek excellent teaching?

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10.4 MORALITY AND ADVANTAGE

HEUME ASKS, rhetorically, "What theory of morality can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can prove, by a particular detail that all the duties it proposes are also the true interest of each individual?" But there are many to whom this question does not seem rhetorical. How, we ask, do we speak the language of morality, force upon our fellows their duties and obligations, urge them with appeals to what is right and good, if in the language of prudence, we may speak with the same effect, appealing to considerations of value and advantage? When the muse drives the poet, Ogden Nash, to cry out: O Duty, why don't you have a sweetie or a cutie's face? We don't expect the answer: o Poet, I'm a cutie, and I guess you should know that. The conviction that obligation cannot be reduced to profit, or that ethics that allow the agent to delegate all advantage considerations, is one that has defied the assaults of Plato's counter-conscious philosophers to the present. However, if it were not for the conviction that only profit and advantage could drive human actions, it

would be hard to understand philosophers battling so fiercely for morality's legitimacy with prudence, or at least compatibility. However, if morality is not true prudence, it would be wrong to assume that the philosophers who sought a link between morality and benefit were merely misguided. For it is a truism that we should all expect to be worse off if men were to replace morality in all their dealings with prudence, even of the most civilized type. And this truism needs not just some relation between moralities so profit, but an almost paradoxical connection. For if we were all to anticipate misery, if men were to be cautious rather than moral, then morality would lead to advantage in a unique manner, a manner in which prudence-following advantage motives cannot be advantageous. Perhaps Thomas Hobbes is the first philosopher to try to establish this seemingly paradoxical relation between morality and advantage. But since he was unable to accept that a person could ever fairly delegate advantage considerations to the dictates of duty, he was led to deny the possibility of real conflict between morality and prudence. His reasoning therefore fails to explain the difference between the views that bond claims are limited to interest considerations and the view that bond claims are promoting advantage in a manner in which interest considerations cannot. More recently, Kurt Baier claimed that "being ethical follows laws structured to override self-interest if it is in everyone's interest that everyone should set aside their interest. "Since prudence follows rules of self-interest, Baier claims that morality is intended to override prudence when it is in everyone's interest to do so, or in other worries. In reality, he is not asking why morality can do this. I plan to show this possibility. What I want to prove is that this thesis may be valid, that morality may possess the characteristics that the thesis assigns to it. I will not try to prove that the theory is valid, I will claim in Section V that it provides an incomplete concept of morality at best. But it is possible to conclude that a revised thesis form specifies a necessary condition for a moral system, though not enough. Two sentences in the study need to be elucidated. The first is "advantageous to everyone." I use this term to mean that if the system is adopted and acted on, that person will do better than if either no system is accepted and acted on or a system that is identical is accepted and acted on, except that it never allows anyone to conduct disadvantageous

actions. Obviously, however, the argument that adopting and acting on the scheme is beneficial to everyone is a very strong one; it may be so strong that it could not be satisfied by any set of values that could usually be followed. But I will find one of the possible ways to undermine the argument in Section V. The second sentence requiring explanation is "disadvantageous acts." I use this term to refer to actions that would be less beneficial to the actor in the sense of their success than any other act available to him in the same context. The expression does not apply to acts that simply place a short-term disadvantage on the actor that is long-term recovered or outweighed. Rather, it applies to actions that enforce an unrecovered disadvantage. Consequently, when faced with the necessity to perform such an act, the actor may suggest to himself that it would be easier for him not to perform it. It is important to note that the study, as elucidated, does not establish that morality is beneficial to everyone in the sense that if the system of values is adopted and implemented, that individual will do best. Each individual will do better than if no model is adopted or if the aforementioned one particular alternative is adopted, but not if any alternative is adopted. Nevertheless, for every person needed by the system to perform any disadvantageous act, it is easy to specify a better alternative to change the system so that it does not allow him to perform some disadvantageous act on his own. There is no justification, of course, to consider such an option to be better for everyone than the moral system, or indeed for anyone other than the person who received the special exemption. A second point to note is that each person should benefit more from the harmful acts performed by others than they lose from the harmful acts performed by themselves. If this were not the case, then some person would do better if a system was applied in exactly the same way as the moral system except that it never demands disadvantageous actions from any person. This is omitted by the force of "advantageous to all." An example can illustrate it point. Suppose there is exactly one rule in the process. Everyone must tell the truth at all times. It follows from the thesis that each person earns more from those occasions when others tell the truth, even if it is disadvantageous for them to do so, than he loses from those occasions when he tells the truth, even if it is disadvantageous for him to do so. Now this is not to suggest that every person gains the truth by asking

others to make sure they tell him the truth in return. Such gains would only result from embracing such short-term drawbacks those associated with telling the truth to reap long-term benefits those associated with telling the truth. Rather, what the study demands is that those disadvantages that a person entails in telling the truth, when he cannot expect any short-term or long-term benefits from telling the truth, are outweighed by those advantages that he receives when others tell him the truth when they cannot expect any benefits from telling the truth. In those situations where whether or not one tells the truth will have no effect on whether or not others tell the truth, the rule imposes truth-telling. Those cases include those where others don't know if they're told the truth or not. The thesis demands that in these cases, the drawbacks one brings in telling the truth are less than the benefits one gains in being told the truth in parallel cases by others; and the thesis requires that this holds for everyone. Therefore, we see that while the drawbacks placed on any individual by the program are less than the advantages gained by imposing disadvantages on others, the disadvantages are real in that they are unrelated to receiving the benefits. Long-term prudence's suggestion that I should suffer any immediate loss in order to eventually obtain financial benefits is totally inapplicable here. An example of a system that holds certain characteristics ascribed to morality by the thesis will be useful to analyse in some depth. Abstract from the field of international relations, this example will allow us to discern more clearly, firstly, behaviour based on immediate interest; secondly, behaviour that is genuinely prudent; and thirdly, behaviour that facilitates mutual benefit but is not prudent. A and B are two nations with strongly opposing interests that are working against each other in an arms race. Both have the new weaponry, so everyone knows that the real outbreak of full-scale war between them would be potentially catastrophic. This understanding leads A and B to conclude that if they were disarming each other rather than arming each other, each would be better off. For mutual disarmament, while reducing the risk of war, it would maintain the balance of power between them. A and B thus enter into an agreement for disarmament. If both agree and act on it, the contract is good for both, although it is obviously not advantageous for either to act on it if the other does not. Let A consider whether or not to adhere to the treaty in

certain cases, whether or not to execute a disarmament act. A is likely to consider the act to have adverse effects. A hope to benefit not from his own disarmament actions, but from the acts of B. Therefore, if A was merely to think in terms of immediate interest, A could well decide to break the agreement.

But the judgment of A does not need to be cautious or fair. First of all, suppose B may decide whether A adheres to the contract or not. If A breaches, then B must sense the violation and consider what to do in the light of the actions of A. Disarming alone is not to the benefit of B; B hopes to profit, not through his own acts of disarmament, but through the actions of A. Therefore, when known to B, the violation of A naturally leads to counter-violation of B. The pact's influence is completely undone if this persists, and A and B return to their mutually disadvantageous arms race. A, therefore, to anticipate this when deciding whether to adhere to the pact or not in the given situation, should assume that adherence is the genuinely prudent course of action. Then presume that in the particular situation under review B is unable to determine whether or not A adheres to the contract. If A considers compliance to be disadvantageous in itself, then it will agree to breach the contract on the basis of both immediate interest and prudence. Since A's decision is unknown to B, it cannot influence whether or not B adheres to the contract, and therefore no consequent disadvantage outweighs the advantage gained by A's infringement. Therefore, if A and B are cautious, they must adhere to their disarmament pact whenever violation is detectable by the other, and breach the pact if breach is not detectable by the other. In other terms, they will cling freely and secretly abuse. Therefore, the A-B disarmament pact holds two of the qualities ascribed to morality by the study. Second, it is more beneficial for each to embrace the pact and act on it than to make no pact at all. Second, to the degree that the treaty stipulates that each should disarm even when disarmament is undetectable by the other, it demands that each conduct disadvantageous acts-acts which run counter to prudence considerations. If the disarmament pact is to embody the qualities ascribed to a morality scheme by the author, another criterion must be met. It must be the case that the obligation for each party to carry out disadvantageous actions is

important to the benefit conferred by the pact; or, to put the matter in the way we expressed it earlier, both A and B must do better to adhere to this pact than to a pact that is identical except that it does not allow disadvantageous acts. For example, A and B must do better to stick to the pact than to a pact that stipulates that disarming must be observable by each other only when disarming. Plausibly we can conclude that this condition is fulfilled. While A will benefit by secretly maintaining weapons itself, B's similar acts will lose it, and its losses may well outweigh its profits. Through A's hidden abuses, B can lose more than it gains by itself. So, despite the fact that prudence requires that secret violation, each can do better if both secretly adhere than if both secretly violate. If this is the case, as defined by the article, the disarmament agreement is theoretically equivalent to a moral system. In other words, agreeing and adhering to the pact by A and B is more beneficial for each of them than making no pact at all or accepting and adhering to a pact involving only open disarmament, and the pact demands that each of them conduct disadvantageous acts of secret disarmament. Some simple notation, adapted from the mathematical theory of games for our purposes, can make the example even more perceptible. Each can follow two pure strategies-adherence and breach, provided a disarmament agreement between A and B. Then there are four different methods combinations, each deciding a specific outcome. These results can be ranked preferentially for each nation; from the first to the fourth preference we will let the numerals I to 4 reflect the ranking. We can now return with benefit to the relation of morality. Morality, if it is a set of values of the kind described in the study, allows certain persons to perform acts that are inherently disadvantageous to themselves as a means of greater mutual benefit. Our example shows sufficiently that such a process is possible and reveals its character more precisely. In general, by arguing strictly parallel to what we have been doing, we can show that men who are merely cautious will not perform the disadvantageous actions necessary. But they will weaken themselves in so breaching the standards of ethics. Everyone will lose more from other people's violations than they gain from their own violations. Now this inference would be unsurprising if only no one would benefit if he were rational rather than wise on his own. Clearly such a man loses because to

his own detriment he adheres to moral principles, while others still disregard them to his disadvantage. The moral system's value is not one that any individual can obtain for himself, as each person gains from the sacrifices of others. That shocks us in our conclusion is that if he is ethical, no man can ever profit. Not only does he not gain by being moral when others are wise, but if others are good, he also does not gain by being moral. For while he now enjoys the benefit of adherence of others to moral principles, he is reaping the downside of adherence of his own. He must do best to be cautious as long as his own commitment to morality is independent of what others do and this is necessary to distinguish morality from prudence. If all people are good, they're all going to do better than if everyone is cautious. But if he's wise, any man will always do better than if he's wrong. There is no particular irony in believing that morality is good, although it needs disadvantageous actions to be done. On the assumption that morality has the characteristics ascribed to it by the thesis, is it possible to answer the question "Why should we be moral?" where "we" is taken in a distributive manner, so that the question is a compendious way of asking every person, "Why should I be moral?" More simply, is it possible to answer the question "Why should I be moral?" It needs moral reasons to be shown as justification for non-circular argument to act. Unlike Baier, those who would answer it seek to do so by adding advantage considerations. From our conversation, two such points arose.

The first is that if everyone is good, everything is going to do better than if everyone is cautious. This will help to answer the question "Why should we be moral?" if this question is translated as "Why should we all be moral rather than being anything else?" If we all have to be the same, then each person has a reason, a prudential reason, to prefer that we are all moral. Yet, so translated, "Why should we be moral?" is not a compendious way of asking the man, "Why should I be moral?" I should be moral, of course, if everyone is to be whatever I am. But this cannot be presupposed by a general answer to the question "Why should I be moral? "The second consideration is that, given that his option does not decide other choices, every person always does better to be wise rather than ethical. But to the degree that this raises the question "Why should I

be moral?" this leads to the conclusion "I shouldn't be moral." One thinks this isn't the right response. Otherwise we may put the matter. It is difficult for the person who wants a reason to be moral that is not himself a moral reason. There is nothing unusual about this; if such explanations could be identified, it would be much more shocking. Since it is more than seemingly paradoxical to believe that benefit factors could ever justify embracing a real disadvantage on their own. In Section II, I proposed that the thesis could provide a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for a moral system in a modified form. Now I would like to think how to describe the man who, according to the study, will classify as moral I'll call him the "ethical" person and then ask what would be missing from this definition, in terms of some of our common moral views. The rationally prudent man, even in the limited sense described by the thesis, is incapable of moral behaviour. Which difference do the wise man and the "ethical" man have to make? Quite obviously, the cautious yet trustworthy man is the "true" man. I view trustworthiness as the capacity which allows its owner to adhere to, and decide that it should adhere to, the promise that it has made, irrespective of advantage considerations.

This skill is not entirely possessed by the cautious yet trustworthy man. He is only capable of trustworthy actions to the degree that he finds his engagement to be beneficial. Therefore he varies only in the related respect from the cautious man; he supports arguments of the form "If it is advantageous for me to agree to dox, and I agree to dox, then I should dox, whether or not it then proves advantageous for me to do x." Suppose that A and B, the parties to the disarmament pact, are prudent but trustworthy. A, considering whether to violate the agreement secretly or not, reasons why its advantage in implementing and preserving the agreement, given that B does so, is greater than its advantage in not making it. If it can presume the same reasons for B, then it is in a position to say that the contract should not be broken. While infringement would be advantageous, consideration of this advantage is excluded by the trustworthiness of A, given the advantage of agreeing to the pact. The cautious yet trustworthy man meets the tacit criteria of the "ethical" man's thesis. But to what degree does this "ethical" man exhibit

two widely associated characteristics of morality-first, a willingness to make sacrifices, and a respect for fairness? If, for reasons other than those of greater advantage, a man sacrifices his own benefit, he can be said to make any sacrifice. Therefore, the "good" man is required to make such sacrifices in being trustworthy. But these are very few. And-not surprisingly, considering our argument its general direction, they may well restrict the advantages that the "good" man could obtain.

Check your Progress-3

1.Who is incapable of moral behaviour?

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10.5 LATER SELVES AND MORAL PRINCIPLES

Morals are the actions that you think are right and wrong. The Free Dictionary website describes moral principles as "the concepts of right and wrong that an individual or a social group embrace." While each individual may have a different interpretation of this term, as a general rule, morals are what we use as a guide to our acts. Some people agree on certain moral principles, and others vary from group to group and from person to person. It's very easy to make minor changes in your moral principles when you don't abide by your moral principles. This is what we do by justifying our acts. We do or say something with which we know we don't agree, but we find a way to justify it to ourselves in a way that makes it sound like it isn't bad. The problem is that deep inside, we know we've crossed a line with our moral principles. Even though at the moment we don't admit it, we already know it's happening. Making small compromises about your values always makes it easier to make bigger compromises. Before you know it, you're making all sorts of mistakes and acting in ways you'd never think you'd be doing it if you knew it was wrong. You also start dealing with things like guilt and shame when you live like this. You know you're not in agreement with the behaviour, which makes you feel guilty. This also leads you to feel ashamed of this action because you know deep down that it's right, even if you've tried to justify it. In adhering to our moral principles in

practice, we are able to live a life we can be happy about and one we are proud to live. Here are some examples of ideals of morality and how they affect your life. Treating Others, the Way You Want to Be Treated This is a moral principle that is taught to many in infancy. Parents use this example regularly to teach their children how to communicate with their siblings. It also applies to children, however, with whom they interact at school, their co-workers later on, and any person who may follow their course. The concept behind this rule is to treat us well and respectfully. Therefore, if we keep in mind this idea, we will treat others the same way we want to be handled. You take the time to have compassion for another human as you live by this moral principle and try to see things through your eyes. You'd think of the situation they're in rather than your own, and ask what you'd want someone to do with you if you'd be in that situation. If everyone were to abide by this law, there would be a complete decrease and eradication of crime and harassment. You are likely to be treated well in exchange if you treat other people well. Most of the time it's a win - win scenario. And if they don't choose to treat you kindly, you're going to be even happier because you know you've acted in a way that's consistent with your morals and values. This is an important moral concept for everyone. Everybody needs to be honest with them. We want to know they're not being lied to and they can trust the person they're talking to. Nonetheless, in some cases, people can justify not being truthful by providing meaningful reasons. In order to support their decision to tell a lie and accept the act of breaking this morality, they can say things like "white lie" and "doing it for their benefit. "If you're straightforward with others, they're going to know they can trust you, which can help build better relationships, go forward. If you're not honest with other people, though, they won't want to continue to be a partner with you. And if they keep a relationship with you, it will be very hard for them to trust you. Don't Waste What You Don't Have Many people think it's wrong to be in debt? Some feel it's not right, just believe it affects one's life adversely. Such people believe that being a good steward of what you are given is very necessary. Stewardship means you are responsible for managing the wealth, including not spending money you don't have. Keep Your Word This one goes hand in hand with being honest and not cheating, but worth

mentioning separately. It was important for people to keep their word throughout history. If you haven't held your word, you'd probably be shot. That's how necessary your word was to be a man or a woman. In culture, however, we've been very far from that now. People are constantly saying things they don't want to do. That's why we have to explicitly state what the consequences are in legal contracts if one party or the other fails to do so. Many people are now so used to going back to their word that they don't even think about it twice. That's why we have issues like mortgage foreclosures, repossessing property, and high rates of divorce. When you keep going on the things you say you're going to do, people will have more faith in you. You'll also have more faith in yourself. It leads to better personal relationships, changes in employment, and overall a better life. Don't take what doesn't belong to you / don't steal many people would agree you shouldn't steal, and you shouldn't take something you don't have. Nevertheless, on a regular basis, most people make minor compromises that do not adhere to this theory.

Of example, if you're an hourly employee and you're on the clock, your company's time. Which means, if it is not part of your job, the following things can be considered to steal time from your business: spending time on social media making a personal phone call speaking to friends instead of working your employer will pay you for the work you do. So, when you use company time for personal activities, you take that money but don't give it back as decided on your employment agreement. Therefore, this example actually contradicts a few of the moral principles we discussed in this article, including not keeping your word and taking what is not yours. Do you practice the standards of morality? If you don't live on the moral principles you believe in, consider taking steps to correct it. If you go against the values you believe in, you don't live your best life. It's necessary to align your life, acts, and words with your principles of morality. Things in your life can begin to fall into place when you do this. If you remain true to yourself, you will experience more happiness. The challenge is that while we may be able to recognise the weaknesses and conflict areas of other peoples, when it comes to our own lives, it is a little more difficult to identify areas of controversy for

which improvements may be somewhat elusive. Whether you struggle to recognize the moral principles that matter to you, to carry them out in your own life, or to fix where they have gone wrong in the past, speaking to a licensed therapist could help you get on the right track. A mental health professional can provide you with an unbiased opinion and guidance to help you achieve your goals and live a life more in line with your moral principles. That's why it can support a third-party person who is trained and experienced in these conversations. They will help you see what matters to you and lead you along the right path. Better Help's trained and certified therapist can help you feel the changes you want in life. When things in your life seem to go wrong, it might be that you're not living.

10.6 LET'S SUM UP

All morality is based on the individual's promised benefits. In modern economics, therefore, the formal, clear definition of advantage is put at the core. I like to compare the relationship between ethics and iceberg benefits. Moral norms, beliefs, and values imitate the seventh of the iceberg whose elegance, sparkling in the sunlight above the water's surface, mysteriously attracts us all, but particularly the metaphysical ethicist. The remaining six sevenths, however, which float invisibly under the ground, form the foundation; they correspond to the economic substructure. One cannot separate the two–for example, in order for morality to establish its own truth and even serve to domesticate and control the economy with its own self-interest. Whoever wants to reinforce morality should ensure that sufficient conditions are put in place, and whoever wants to avoid the deterioration of morality within the modern world's systemic structures should ensure that the benefits of moral action are not dissolved: like the ocean, morality melts away from below, from its economic roots, and not, say, through any arbitrary switch of val.

10.7 KEYWORDS

Unbiased: Showing no prejudice for or against something; impartial.

Repossessing: Retake possession of (something) when a buyer defaults on payments.

Foreclosures: The action of taking possession of a mortgaged property when the mortgagor fails to keep up their mortgage payments.

Interpretation: The action of explaining the meaning of something.

Disarmament: The reduction or withdrawal of military forces and weapons.

10.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the term of "family resemblance"?
2. Psychological research on the future self-explores?
3. What is necessary to meet the learning outcomes of the course?
4. What moral system except?
5. What theory of morality can ever serve?

10.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/71269
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition
- https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0f0e/6a72b35344600aaf70d2be6e573123f78964
- https://www.betterhelp.com/advice/behavior/moral-principles
- Morality and Self-Interest The Book

10.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

In the case of religious belief and what can be considered' humanism' simply or provisionally, this can be shown. But it is also possible to find

common modes of thinking which belong completely and firmly to each side.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

Many of us, students, lecturers and regulators alike, tend to seek excellent teaching because, particularly in times of economic and political uncertainty, we see a strong interest in arts education that should be retained.

3. (Answer for Check your Progress-3 Q.1)

The rationally prudent man, even in the limited sense described by the thesis, is incapable of moral behaviour. Which difference do the wise man and the "ethical" man have to make? Quite obviously, the cautious yet trustworthy man is the "true" man.

UNIT-11: RELIGION AND ETHICS

STRUCTURE

11.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on "Religion and Ethics", you will get the knowledge about important sections such as:

- The importance of religion and mortality.
- God without ethics and vice versa.
- Connection between mortality and ethics.

11.1 INTRODUCTION

Man, as a human being, without religion, cannot exist because he is fundamental to his nature. Religion cannot be separated from the condition of life. From the role it plays in enriching the quality of life, religion decides its true value. It has a role to play, a role that leads to man's development by offering ethical codes, social rules and values, rituals and commitment to society. Religion also strengthens human values and understanding of oneself. Religion helps one lead a life that is controlled and purified. Religions still stand for the human soul's change. While devotedly called by different names, the different religions display a remarkable connection between spirit and life. It is a peculiar

expression that is different and cannot be compared to anything. There is no religion that does not emphasize one form of universal fraternity or another, and that does not promote kindness to all living things. There is, at least in principle, recognition of the non-killing commandment in the traditions of the non-vegetarian people. And there's the Semitic religions 'general acceptance that a kind of grace follows meat fasting then abstention on certain days. In theory, Buddhism is based squarely on non-hurting (ahimsa), and Jainism gives this principle a high standard. A name-worthy religion should implement some morality structure to direct its followers. The topic of the relationship between religion and ethics has sometimes occupied a major position in philosophers 'discourses. The moral stance on the relationship between ethics and religion in general, the personal connection between these two, as conditional historical facts, has never been disputed and can never be denied. Ethics is the analysis and evaluation of human behaviour in the light of moral principles. Ethics is seen by philosophers as a theory. Many theorists of religion are searching for a complete moral standard. The importance of morality has been stressed by major religions. There is an interconnection between faith, morality and philosophy. Religious vision offers all other interests essential guidance. Ethical behaviour and philosophical awareness also support spirituality growth. Religion is hollow without ethics and philosophy and without moral guidelines, ethical and philosophical actions become useless in the same way. The value of morality is known by all religions. Religion is intertwined as an experience with something in the higher order of life and ethics as a personal and social code of conduct; it is man's religious activities. Religion is about man's moral life. F.H. Bradly sees faith as an expression of man's moral goodness. Bradly defines' Religion is rather an attempt to express the full reality of goodness through all aspects of our being' (Paul Edwards 140). Apprehending religion from the point of view of morality, N.F.S. Ferre says:' Religion is a quest for power to overcome the bad side of life even more than its concern to know what life means at its heart or depth.' The concept of free will is a principle that is fundamental to most philosophies, political, religious and social. It was claimed that the root of liberty lies in natural events uncertainty. According to Kant, freedom of the will is the central postulate of moral

philosophy, it does not require proof, and it is an apriori reality (Kant, 18. Freedom is the very cornerstone of morality. Moral and religious life is real, and it cannot be so without liberty. As far as the theological understanding of the free-will issue is concerned, it seems that the religious traditions of the faith are concerned.

11.2 RELIGION AND MORTALITY

Religion-morality relationship has been hotly debated for a long time. Will spiritual inclinations exist regardless of religious intuitions? Such controversies, which are currently ongoing in both scientific journals and public life, have often been marred by a series of philosophical confusions and limitations. Much scientific research has failed to break down' religion' and' morality' into logically grounded elements; has embraced parochial conceptions of key concepts, in general, sanitized definitions of' prosocial' behaviour; and has declined to recognize the complex interplay between cognition and culture. They suggest that the categories 'religion' and' morality' must be separated into a collection of biologically and psychologically cogent characteristics in order to make progress, exposing the mental foundations which form and limit related cultural variants. We are following this fractionating approach, creating a systematic evolutionary context within which relevant evidence can be placed and evaluated. Their goals are twofold: to provide a comprehensive picture of the current state of the field and to provide a guide for future research into the relationship between religion and morality. The relationship between religious views and values is morality and faith. Most religions have individual behavioural meaning systems that are intended to direct followers in deciding between right and wrong. These include the Jainism Triple Gems, Islam's Sharia, the Canon Law of Catholicism, the Eightfold Way of Buddhism, and, among others, the principle of' good thoughts, good words, and good deeds' of Zoroastrianism. Different sources such as holy books, oral and written practices, and religious leaders define and explain these structures. Many of these share concepts with systems of moral meaning such as consequentialism, free thinking, and utilitarianism. Different sources such as holy books, oral and written practices, and religious leaders define and explain these structures. Many of these share values with

systems of secular meaning such as consequentialism, free thinking, and utilitarianism. Religion is not associated with morality. Morality does not necessarily depend on faith, although for some its is' an almost automatic assumption.' According to the Dictionary of Christian Ethics in Westminster, religion and morality' are to be interpreted differently and have no definite relations with each other. Conceptually and in theory, morality and a system of religious meaning are two distinct types of value systems or rules for practice.' The two can overlap in the views of others. According to one definition, morality is an active process that is,' at least, the attempt to direct one's conduct by intent, that is, to do what there are the best reasons to do, while giving equal consideration to the interests of all those affected by what one does.' People in different religious traditions, such as Christianity, can derive from the rules and laws set out in their respective authoritative guides and by their religious leaders' ideas of right and wrong. The Divine Command Theory is equating ethics with obedience to authoritative orders in a sacred book. Polytheistic religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism usually draw from some of the religious works 'broadest canons. The relationship between religion and crime and other activities that do not conform to contemporary laws and social standards in different countries has been of concern. Such relationships have been examined by studies conducted in recent years, but the findings are inconsistent and sometimes conflicting. A matter under consideration is the capacity of religious beliefs to provide meaning structures that are considered useful. Religious scholars have argued that without an absolute lawgiver as a reference, a spiritual life cannot be led. Some critics argue that moral action is not based on religious values, and secular analysts point to ethical problems that clash with contemporary social norms within different religions. Religious traditions coexist with secular moral systems such as humanism, utilitarianism, and others within the wide range of ethical traditions. There are many religious values of different types. Western monotheistic religions like Islam, Judaism, and Christianity (and to some extent others like Sikhism) describe right and wrong by the laws and rules set forth by their respective gods and represented by religious leaders within the respective faith. The religious traditions of polytheism appear to be less complete. Within Buddhism, for instance, the individual's motive and

circumstances play a role in determining whether an action is right or wrong. Barbara Stoller Miller points out another difference between the values of religious traditions, noting that in Hinduism,' practically, right and wrong are determined by social rank, kinship, and stages of life. To modern Westerners raised on principles of universality and egalitarianism, this inconsistency of values and responsibilities is the most difficult aspect of Hinduism to grasp.' According to Stephen Gaukroger:' In the 17th century, it was generally assumed that religion offered the sole basis for morality, and that without religion, morality could not exist.' Pierre Bayle stated in 1690 that religion' with morality is neither necessary nor sufficient.' The two definitions are distinguished by modern sources. For example, Christian Ethics 'Westminster Dictionary says that morality and religion are the same or inseparable for many religious people; for them either morality is part of religion or their religion is their morality. For others, morality and religion are distinct and separable, particularly among non-religious people; religion may or may not be immoral, and morality may not be religious. The two are different and separable even for some religious people; they may argue that religion should be faith and morality, but they accept that they may not be. Richard Paula and Linda Elder of the Critical Thinking Foundation argue that,' Many people confuse ethics with actions in keeping with social conventions, religious beliefs, and law.' They distinguish the definition of ethics from these subjects, arguing that: the proper role of ethical reasoning is to emphasize behaviours of two kinds: those that promote the well-being of others that deserve our praise.

Check your Progress-1

1. The relationship between religion and crime?

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11.3 POSTULATES OF MORALITY: GOD AND IMMORTALITY

When it comes, "Postulates of Mortality: God and Immortality, the foremost named come in front of the world's face is "Kant."Kant's argument based on practical reason argues that the notion of personal immortality as a postulate is supported by moral considerations alone. Here are some recent objections which charged him with violating his own distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. Kant is exonerated after questioning the reasons for breaking his own beliefs. Nevertheless, the peculiarity involved in postulating an endless progress towards a target whose accomplishment, by definition, will destroy the very foundations of morality that, for Kant, often involves the agonistic state of striving to better one's lower nature, is more worrying. It is argued that this phenomenon requires a re-examination of some implicit cultural assumptions that underlie Kant's soul formation. Eventually, an analysis is made of Kitarō Nishida's thinking, whose Basho's Zen Buddhist-inspired dialectic, meaning rational "place," provides an alternative viewpoint from which to rethink the postulate of immortality. Unlike Kant, Nishida rigorously maintains the distinction between the phenomena, but his analysis of ethics leads him to postulate a potential solution of the concept of "soul." It is argued that the postulate of immortality of Kant, though possible on its own terms, is constrained by a Western cultural bias and therefore ultimately fails to be convincing. The three postulates, namely equality, God and Immortality, although not theoretically proved, were integrated into Kant's already coherent and concrete ethical structure in order to make his ethical philosophy more practical, bearing in mind that man is not a purely rational being, but a being possessed by inclinations. Liberty, God and Immortality, the three postulates are not abstract dogmas, but need pragmatic comparison. The inclusion of the postulate in the philosophy of Kant can be viewed as an attempt to limit the abstract and to expand the practical in order to bring them together. God as Kant's postulate is not religion's god. The postulate of God originates from one's own intention, which would necessarily mean that submitting to God's will submits to one's own reason. God's need emerges because this universe does not guarantee the

relationship between moral law and happiness. So here God comes to the rescue and thus the harmony of virtue and the recognition of the highest good is required. The immortality postulate is very closely interwoven with God's postulate. Taking human beings 'sensuous existence into account, Kant notes that being noble without hope is very difficult for a man. Immortality guarantees that this dream is assured and ensures that there is enough space to be satisfied in relation to worthiness. Among the other two postulates, a special role is granted to the postulate of independence. Freedom is an apriori we don't understand, however we know it as the moral law state we know. God and Immortality achieve objective reality and authority as well as moral value because of equality. Justice can then be regarded as the keystone of pure reason's structure. The postulates bring us to the logical and rationally dominated ethical framework of Kant's otherwise theoretical domain. But in Kant's attempt to make his philosophical construct a timeless one, these postulates were also of little support. Although it retains its strong moral basis, the postulates have made its ethical philosophy more humane.

A. The Postulates: A Practical Necessity

Human beings were certainly born with reason. Built on this logical existence, Kant's philosophy is essentially woven. The overwhelming force of reason can be glorified, adjusted and developed from a philosophical perspective to form a strong structure. Yet taking care of the fact that man is not a mere moral being and is susceptible to inclinations is something very difficult. During his early years, Kant turned a blind eye to this dimension behind the influence of rationality. The postulates-Freedom, God and Immortality show his knowledge of human beings 'inability to rely solely on reason. These postulates make more moral and realistic the morals of Kant. According to Kant, a postulate is "a philosophical principle which is not demonstrable as such but which is an inseparable corollary of an unconditionally true functional law of apriori." Thus the postulate is part of the moral framework of the Kant, but it makes it clear that the postulates do not play a theoretical or explaining role. Since we have no intuitions to apply the principles of liberty, God and immortality; there can be no

philosophical understanding. "A postulate of practical reason is an object of rational belief, as Kant makes it clear, but the reasons for the belief are practical and ethical. The person needs the belief as a condition of adherence to the moral law, and this is what explains the belief in conjunction with the categorical existence of that law. Although the beliefs in form-will are abstract, there is God-their foundation and their functions are practical. The postulates are indemnifiable and for practical operation are necessary. It's Kant's attempt to limit the abstract, broaden the practical, and take them together. While a postulate generally means implying or agreeing that something is valid so that it can be used as the basis of a concept, in this case it does not form the basis but merely realistic import presuppositions. C.D. Broad writes: A postulate of pure practical reason is a logical statement that incorporates the two following characteristics: I for or against it there is no conclusive evidence of truth. (ii) If an individual does not embrace it, it is, in theory, unrealizable in the practical dilemma of knowing himself to be under an absolute duty to try to bring about a certain state of affairs. Therefore, the postulates are "not philosophical dogmas but presuppositions with a necessary pragmatic context," which "do not expand conceptual reasoning" but "bring objective reality to the concept of speculative purpose in general." The three postulates are closely linked to the three ideas of theoretical explanation, namely the idea of the absolute unity of the subject of experience (soul), the idea of the logical cause. The three postulates come to the rescue when presented with the question of certainty of the existence of events relating to the three ideas of pure reason. For they contain the basis of the possibility of understanding the required object of practical reason (the highest good), while philosophical reason finds in them morally regulative principles which have their importance in fostering the exercise of knowledge in reality, but not in enabling us to obtain some certainty as to the nature of any object beyond experience. While Kant aims to show that philosophical and pure practical reason point to the same things, but while they "go before it when it follows the path of pure speculation," they can certainly be grasped on the practical path. Instead of giving us knowledge of their objects, the postulates allow us to claim their existence. When these ideas of God, of the intelligible universe and of immortality are

predicates which are taken from our own existence, this decision must not be treated either as a sensualisation of these pure ideas or as a transcendent awareness of super sensitive objects; for the predicates we use are only comprehension and will, and indeed they are considered only in the relationship between us. We have the postulates purely from the practical point of view. Going behind the concrete postulates in search of abstract facts will be stupid. We are therefore obliged to concern ourselves "with the creation of a relationship of meaning to the will to which apriori is decided by practical law, and to which objective truth is protected by the same practice. Kant assumed that postulates made a very small contribution to the theory. He says, "The practical argument compels knowledge to accept that such entities exist without describing them more accurately." It is because of the postulates that theory achieves accession, but this does not in any way break ground for the further expansion of its domain by making artificial a priori assumptions about them. The postulates also become the sources of ideas that were theoretically considered null. It must be argued that Kant moves from postulates to postulates have artefacts through the primacy theory of mere practical reason. If we only give the privilege of defining truth for philosophical reason and not practical reason, then we will face twin problems (a) we will not be able to establish a coherent independent system. (B) Where the doctrine of the postulates persists in the state of justifying only the method of postulating as a practical act, but not the postulates as a real and full area of human experience, it is equally unfounded in any theory of the universe in itself. Kant is highly critical of the attempts to use logic in theology and to offer abstract proofs and dogmas for events in the extraordinary universe that cannot be achieved by human reason. In the first Critique Kant argues, "All efforts to use reason in theology in any way that is purely speculative are completely fruitless and by their very definition null and void... the only theology of reason that is conceivable is that which is founded on moral laws." Therefore, God's postulate is based on moral evidence rather than empirical evidence. God's theory must come from our own purpose. Kant's postulated deity is not religion's creator. It's not the spiritual dogmas here that call the shots and that one has to adhere to, but it's for one's own purpose. Why are God's postulates coming into the picture?

Kant says, "This self-rewarding morality scheme is just a concept whose realization rests on the assumption that everyone does what they should do. But for no one, his is no excuse not to be ethical. Kant would say if we have a good reason to believe we will achieve the goal we are seeking. But the purpose set by ethics is not always understood in the natural world. Although the relationship between happiness and moral law is not assured, "to be satisfied is inevitably the desire of every logical finite being, and thus it is an inevitable finite being, and therefore it is an inevitable determinant of its faculty of desire." If this were guaranteed, then we would not have seen people lacking good will achieve uninterrupted wealth and morally good people should have experienced goodness. Therefore, we should postulate as unreal universe beyond the physical structure of ordinary life and ruled by a good, benevolent and strong God in whom the ideal results of morality will become reality. In general, the "most original good" turns out to be Allah. From whom the "most derived good" derives the fulfilment of all as a result of justice of all. The presumption of God's existence can never be the foundation for our responsibility to uphold the moral law. Assuming God's existence is indeed a moral necessity. God's postulate is a need or obligation for our moral conscience, or a moral imperative that is personal and not factual, meaning it is not a duty in itself. God's postulate is in no way connected with our obligation consciousness. The divine will is the reason for action, not the motivation for action. Thus, the hypothesis required to justify the possibility of the existence of a certain entity; however, inasmuch as the object in question is one placed before us by our own logical nature as that which should be achieved, we rightly call it "a faith and indeed a faith of reason." Kant emphasizes that the properties of Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence can be attributed to God for playing. God is not a metaphysical concept, original being, first of all because the divine source of all things does not work blindly. This acts in a rational agent's mind and exerts a real influence on his / her behaviour.

B. Immortality

God's postulate is closely related to God's postulate in understanding the spiritual ideal. As Kant points out in his critique, "belief in God and

another universe is so interwoven with my spiritual feeling." Kant took Kant's postulate of salvation seriously even when he was conservative in his rationalism. In the "incomplete equilibrium between morality and its implications in the universe," the concept of immortality was discovered. He believed that the faith in immortality must be based on spiritual nature and not one expectation for future rewards. Kant says in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Practical Reason that the belief in immortality is based on a' notable feature of our existence, never being able to be content with what is temporal Based on the principle of purposefulness, Kant bases his first claim for immortality. Each institution or faculty in the eh world has its own specific claim that human life as a whole must have its own end, even though it is an end not in this life but in a life to come. Beck argues that the statement is teleological and logically and false, because it requires the fallacy of composition to judge that what is true of the sections of a whole is true of the whole. Kant provides the moral arguments for the existence of the soul, not the theoretical arguments: "1. The highest good is the target of the will required. 2. Holiness is necessary condition of the highest good, or full fitness of actions to the moral law. 3. In a sensual human being, holiness cannot be considered. It can be accomplished only in endless progress, and since holiness is necessary, such endless progress towards it is the true object of the will that such progress can be endless only if the moral being's personality endures endlessly. The highest good can be made real, hence only on the presumption of the soul's immortality. The problem that arises immediately is that it would go against Kant's self-rewarding ethics if we search for unknown fulfilment in an unknown world that also looks like a kind of consolation for the inability to attain happiness in natural life. Therefore, in the second criticism, Kant would conclude that we need immortality not to achieve happiness at all, but rather to make "endless progress" towards "the full compliance of dispositions with the moral law," that is, to the value or worthiness of being happy. The evidence given by Kant suggests God's presence postulate. God's postulates and salvation count happiness as a proposal to worthiness to be content to ensure that this is a force and a place to fulfil it. As he states,' such a ruler together with life in such a world that we must consider as a future world, reason considers itself compelled to

assume; otherwise it would have to regard the moral laws as empty brain figments, since without this postulate it could not obey the necessary implication that it itself interacts with these rules. Kant also makes it clear that the postulate of immortality is something that cannot be understood but can be thought of only. Kant also argues that his reasons for immortality do not provide us with any philosophical dogma but only real and empirical reality which can give rise to motives of action and, above all, support a moral agent in the moral nature involved in making himself worthy of the highest good.

C. Freedom

Although freedom is one of the postulates, among them Kant gives it a special place. It is independence that is considered in the first Critique to be logically possible and actually useful. From the following verses of the Critique of Practical Reason, the special statues given to liberty can be read very well: freedom, indeed, is the only possibility we know apriori among all the ideas of speculative reason. We don't understand it, however we know it as the moral law state that we know. On the contrary, the concepts of God and salvation are not requirements of moral law, but only conditions of the essential purpose of a will decided by this principle, which will be morally the practical use of our pure reason. In the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant states that the concept of freedom is' the central pillar of the whole structure of pure reason architecture and even of theoretical reason.' Freedom should not be granted a hypothetical work in its optimistic development. The position of freedom concept and the intelligible world is a practical one, rather. This offers a self-conception that motivates us to follow the moral law. Because freedom of will cannot be defined theoretically, it is only confirmed from the practical point of view. Empirical or conceptual proof of liberty cannot be given. In the first critique, Kant says that it is therefore moral law that we can actually become aware of as soon as we draw up maxims of the will of ourselves that offers itself to us and directly leads to the concept of liberty. In Groundwork Kant's attempt was to provide a philosophical proof of the nature of our freedom, but he was unsuccessful and coming to Critique of Pure Reason he maintained

that we could infer the reality of our liberation from consciousness by means of the theory that' thinking could imply.' Kant's conception of the freedom of the will can be seen moving through five stages. He takes the view that free human behaviour is those with internal rather than external causes in his first position. We have Kant as the second position arguing that we cannot prove the existence of free human acts that are not determined by nature's deterministic laws. This is explained in Pure Reason's Critique. The third phase can be seen in Groundwork, published in 1785, where he notes that the nature of human freedom can be proven and thus also demonstrate that moral law applies to us. In the fourth step we see Kant claiming that we can show our will's independence is the unquestionable fact of our faith. This can be seen in the 1788 Critique of Practical Reason. As Religion's final and fifth position in 1793, Kant is no longer concerned with proving the existence of free will, but rather with showing that its presence merely means the escapable possibility of human bad, but also the equally indestructible possibility of human conversion to goodness. According to Kant, God's ideas and immortality achieve objective reality and validity, and indeed, independence from subjective obligation is given fundamental importance as it gives God's ideas and immortality consistency and objective reality. As Kant says in Critique of Practical Reason: in so far as its existence is proven by an apodictic principle of practical reason, the concept of freedom is the keystone of the whole structure of the framework of pure reason and even of theoretical reason. All other conceptions of God and Immortality that are pure theories are now added to the concept of freedom and profit, with it and through it, harmony and objective reality, undermined by anything in speculative reason. That's their probability is proven by the fact that liberty actually exists, since moral law shows this concept. Although liberty has a special status, it doesn't mean it's completely different from other postulates. Since we are neither able to prove their existence through speculative reason nor disprove temper-assuming all three postulates is a need for mere practical reason, based on the obligation to make the highest good the target of the will.

11.4 RELIGION AND THE QUEERNESS OF MORALITY

Some reasons for God's existence can be interpreted as saying that there is some aspect of the universe that would somehow be useless unless there is anything else that has a stronger version of that feature or some approximation of it. Therefore, for example, the cosmological line of argument can be regarded as centring on the statement that the way the world exists called'' contingent'' life would be nonsensical unless there was something else that is, God who had a stronger grip on existence that is'' essential'' existence. Currently, in regard to ethics, a number of writers have taken a view of something like this. He believed that morality relies on religion in some important way, that is, in such a way that morality would also fail if religion were to fail. And they argued that the dependency was more than mental, that is, if religion were to fail, it might be acceptable to fail morality, perhaps logically or perhaps in some other way. One way to express this theme is through Dostoevsky's'' if there is no God, then all is permitted,'' a feeling that Sartre has expressed strongly in this century. But perhaps the most important metaphysical thinker of the modern age to support this view, albeit in a somewhat idiosyncratic way, was Immanuel Kant, who believed that God's existence was a mere postulate for' practical' that is, moral reason. On the other hand, moral philosophers have recently been influential in rejecting this concept and maintaining that morality's reliance at religion is, at best, psychological. Unless faith failed, as they seem to believe, this would not offer any justification to morality failure. Whatever these feet can turn out to be, morality stands on its own feet. Today, I am rather drawn by the idea that morality relies on religion somehow. It is this suggestion that she wants to discuss in this article, although the features of this suggestion that make it attractive seem to be particularly difficult to articulate clearly. The thought may be that the related notions of sacrifice and gift reflect or come close to representing the truth, that is, the pattern of life, the skewed version of which we know as morality here. Imagine a situation, if you will, an'' economy, 'in which no one ever buys or sells for or seizes good things. But whatever good he enjoys is either one he made himself or one he receives as a free and

unconditional gift. And as soon as he's tried it and saw it's great, he's ready to give it back as soon as the opportunity occurs. In such an environment, if one were to talk of his rights or his duties, his comment could be encountered with confused laughter as his hearers struggled to remember an ancient world in which those words referred to something important. Christianity, then, in one way and perhaps in two, is linked to queerness and morality. Next, it offers a worldview in which ethics is not an absurdity. This gives morality a deeper place in the world than a Russellian view and thus helps it to'' make sense.'' But in the second instance, it may mean that morality is not the fundamental value, that it is fleeting and transitory, that it is supposed to serve its use and then pass away in favour of something more and more profound. Maybe we can assume it ends by reversing the quote that, because God exists, not everything is allowed; but it may also continue to tell us that, because God exists, there will eventually be no possibility for any prohibition.

11.5 ETHICS WITHOUT GOD

It is hard to believe that such a view could even be expressed by intelligent and educated people, but they do! It never seems to have occurred to them that the Greeks and Romans, whose gods and goddesses are anything less than paragons of virtue, still lived lives that were not obviously worse than those of the Alabama Baptists! In contrast, pagans including Aristotle and Marcus Aurelius also managed to produce philosophical treatises of considerable complexity, while their structures are not appropriate for us today, sophistication seldom if ever equalled by Christian moralists. Atheists 'behaviour is subject to the same rules in sociology, psychology, and neurophysiology that control all members of our species 'behaviour, including religionists. However, despite protests to the contrary, we may say as a general rule that when religionists practice ethical behaviour, it is not really because of their fear of hell-fire and damnation, nor is it because of their eternal aspirations. Ethical behaviour–regardless of who the practitioner is–is always the product of the same causes and is governed by the same powers, and has nothing to do with the presence or absence of religious belief. We are

social animals as human beings. Their sociality is the product, not the selection, of evolution. Natural selection has provided us with nervous systems that are particularly sensitive to our fellows 'emotional status. Emotions are infectious among our species, and it is only the odd psychopathic mutants among us that can be content in a sad society. Being good in the midst of joy is in our essence, sad in the midst of sorrow. Fortunately, it is in our nature to seek happiness for our fellows as we seek happiness for ourselves. When it is shared, our joy is greater. Nature has also equipped us with nervous systems that are capable of imprinting to a significant degree. This trend is definitely not as pronounced or as ineluctable as it is, say, in geese–where a newly hatched gosling can be "imprinted" into a toy train and follow it to exhaustion as if it were his mother. However, humans exhibit a degree of imprinting. The human nervous system seems to maintain its capacity to impress well into old age, and the phenomenon known as "love-at-first-sight" is highly likely to be a result of imprinting. Imprinting is a type of action of attachment and it allows us to form strong interpersonal bonds. It's a major force that helps us break through the ego barrier to build "significant ones" we love as much as we love ourselves. Though they are the basis of all altruistic behaviour and art, these two characteristics of our nervous system emotional suggestibility and attachment imprint capacity are fully consistent with the selfishness characteristic of all behaviours produced by the natural selection process. That is, habits that please us will be found to a large extent, at the same time, to satisfy our friends, and vice versa. This should not shock us when we know that the great apes, social behaviour is not chaotic among the communities of our closest primate cousins, even though gorillas lack the Ten Commandments! The female chimpanzee need not have an oracle to ask her to obey her mother and not to kill her brothers and sisters. Ape societies have, of course, observed family squabbles and even murder, but such behaviours are exceptions, not the norm. So it is everywhere and at all times in human societies. The African apes whose genes are ninety-eight to ninety-nine percent the same as ours live their lives as social animals, participating in the living of life, completely without the help of the priesthood and without the commandments of Exodus, Leviticus or Deuteronomy. It is also exciting to hear that among baboon

troops socio-biology's have even witnessed altruistic behaviour. More than once, males of post-reproductive age are observed in troops threatened by leopards to remain at the rear of the fleeing troop and engage the leopard in what is often a suicidal battle. As the old man delays the pursuit of the leopard by sacrificing his very life, the women and young people escape and live to fulfil their various destinies. The bravery that we see our fellow men and women acting out from time to time is much older than their religions. There was bravery and acts of self-sacrificing love long before the gods were formed by the fear-filled minds of our less brave ancestors. At that time, they did not need a supernatural excuse, nor do they need one now. So, given the general fact that nature has equipped us with nervous systems biased for social rather than antisocial behaviour, is it not true, however, that there is antisocial behaviour, and that it occurs in quantities greater than a rational ethicist would consider tolerable? Sadly, that's true. But this is largely true because we live in more complex environments than the Palaeolithic world where our nervous systems evolved. To grasp this fact's moral meaning, we need to digress a little and study human behaviour's evolutionary history. Today, heredity can regulate our actions in only the most general way, it cannot prescribe specific behaviours suitable for situations that are infinitely varied. Heredity needs help in our culture. In comparison, the problems to be solved in the universe of a fruit fly are few in number and in essence highly predictable. As a result, the brain of a fruit fly is basically "hard-wired" by descent. In other words, most behaviours arise from environmental stimulation of nerve circuits that are spontaneously established at the time of adult fly emergence. This is a severe instinctual behaviour example. That behaviour is programmed by a gene or genes which predispose the nervous system to create some forms of circuits, not others, and where it is almost impossible to act contrary to the predetermined genetic script. A mammal's world says a fox is far more complicated and volatile than the fruit fly's world. The fox is therefore born with only a portion of its hard-wired neuronal circuitry. Many of its neurons remain life-long "plastic." That is, depending on environmental circumstances, they may or may not hook up in operational loops with each other. Learned behaviour is behaviour resulting from these

environmentally influenced circuits being triggered. Training helps the individual animal to learn more adaptive habits–through trial and error–than heredity can transmit. Wall-to-wall genes would be a fox if all of the behaviours were biologically determined. Nevertheless, with human evolution, the nature of the world increased out of all proportion to the genetic and neuronal changes that differentiate us from our simian ancestors. This was partly due to the fact that our species evolved in the Ice Ages during a geological period of great climatic change and partly due to the fact that our own activities began changing our climate. In addition, the changing world created new issues to address. Their strategies improved the world more, and so on. Therefore, the discovery of fire led to the burning of trees and forests, leading to the destruction of local water sources and watersheds, leading to the growth of aqueduct-building technology, leading to water-rights laws that led to, and on and on, international conflict. Even the ability to learn new behaviours is insufficient in view of such complexities. If the only methods were trial and error, many people would die of old age before they were able to rediscover fire or reinvent the wheel. Humanity has established culture as a replacement for instinct and to increase learning performance. The ability to teach –and to learn grew and the teaching through trial and error became a last resort process.We can do what Darwinian genetic selection would not permit by transmitting culture–passing on the sum total of the learned habits common to a population: we can inherit the acquired characteristics. When invented, the wheel can be transmitted through generations to its manufacture and use. Culture can adapt to change much faster than genes can, delivering fine-tuned responses to environmental disturbance and upheaval. By cultural transmission, certain habits that have proved useful in the past can be transmitted to the youth easily, so that adaptation to life can be accomplished on the Greenland ice cap. Nonetheless, social transmission continues to be rigid: it took about a hundred thousand years for both sides of the hand-as to be chipped! Social anomalies, such as genetic mutations, appear to be negative more often than not, and both resist–the latter through cultural conservatism, the latter through natural selection. Yet developments are progressing faster than genetic transition rates and societies are changing gradually. Even that religious giant known as the

Catholic Church, despite claiming to be the unchangeable source of reality and "right" behaviour, has greatly changed since its creation. By the way, at this hand-axis point of human evolution, most of today's religions are still stuck. At this point, our inflexible, absolutist moral codes are also set. The Ten Commandments are the spiritual equivalent of the technological evolution cycle "here's-how-you-rub-the-sticks-together." The stick-rubbing method is appropriate if the only sort of fire you want is to warm your cave and cook your clams. But if you want your jet-plane to be powered by a spark, some changes must be made. So, too, with positive conduct transmission. If we are to lead socially as dynamic lives as technically advanced jet-planes, we need more than the Ten Commandments. We cannot base our moral code on arbitrary and capricious fiats which people claim to be private to the desires of the Sinai or Olympus denizens have revealed to us. Our ethics cannot be based on fictions about human nature or fake reports about the deities 'desires. In the soil of scientific self-knowledge, our values must be firmly planted. They have to be adjustable and improvable. Plato revealed in his Euthyphro dialog a long time ago that we cannot depend on a deity's spiritual fiats. Plato wondered if a god's commandments were "good" merely because they were commanded by a god or because the deity knew what was good and directed the action accordingly. If something is good just because it was commanded by a deity, anything could be considered good. There would be no way to predict what the deity in particular might want next, and it would be completely meaningless to say that "God is good." Bashing babies with rocks would be just as likely to be "good" as the "Love your enemies" rule. On the other hand, if the commandments of a god were based on an awareness of the inherent goodness of an act, we are met with the fact that t. We can bypass the god in our quest for the good and go to his source! Therefore, given that gods a priori cannot be the origin of ethical principles, in the universe in which we have evolved, we must follow those principles. We have to consider the spiritual in the earthly. The "enlightened self-interest" theory is an excellent first approach to an ethical principle that is both compatible with what we know about human nature and applicable to life issues in a complex society. Let's look at this idea. First, we have to differentiate between self-interest "enlightened" and

"unenlightened." For comparison, let's take an extreme example. Suppose you lived a totally selfish life in which every desire was instantly gratified. Suppose you took it to yourself whenever someone else had something you needed. It wouldn't be long before you were all in combat, and you'd have to spend all your waking hours fending off reprisals. Based on how crazy the behaviour is, in a neighbourly revenge orgy you might very well lose your life. The life of complete yet unenlightened self-interest as long as it lasts may be thrilling and fun–but it is unlikely to last long. By contrast, the person practicing "enlightened" self-interest is the person whose behavioural strategy at the same time maximizes both the intensity and duration of personal gratification. A wise approach will be one that will produce ever greater amounts and variations of pleasures and satisfactions if pursued over a long period of time. It is clear that by working with others more is to be achieved than by acts of unilateral egoism. One man with a rock is unable to kill dinner buffalo. But a group of men or women, with lots of stones, could drive the beast off a cliff and still have to eat more than they would have had without cooperation, even after dividing the meat up between them. But it's a two-way street for collaboration. Unless you partner with several others to destroy buffaloes and each time, they drive you away from the kill and eat it on your own, you'll quickly take your services elsewhere and leave the ingrates to fail without the fourth-for-bridge Palaeolithic equivalent. Cooperation requires reciprocity. Justice has its roots in the problem of working together to establish equality and reciprocity. When I work with you to till your corn field, how much of the corn is due to me at the time of harvest? Cooperation occurs at maximum efficiency when there is equality, and the benefits of cooperation are becoming more desirable. Therefore, an enlightened self-interest involves a desire for justice. We can have symphonies of equality and cooperation. We don't even have an album without it. Because we are emotionally suggestible, when we exercise rational self-interest, we would typically be wise to choose actions that will make us happier and willing to cooperate and support us for their happiness. On the other hand, acts that damage others and make them sad even if they do not prompt open retribution that diminishes our satisfaction will create an emotional atmosphere that will make us less happy because of our

suggestively. Since our nervous systems are capable of imprinting, not only are we capable of falling in love at first sight, we can love objects and ideas as well as men, and we can love with varying intensities. Like the gosling drawn to the toy train, the desire for love drives us forward. However, unlike the "love" of the gosling, our love can be shaken to a considerable extent by experience and educated. Surely, one of the major goals of enlightened self-interest is to give and receive sexual and non-sexual attention. As a general but not absolute principle, we have to choose those behaviours that are likely to bring us love and acceptance, and we have to avoid those behaviours that are not going to. Nevertheless, the perception of love and beauty is a passive mind activity. How much greater is the pleasure of making beauty. How delightful it is to consciously exercise our creative powers and bring out what can be cherished. Paints and pianos are not necessarily prerequisites for creativity exercise: we have been creative whenever we transform the raw materials of existence so that we leave them better than they were when we found them.

Check your Progress-2

1. State the thing about ethics without god?

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11.6 LET'S SUM UP

Kant's postulates of Deity, Immortality and Justice are an effort to limit the mystical and extend the rational in order to bring them together. While the philosophy of Kant has a strong foundation in rationality, it was not possible to use this rationality alone to give completeness and consistency to his theory and to the end; he had to incorporate postulates to have meaning in the practical realm. Nevertheless, approaching the postulates from yet another perspective, we are suspicious of the whole reason-built philosophical system, and the postulates provide fuel for our

thought as to whether Kant's last-minute attempt is to save the whole structure. For the acceptance of postulates, Kant drawn flak from many. According to Hegel, Neiman argues, "Kant's postulates of reason are pitiful substitutes for the reality it failed to establish." Another problem that arises from the incorporation of postulates is that postulates are important only to a rational person, and it is difficult for a person turning a blind eye to objectively define the essence of God, liberty and immortality. As Walsh writes, "If there was someone who was totally oblivious to the call of moral obligation and totally indifferent to the issue of whether or not the world could be made better, he could not even understand what the proof was about. And Walsh would again say that they become little more than hollow sounds when the postulates are stripped of their practical significance. For Kant attempting to' deny information' to make room for faith, many questions are raised. Kant's refusal to put theoretical knowledge into the practical postulates does not satisfactorily articulate the intrinsic relationship between morality and metaphysics that Kant is trying to establish. The postulates, introduced to critical philosophy not by virtue of their philosophical existence and epistemological comprehension, but by their transcendental reality, are essential to human life as it provides a moral certainty that enables us to respond to the demands of moral law. A central aspect of ethics is "good life," life worth living or truly satisfying nature, which is considered more important by many philosophers than traditional moral codes. It was called eudemonia or fun by the ancient Greeks. The ancient Greeks concluded that happiness was brought about in keeping with virtue-positive character traits through living one's life. In a well-educated individual, virtue in the highest sense would require not only good personal habits like courage and temperance, but also honesty and justice and intellectual virtue. The essence of ethics is brought about by sincerity in the person's wholeness. The influential philosopher, Immanuel Kant, advocated God's theory as a fundamental moral imperative. He said we ought to be faithful and fulfil our obligation. Kant assumed that goodness ought to be compensated with happiness, and it would be impossible if it were not so. Kant argued that the soul must be immortal, for it is obvious that kindness in the present life always goes unrewarded. Virtue must earn its rightful reward in a future life, and a God must ensure that it is so

rewarded. The existence of God and the salvation of the soul was what Kant called the foundations of practical reason without which it would not be possible, he said, for religion and spiritual life. Revealed religions like Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are imposing such clear and unambiguous laws to follow. If God wrote and directed their scriptures, then God himself orders the instructions in them. It cannot be changed unless human circumstances change and moral principles evolve. When religion plays a role in making moral decisions, what is that role to play? In America, their religion is a fundamental aspect of who they are for many people, so outside their religious beliefs they would be almost unable to make ethical decisions. Yes, some of our most basic moral values are directly associated with religious ideology. Many people agree, for instance, that acts like murder and adultery are always wrong, regardless of circumstances. These views are held by most major world religions, and it can be argued that the original source of our moral intuitions is the ancient codes of conduct embodied in these rituals. At the very least, we seem to see religion as a good source of basic moral guidance, making it unwise to argue that religion and ethics should not be related. The Golden Rule best describes the religion-morality relationship. Nearly all the world's great religions include in their religious texts a version of the Golden Rule: "Do to others as you would like them to do to you." In other words, as we want to be treated, we have to treat others. This is the basic philosophy affecting all religions. If we do that, there's going to be joy.

11.7 KEYWORDS

- Religious - Relating to or believing in a religion.

- Ethics - moral principles that govern a person's behaviour or the conducting of an activity.

- Religion-Studies - Religious studies, also known as the study of religion, is an academic field devoted to research into religious beliefs, behaviours.

- Philosophy-theology - Philosophical theology is both a branch and form of theology in which philosophical methods are used in developing or analyzing theological concepts.

- Ethical - Relating to moral principles or the branch of knowledge dealing with these.

- Morality - Principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour.

11.8 UNIT END QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by Religion?

2. What is meant by Ethics?

3. State the difference between Religion and ethics.

4. What is "Ethics without God"?

5. Which are the Kant's postulates?

11.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- The main theme of the unit gets from the 'Shoshana' https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in.
- Kant's main story https://www.jstor.org.
- Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory.
- "Secular morality" - https://en.wikipedia.org /wiki /Secular morality.
- Religious Ethics, Sarah E. Fredericks, Stephen C. Meredith, Richard B. Miller, Martha C. Nussbaum, William Schweiker, Laurie Zoloth.

11.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

The relationship between religion and crime and other activities that do not conform to contemporary laws and social standards in different countries has been of concern. Such relationships have been examined by studies conducted in recent years, but the findings are inconsistent and sometimes conflicting.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

It is hard to believe that even intelligent and educated people could hold such an opinion, but they do! It seems never to have occurred to them that the Greeks and Romans, whose gods and goddesses were something less than paragons of virtue, nevertheless led lives not obviously worse than those of the Baptists of Alabama!

UNIT-12: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY

12.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on "Contemporary Challenges to Classical Ethical Theory", you will get the knowledge about important sections such as

- The importance of Sociobiology, Feminism, and Moral Responsibility.
- Evolution and mortality relations.
- Evolutionary ethics.

12.1 INTRODUCTION

Ethics is the analysis of the right and the wrong in general. It may look at moral behaviour and decisions descriptively; it may provide practical advice on normative ethics, or it may examine and theorize the essence of morality and ethics. Contemporary ethics research has many relations

in philosophy itself and other sciences with other disciplines. Normative ethics has been diminishing, although meta-ethics is gradually being practiced. Experience-based research has replaced theoretical theorizing in many ways. Psychology, psychology, economics, medicine, and neurobiology are fields that have been aided and assisted in ethics advancement. Has drawn closer to ethics within psychology, epistemology, or the theory of how we think. This is partly due to the understanding that intelligence can be seen as a moral attribute, such as quality and goodness. The Gettier problem has shown that conventional information analyses and concepts are unsound. New interest in meta-ethics has been growing. This has evolved in recent years as a known category based on Hume's research, G. E. Moore's work and J's error theories. L. Mackie who, if any, is searching for a real basis to think about beliefs, right and wrong. Mackie is pessimistic about overcoming the problem posed by the value-facts distinction. Reason's hegemony has been constantly questioned from different quarters. In the Anglo-American sphere, the work of Heidegger has become more and more translated and interpreted, and the principle of always pursuing logic is frequently challenged. Many thriving areas of research are the ethics of treatment and environmental ethics. Which point to a general increasing cultural awareness of the hitherto supremacy of rationality and male-based ideals in culture rather than a social world view of interpersonal, situational and group. Reason and emotion are seen in human actions as more equal partners. Major differences in viewpoint exist, for example between continental and empirical approaches, and a priori approaches to process / pragmatism vs. logic. Edmund Gettier wrote a short but influential article showing that a traditionally accepted reason-based interpretation does not capture information. Pragmatism and process theory in particular, are increasingly being embraced as a response to an ever-changing perception of a dynamic world, both physically and in the domains of innovation and science. Mackie says that increasing secularization has meant that many do not see religion as the basis for deciding how to behave. Throughout Kant's work, for instance, Quine's critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction has implications for ethics. Logic is a complex and seemingly versatile branch of learning, rather than as previously thought to underpin mathematics and reasoning.

Postmodernism and its aftermath have left behind the search for an overarching morality philosophy, single theories reputed to explain or justify entire aspects of human experience and knowledge, such as Marxism, religion, Freudianism and nationalism. In the year 1977, authors as varied as Jean-François Lyotard and J L Mackie point to the fall in grand narratives. In general, Mackie saw this fall in the year 1977 as weakening the credibility of traditional morality. This has facilitated the development of both theory of error and meta-ethics as campaigns to either evaluate or affirm the foundation of our hereditary value systems. As a consequence, the plausibility of decision-making based on the context and the particular situation being addressed is generally recognized rather than subscribing to standards. This move away from grand theory reflects Adam Smith's earlier views, who believed that ethical principles are derived from moral actions rather than the other way around. Major ethical problems include the distinction between fact and meaning, the principle of error that seems to negate the validity of moral claims and implicit relativism across cultures and ages. Many believe that the prevalence of ethics theory problems has contributed to a general decline in interest in pure ethics research as more opportunities arise in applied ethics and meta-ethics. Stephen Darwall et al referred to "a truly new era in the ethics of the twentieth century, the robust revival of metaethics coinciding with the advent of a criticism of the moral theory undertaking itself."

12.2 SOCIO-BIOLOGY, FEMINISM, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Human behavioural ecology (HBE), or human evolutionary ecology, is the most closely related modern evolutionary social science to the original sociobiological project; it is the field often referred to by some science philosophers as "socio-biology" (Griffiths, 2008; Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999). "Socio-biology" is most commonly used as a term of comparison with "evolutionary psychology," another current evolutionary social science project influenced by early socio-biologists, and also much developed from how early socio-biology was conceived: see the entry for discussion on evolutionary psychology. Some common names for HBE are "evolutionary anthropology" (Smith, 2000) or

"Darwinian ecological anthropology" (Vayda, 1995) (because most of its practitioners have a background in or are located in departments of anthropology and use anthropological fieldwork as the principal means of testing their human behaviour hypotheses). The various names appear to be used when the researchers concerned stress the psychology and non-human behavioural ecology aspects of their area. HBE has much in common with the above-mentioned non-human behavioural ecology. In general, instead of the psychological mechanisms mentioned in evolutionary psychology, it shares its emphasis on behaviour. Unlike non-human behavioural ecology, it has not continued to use the phenotypic gambit of Grafen (1984), in that its practitioners typically do not attempt to discover or explain the biological or other tools used to produce the actions they are interested in; nor, in that case, do they generally attempt to discover the underlying psychology. Nevertheless, some focus differences exist in that the human behaviour issues addressed by human behavioural ecologists (HBEs) are sometimes different from those addressed by non-human behavioural ecologists. The HBE approach's central purpose is to use the hypothesis that human behavioural techniques are adaptations as heuristic to classify the adaptive and existing regional environmental causes of human behaviour variability. Once a nice standard example of HBE reasoning is research on prey selection strategies between Paraguay's Ache foragers by Hillard Kaplan and Kim Hill (1992). The theory here is that the prey selection strategy of the Ache is a regional manifestation of a larger human behavioural adaptation for prey selection: by making this statement, Kaplan and Hill can use the prey selection behaviour of the Ache as a way to determine the conditions that led to the evolution of the larger prey selection strategy and to determine what causes the Ache to choose the prey they do in their local environment. Just as in non-human behavioural ecology, HBE usually describes behavioural approaches as complex behavioural structures. Behavioural interventions involve behavioural responses to local stimuli; then behavioural techniques include generating a set of different responses to a set of different stimuli (this set of stimuli could be called the tactical response conditions). According to Kaplan and Hill, the Ache prey selection strategy involves choosing a variety of different possible prey items from the environment;

whether or not a prey item is taken depends on a number of circumstances that serve as the conditions of response: for example, the presence of prey with certain specific characteristics, such as the caloric return of the prey given the time needed to process it (kno). HBEs generally describe behavioural strategies in terms of an "epigenetic" or decision rule that is usually given as mathematical function mapping values for response conditions to the correct values for behavioural performance parameters. Kaplan and Hill's research also offers such an epigenetic principle (see Kaplan and Hill, 1992, 170), which defines the relationship between search time, productivity, and so on, to assess the prey to find when the Ache is out foraging. The prey selection strategy as a whole (i.e. not the unique, locally appropriate set of prey choices of the Ache, for example, but the general human prey selection strategy of which they are a manifestation) is also assumed to be, for heuristic purposes, an adaptation to historical conditions that led to the selection of that strategy; these are the selection conditions for the strategy. Supposing that it is appropriate to follow behavioural strategies as such in order to be able to adapt (see the later discussion in section 4) the conditions of choice of a given behavioural strategy would typically include the conditions of response (because it probably involves the development of open behaviour to operate on a behavioural strategy) but likely also features of the larger behaviour). In other words, in the case of prey selection, productivity, prey densities and availability of search time would probably have been among the conditions of choice of a prey selection strategy (assuming it is an adaptation). Other information about the environment, however, would not be directly included in these models, such as the constraints on human capacity which decide what prey is accessible in that environment, the ecology which determines which prey is in the environment, etc. HBEs are therefore involved in systematically defining the criteria for choosing human behavioural strategies. HBEs are anthropologists, however, and therefore also want to explain the local causes of the very different open activities which humans participate in; this can be achieved by describing the local manifestations of the response conditions of the strategies that humans use. Determining these conditions of response is a question of determining the proper operational definition of those strategies (Kitcher,

1987). So how could he explain these strategies? It should be noted that this is quite difficult to do: what HBEs find in the field is collection of overt behaviours in a background of a number of environmental conditions, one of which could be the conditions of response. It may be far from clear exactly why such behaviours occur and what local conditions are the triggers to which the behaviour is a response. Nonetheless, what overt actions are manifestations of the same technique may not even be apparent. In the case of Ache, what Kaplan and Hill found is not a total prey selection technique, but a number of occasions where individuals or groups of Ache people took or did not take prey they met while eating, among many other foraging kinds and other activities. The question is what, if any, of these occasions 'overt behaviours represented a single strategy of prey selection, and how these overt behaviours are related to each other and the environmental conditions in which they occur. The idea seems to be this: if human behavioural strategies are adaptations, then the relationships between behavioural responses and local ecological conditions similar to those of the human evolutionary past can be expected to be locally optimal, ceteris paribus; this means that the strategic response conditions (allegedly) will be those (along with additional plausible selection condition). HBEs, like behavioural ecologists studying non-human animals, tend to use optimal modelling to determine which strategy would maximize (if locally) fitness as it evolved. Just as in non-human behavioural ecology, the model will identify a strategy that would maximize fitness under a set of proposed selection conditions in the evolutionary past, including the response conditions and the various overt behavioural responses to them. Such conditions of choice may be either explicit or implicit in the assumptions of the system or prototype. This raises the question of how the correct model should be selected. For situations where the nature of the issue may be unique to the human case and where the current environment is likely to vary from the situation under which the strategy originally developed, the option of the HBE model will often be different and at least some of the suggested selection conditions will be established by appealing to fossil record data. A nice example could be human life history, where the human condition is relatively unique: human beings have unusually long lives and

childhoods compared to other primates, for example, and long life after menopause. As a result, human behavioural ecologists have to make detailed appeals to the fossil record to decide which kinds of evolutionary changes may have included (Hawkes, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2000). Where the structure of the adaptive problem faced by humans and the conditions affecting their behaviour are expected to mirror those found in non-human animals and be very similar to those found in their evolutionary past, model selection is often standard from non-human behavioural ecology; the proposed selection conditions may be based on the current conditions observed in foragi This is exactly what happens in the Ache foraging case: the prey choice models used by Kaplan and Hill are those used in non-human animals to understand similar sorts of strategies. This is because Kaplan and Hill expect those acting on non-human animals to closely mirror the relevant conditions acting on human prey choice. The main issue for prey selection strategies is whether to take and capture or collect that prey item when encountering a potential prey item while foraging, or whether your caloric return on time invested would be maximized by ignoring it and continuing to look for something else with higher profitability. This can be the case in cases where other potential foods have much higher profitability or encounter rates that are sufficiently high. Then the strategy is about building a "diet" those prey items that are always taken when they are found. This is done in order to obtain profitability by ordering prey items. Then it is necessary to add the most profitable prey to the diet. The next step is to calculate the average foraging rate of return (in calories per hour) obtained by simply searching for the most profitable item, given its profitability, how often it is found, and the caloric cost of the search itself. If the foraging return rate (in calories per hour) with just that item is lower than the profitability (in calories per hour) of the second highest profitability item, the second highest item should be added to the diet; the new foraging return rate should then be calculated with both the first and second highest profitability items. Then that new average foraging return rate should be compared to the profitability of the third highest profitability item— and so on until all remaining potential prey have lower profitability than the average foraging return rate with all items currently in the diet. The theory is that a forager maximizes caloric

output per hour by taking only those things in the diet and avoiding all else. Therefore, the HBEs must eventually try to test their concept of optimality. The model's explanation of that strategy should typically include explanations of possible behavioural responses to conditions (or values for parameters of those responses) that go beyond what has already been observed; this means that the model predicts that if the strategy definition is accurate, such responses should also occur. For example, in the prey choice case of Kaplan and Hill, the model predicts Ache prey choice patterns that had not yet been seen by the observers, such as which prey the Ache should and should not take on encounter and under what circumstances. Therefore, the model can be evaluated by searching for a situation where the strategy's response conditions are obtained and whether the action in response to those conditions is as predicted by the model. This is partly why such rules are tested in foraging societies— because many of these techniques have conditions of response that represent conditions that are believed to be present in the evolutionary past of man, and that can be done in forging societies but not in modern societies. For example, obviously in the foraging case of Kaplan and Hill, few if any modern or even small-scale agricultural societies routinely participate in foraging that is a primary source of nutrition, and thus do not present an opportunity for individuals to make the right type of prey choice. The other explanation for carrying out these tests in foraging societies is because particularly in these societies, the HBEs want to understand the local causes of overt behaviour. If the strategy is as defined, the HBEs will take the prototype to be checked and thus also use the HBEs 'trait definition. Consequently (because these are provided by the trait description) the existence of the local causes of open behaviour will be explained by behavioural ecologists (in the case of Kaplan and Hill, the causes of Ache's prey selection behaviour); and so will the suggested interpretation of the source of the behavioural strategy with regard to past selection conditions be explained by the model emp. Differences between the behavioural approaches expected and defined allow scientists to create new models or propose additional conditions or constraints to apply to the original models; there must be independent evidence that these conditions or constraints are obtained. Observations by Kaplan and Hill differ from what their model predicts:

The Ache is engaged in a variety of prey choices that are not necessarily optimizing fitness. In general, men often seem to disregard most calorie-rich plant and sometimes smaller animals' sources of food, and women are not playing larger sports. The problem then is how to proceed: HBEs frequently propose improvements to the model that could account for these prediction failures; they often provide some independent evidence for their recommendations. For example, one of Hawkes ' proposed explanations for why male hunting activities frequently fail to meet the expectations of prey selection (similar failures are found in many cultures besides the Ache) is that men seek big games for reasons other than simply collecting calories— they are also interested in showing off to get other fitness incentives, such as additional sexual partners or better allian. Hawkes was able to demonstrate that in the year Hawkes, 1991, men's prey selection decisions were consistent with that view. Quite apart from the basic interest in the question of whether human nature exists, the issue is important because it could have a significant moral or social outcome: what society we can have, and indeed what society we should have, can depend on what human nature is like (Wilson, 1978). It was this fear that in the early days after the publication of Socio-biology sparked the "socio-biology wars." The "Socio-biology Study Group" was concerned that Wilson was trying to argue that many problematic or adverse aspects in current societies, such as patriarchal gender roles, toxic race interactions and interpersonal violence, could be portrayed unchangeably in the People's Science Study Group of Socio-biology, 1976). Biology theorists have firmly rejected the idea that humans have a' character' in anything like the traditional sense of a fixed essence (Hull, 1986; Lewens, 2012; Lloyd and Crowley, 2002), but there is also some controversy as to whether humans can be said to have a nature in the sense of a collection of developed characteristics in much the way Wilson suggests (e.g. see Machery, 2008, 2012; for a critique s. Alternatively, philosophers in this field concentrate on conceptions of human nature that take into account human development's versatility and human capacity to construct their own development and hence their own' culture.' Now come with the next and relevant word, "Feminism," the term feminism can be used to describe a political, social or economic movement that seeks to create equal rights and women's legal protection.

Feminism encompasses theoretical and sociological theories and philosophies dealing with issues of gender difference, as well as a movement promoting gender equality for women and fighting for the rights and interests of women. Although the words "feminism" and "feminist" did not gain common use until the 1970s, they had already been used much earlier in the public talk; for example, in the 1942 movie Woman of the Year, Katherine Hepburn talks about the "feminist movement." The history of feminism can be divided into three waves, according to Maggie Humm and Rebecca Walker. The first feminist movement was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the second was in the sixties and seventies, and the third continues to the present from the nineties. From these feminist movements, feminist theory arose. It is visible in a variety of disciplines, including feminist geography, feminist literature, and literary feminist criticism. In a broad range of areas within Western society, feminism has shifted prevailing views, ranging from history to law. Feminist activists have advocated for women's legal rights (contract rights, property rights, voting rights); for women's rights to physical integrity and freedom, abortion rights and reproductive rights (including access to contraception and quality prenatal care); for women's and girls'' protection from domestic violence, sexual harassment and rape; for workplace rights, like partner. Many feminist movements and ideologies covered proponents from Western Europe and North America who were predominantly white middle-magnificence ladies at some point of a lot in their history. Nevertheless, ladies of other races have encouraged alternative feminisms at least on account that Sojourner Truth's 1851 deal with to American feminists. With the U.S. Civil Rights movement and the decline of Western colonization in Africa, the Caribbean, elements of Latin America and Southeast Asia, this phenomenon intensified within the Sixties. Since then, women were advocating "submit-colonial" or "1/3 global" feminisms in former European colonies and the Third World. Many postcolonial feminists have been essential of Western feminism for being ethnocentric, including Chandra Talpade Mohanty. This view is shared via black girls like Angela Davis and Alice Walker. Feminism's two principal divisions are extensively identified

a) Pro-feminism

It is feminism's support without saying that the supporter is a part of the feminist movement. The phrase is most commonly used in reference to people who actively support feminism and gender equality efforts. Pro-feminist men's organizations 'projects include anti-violence work with boys and young men in classrooms, providing seminars on workplace sexual harassment, running community education programs, and therapy for male violence perpetrators. Pro-feminist men are also active in men's health, anti-pornography advocacy including legislation on anti-pornography, men's studies, and the creation of school curricula for gender equity. Sometimes this work is done in partnership with feminists and services for women, such as domestic violence and centres for rape crisis. Many advocates of both sexes will not call men "feminists" at all, and they will call only pro-feminist men "pro-feminists."

b) Anti-feminism

Anti-feminism is Opposition in some or all of its forms to feminism. Feminists have dubbed "anti-feminists" authors such as Camille Paglia, Christina Hoff Sommers, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese. Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge suggest that the word "anti-feminist" is used in this way to discourage academic discussion on feminism. The books Spreading Misandry and Legalizing Misandry by Paul Nathanson and Katherine K. Young discuss what they claim is feminist-inspired misandry. Christina Hoff-Sommers claims that feminist misandry contributes to misogyny explicitly through what she terms "feminist culture" against the majority of women who love men in Who Stole Feminism: Why Women Have Betrayed Men. Marriage rights supporters condemn feminists such as Sheila Cronan who claim that marriage is women's bondage and that women's liberation cannot be achieved without marriage being abolished.

The moral responsibility, crucial term to understand:

When an individual performs a morally significant action or fails to perform it, we often feel that a particular type of response is required. Perhaps the most evident forms this reaction can take are praise and

blame. For example, one who witnesses a car accident may be considered worthy of praise for saving a child from inside the burning car, or otherwise, one may be considered worthy of blame for not using one's cell phone to call for assistance. Seeing these agents as deserving of one of these reactions is seeing them to be responsible for what they have done and left undone. These are examples of other-directed duty assignments. It may also be necessary to self-direct the reaction, e.g. you may consider yourself as being blameworthy. Therefore, being morally responsible for something, say an event, is deserving of a specific kind of reaction praise, blame, or something close to that for having done something. While further elaboration and clarification of the above definition of moral responsibility is necessary and will be given below, this is sufficient to differentiate concern about this type of responsibility from some others commonly referred to by using the words 'responsibility' or' responsibility.' To illustrate this, we may claim that it is responsible for higher than normal spring rainfall. In the first example, we want to establish a causal link between the earlier amount of rain and the subsequently increased vegetation. In the second, we mean to say that some responsibilities, or obligations, follow when one assumes the role of judge. Although these principles are related to the principle of moral responsibility discussed here, they are not the same, because in either case they are directly concerned about whether it would be acceptable to respond with something like praise or blame to some person.

Check your Progress-1

1.Define Pro-feminism and Anti-feminism.

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12.3 ETHICS AND THE DESCENT OF MAN

Man's ethics and descent are interrelated topics that characterize man with morality and true ethics. Man's fall is one of the famous books written by "Charles Darwin." He discusses some of the great work in his novels, a brief explanation of how it came to be published can help understand the nature of the subsequent work. I collected observations on

the origin or descent of man over many years, without any intention of publishing on the subject, but rather with the decision not to publish, as I felt I should only add to the prejudices against my views. In the first edition of my' Origin of Species' it seemed to me enough to suggest that "light would be shed on the origin of man and his history" through this work; and this means that man must be included with other organic beings in any general conclusion about his way of being on this planet. Now the scenario has a completely different dimension to it. If, in his address as President of the National Institution of Geneva (1869), a naturalist like Carl Vogt ventures to say, "personne, en Europe at least, n'ose plus soutenir la création indépendante et de toutes pièces, des espèces," it is clear that at least a large number of naturalists should agree that organisms are the altered descendants of other animals; and that is particularly good with that. The larger number supports the natural selection agency; although some demand that the future will rule with fairness, I have greatly overrated its significance. Sadly, many of the older and respected natural science leaders are still opposed to evolution in all types. As a result of the views now accepted by most naturalists and eventually pursued, as in every other case, by others who are not scientific, I was led to bring together my notes to see how far the general conclusions drawn in my earlier works are applicable to man. It seemed even more important, as I had never consciously extended such beliefs to an individual species. When we restrict our attention to any type, we are deprived of the weighty arguments derived from the existence of the affinities that link entire classes of organisms— their past and present geographical distribution and their geological succession. A species 'homological structure, embryological development, and primitive organs remain to be considered, be it man or any other animal to which our attention may be directed; however, as I see it, these great groups of facts provide ample and definitive evidence in favour of the gradual evolution theory. Nevertheless, the strong support resulting from the other claims should be held before the mind at all times. The sole purpose of this work is to examine, firstly, whether man, like any other organism, emerges from some pre-existing form; secondly, the manner in which he develops; and thirdly, the meaning of the distinctions between the so-called human races. Since I will confine myself to these examples,

it will not be necessary to describe in detail the distinctions between the various races an enormous subject that has been explored in many useful works. Recently, a number of eminent men's labours, beginning with M, have demonstrated the deep antiquity of man. Boucher de Perthes; and this is the basic basis for understanding his roots. Therefore, I shall take this conclusion for granted and refer my readers to the excellent treatises of Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock and others. Nor will I have the opportunity to do more than to appeal to the distinction between man and anthropomorphic apes; for Prof. Huxley, in the view of the most knowledgeable judges, has shown conclusively that in every observable aspect man varies less from the higher apes than they do from the lower members of the same primate order. This work hardly contains any original man-related facts; but as the conclusions I drew after drawing up a rough draft seemed fascinating to me, I figured they might interest others. It has often been proclaimed with certainty that the source of man can never be known: but ignorance produces trust more often than knowledge: it is those who know nothing, and not those who know a great deal, who affirm so confidently that science will never solve this or that problem. The idea that man is the co-descendant of some ancient, lower, and extinct type with other species is not recent to any degree. Lamarck came to this conclusion long ago, which several influential naturalists and philosophers have recently maintained; for example, Wallace, Huxley, Lyell, Vogt, Lubbock, Büchner, Rolle, & c. And Hackle in particular. This last naturalist, in addition to his great work,' Generelle Morphologie' (1866), published his' Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte' recently (1868, with a second edit. in 1870), in which he explores the genealogy of man in full. If this thesis had existed before my essay was published, I likely should never have finished it. Almost all the observations I have drawn were supported by this naturalist, whose experience on many issues is far more detailed than mine. Wherever I have inserted any details or views from the writings of Prof. Häckel, I offer his authority in the text; other claims that I leave as originally stated in my manuscript, often referring to his works in the footnotes, as clarification of the more controversial or interesting points. For many years, it seemed highly likely to me that sexual selection played an important role in separating man's races; but in my first edition

of' Origin of Species,' I contented myself with merely referring to this assumption. I considered it necessary to examine the whole subject in full detail when I came to apply this view to man. Consequently, the second part of the present work, dealing with sexual selection, stretched over the first part to an unnecessary length; but this could not be avoided. I planned to add an article on the representation of the different emotions by man and the lower animals to the present volumes. Many years ago, Sir Charles Bell's exemplary research called my attention to this subject. This esteemed anatomist believes that for the sole purpose of communicating his feelings, man is born with certain muscles. Since this view is clearly contradictory to the assumption that man is descended from some other and lower sort, I had to consider it. I always wanted to find out how far the different races of man transmit the emotions in the same way. Yet I thought it better to reserve my essay for separate publication because of the duration of the present work. "The decent of man," applying evolutionary theory to human evolution and explaining his theory of sexual selection, a type of biological adaptation that is distinct from, but intertwined with, natural selection. The book discusses other related issues, including evolutionary psychology, evolutionary morality, and human race disparities, gender differences, women's dominant role in mate choice, and the importance of evolutionary theory to society.

12.4 EVOLUTION AND ETHICS: THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL APPROACH

With Edward O. Wilson's 1975 publication Socio-biology: The New Synthesis, the term socio-biology can be traced back to the 1940s. In it, he introduced the concept of socio-biology as the application to social behaviour of evolutionary theory. Socio-biology is based on the premise that certain behaviours are at least partly inherited and that natural selection can influence them. This begins with the belief that habits have evolved over time, similar to how it is assumed that physical traits have evolved. Therefore, animals should act in ways that have proven evolutionarily efficient over time, which, among other things, may lead to the formation of complex social processes. According to sociobiologists, natural selection has influenced a lot of social behaviour.

Socio-biology examines social behaviours such as patterns of gaming, territorial battles, and hunting packs. This suggests that just as selection pressure led animals to learn useful ways of interacting with the natural environment, it also contributed to beneficial social behaviour's genetic evolution. Therefore, behaviour is seen as an effort to preserve one's genes in the population and it is believed that certain genes or gene combinations affect similar behavioural traits from generation to generation. The theory of evolution by natural selection by Charles Darwin suggests that features less suited to different conditions of life will not survive in a population because species with those features appear to have lower rates of survival and reproduction. Sociobiologists model in much the same way the evolution of human behaviours, using different behaviours as the appropriate traits. However, they add to their theory several other conceptual elements. Sociobiologists believe that evolution requires not only genes, but mental, social and cultural features as well. As people reproduce, offspring inherit their parents 'genes, and when parents and children share biological, developmental, physical, and social conditions, they inherit their parents 'gene-effects. Sociobiologists also agree that the varying rates of reproductive success within that community are linked to different levels of wealth, social status, and power. The study of sex-role stereotypes is one example of how sociobiologists use their theory in reality. Traditional social science suggests that human beings are born without inherent predispositions or cognitive content and that discrepancies in the behaviour of children are clarified by the differential treatment of parents who have sex-role expectations. Giving baby dolls to girls to play with while giving boys toy trucks, for example, and dressing little girls in pink and purple while dressing boys in blue and white. Nevertheless, sociobiologists claim that babies have inherent differences in actions that cause parents 'reaction to treat boys one way and girls another. In contrast, women with low status and less resource access appear to have more female offspring, while women with high status and more resource access tend to have more male offspring. This is because the anatomy of a woman responds to her social status in a way that influences her child's gender and style of parenting. That is, women who are socially dominant tend to have higher levels of testosterone than others, and their physiology makes them more

aggressive, assertive, and confident than others. It makes them more likely to have male children and a more assertive, dominant style of parenting. Like any theory, there are opponents of socio-biology. Another critique of the concept is that reasoning for human behaviour is insufficient because it lacks the psychological and cultural contributions. The second socio-biology critique is that it depends on genetic determinism, which means the status quo acceptance. For example, if male aggression is biologically predetermined and beneficial for reproduction, critics argue, then male aggression tends to be a biological reality we have little control over.

12.5 PROSPECTS FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS

Evolutionary ethics is a research field that examines how evolutionary theory can impact on our understanding of morality and ethics. The range of issues that evolutionary ethics is examining is quite broad. Evolutionary ethics proponents have said it has significant implications in the fields of descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and met ethics.

a. Descriptive Ethics

Descriptive evolutionary ethics is the most widely accepted form of evolutionary ethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics seeks to explain in genetic terms, in whole or in part, different types of ethical phenomena. Ethical topics covered include altruistic conduct, an intrinsic sense of fairness, a potential for ethical direction, feelings of compassion and affection, self-sacrifice, incest-avoidance, parental care, loyalty in-group, monogamy, rivalry and retribution-related emotions, moral "cheating" and hypocrisy. A key issue in evolutionary psychology was how altruistic emotions and actions could have developed, both in humans and non-humans, when the natural selection process was focused on spreading over time only those genes that better respond to changes in the species 'climate. Kin selection, team selection, and mutual altruism, both direct and indirect, as well as on a societal scale, were the concepts discussing this. Descriptive evolutionary ethicists have addressed how different types of ethical phenomena should be seen as adaptations that

have developed due to their direct adaptive advantages or spin-offs that have evolved as side effects of adaptive behaviour.

a.   Normative evolutionary ethics

It is evolutionary ethics 'most divisive branch. In evolutionary terms, the purpose of normative evolutionary ethics is to determine which actions are right or wrong and which things are good or bad. It does not just define, but prescribes priorities, principles and obligations. The most historically influential form of normative evolutionary ethics is social Darwinism, discussed above. Just like philosopher G. E. Moore's popular point was that many early versions of normative evolutionary ethics tended to commit a logical error that Moore called naturalistic fallacy. In terms of some non-normative, naturalistic property, such as enjoyment or survival, this was the error of describing a normative property, such as goodness. More complex models of evolutionary moral ethics do not need to commit any naturalistic fallacy or fallacy. But all kinds of normative evolutionary ethics face the difficult challenge of describing why evolutionary evidence for rational agents can have normative authority. "The question for a rational person, regardless of why one has a characteristic, is always: is it right for me to practice it, or should I renounce it and avoid it to the degree I can?"

c.   Evolutionary met ethics

Evolutionary theory may not be able to tell us what is morally correct or incorrect, but it may illuminate our use of moral language and cast doubt on the nature of objective moral evidence or the likelihood of moral knowledge. These arguments have been made by evolutionary ethicists including Michael Ruse, E. O. Wilson, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street. It is used by some philosophers who advocate evolutionary meta-ethics to contradict conceptions of human well-being based on Aristotelian teleology or other goal-driven accounts of human flourishing. In an effort to debunk moral realism and encourage religious skepticism, a variety of theorists referred to evolutionary theory. Sharon Street is a prominent ethicist who believes the theory of nature lacks moral realism. Human moral decision-making is "completely loaded" with evolutionary factors, according to Street. Natural selection, she suggests, would have favoured

moral dispositions that, if they existed, would have improved health, not those that obey moral truths. It would be a stunning and impossible occurrence if ethical "morally blind" features purely aimed at survival and reproduction are closely aligned with objective moral truths. And we can't trust our moral beliefs to record objective moral reality accurately. Realism thus causes us to accept ethical cynicism. These skepticism is implausible, Street argues. We should therefore oppose realism and instead accept some antirealist view that requires moral beliefs that are rationally justified. Moral realism proponents have given two kinds of responses. One is to argue that changing ethical reactions are likely to dramatically diverge from moral truth. Of example, evolution would prefer moral responses promoting social peace, harmony, and collaboration, according to David Cop. Yet precisely those values are those that lie at the heart of any plausible theory of objective moral truth. So, the supposed "dilemma" of Street rejects evolution and supports religious cynicism is a wrong choice. A second response to Street is to deny that with genetic factors as Street says, morality is as "saturated." For example, William Fitzpatrick argues that although there is considerable evolutionary impact on the nature of many of our moral beliefs, it remains possible that many of our moral beliefs are formed in part or in some cases entirely through autonomous moral reflection and reasoning, just as with our empirical, science and philosophical beliefs. Another common argument used by evolutionary ethicists to refute moral realism is to argue that the success of evolutionary psychology in explaining human ethical responses makes the notion of moral truth "explanatory superfluous." When, for instance, we can fully explain why parents instinctively love and care for their children in purely evolutionary terms, there is no need to invoke some rational "spooky" Therefore, for logical consistency purposes, we should not challenge the presence of such truths and instead describe the widely held belief in objective moral reality as "an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes in order to get us to collaborate with each other in order to survive our species."

Check your Progress-1

1.Explain "Evolutionary met ethics".

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12.6 EVOLUTION OF MORALITY

Morality begins with the instincts that we have evolved over eons to help us survive and reproduce. There are three of these instincts for human beings: one is focused on the choice of kin, and it tells us to care for our closest relatives, particularly our children. After all, caring for our relatives increases the likelihood that they will survive and reproduce, which in turn increases the likelihood that our genes will be passed on to future generations-including those that lead us to care for our relatives. The second is our friends 'love that we hear. As a species that produces little offspring, needs a nine-month pregnancy that culminates in unstable delivery and leads to a very helpless child which requires years of treatment, we have developed a strong tendency to develop attachments to our mates. As any parent will tell you, raising children requires at least two people. Sympathy is the second. They are social creatures, like many other species, and like so many prairie dogs, they are attuned to our fellow human beings 'feelings and behaviours. When one of us gets scared, the rest go into high alert; when one of us gets angry, we can rouse an entire mob's ire; when one of us laughs, others also start laughing-even if they don't get the joke. Sympathy is the least of these three. There are always "cheaters" in the animal world, creatures of the same species who take advantage of others that support each other instinctually. We have a lot of examples of these cheaters in the human world, which we often mark as "sociopaths." The inclination for empathy often depends heavily on social learning. For example, it needs to be nourished. Any instinctual inclination a child may have can be easily destroyed by abuse or neglect or just self-centred parenting in any environment where empathy is lacking. We also developed as human beings into a rather large brain, one that is capable of learning a great many things, including language. Learning ability allows for quicker adaptation to environmental change than evolution, and thus helps to "shake out" much of the hard wiring produced by animals. We still have instincts, of course, but with social learning they can be overwritten

much better than in, say, cats and dogs. A community that has survived and expanded for many decades or centuries is one that has provided patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaviour to its members that allow it to survive. We may call these trends myths, or stick with older terms like creeds and techniques-it doesn't matter. Among the trends that seem to work well for most communities are those that promote widening the scope of empathy and family love impulses to all community members, rather than just close relationships. Good examples are practices of mutual respect, obedience to authority, co-operation, etc. Such practices make it less likely that members of the community would spend their resources on internal conflicts and use it for productive activities, public preservation, and probably expansion at the expense of other groups. The Old Testament Hebrew is a great example of a culture whose values allowed them to prosper. But when the Bible says that we should love our neighbour, it means literally our friend, our fellow Jews, and not, says Egyptians or Assyrians or even Canaanites, as demonstrated by all the very violent war of the day. Being nice to one's foe, someone who is not a member of our "tribe," is a rather new concept, one that, in fact, only exists among the Jews of Hellenistic times. After all, any society that has the conviction that even aggressors should be good is a culture that typically doesn't last long and takes down that friendly belief with it. While previously promoted the idea of universal reverence, especially by Buddha, Jesus, and Greek thinkers, the movement most prominent in actualizing the idea would not come until the Enlightenment. I guess this was because we had practically filled the world only then. There was no space to wiggle between nations and empires. It had become clear that, if we were to be happy, we couldn't stop making our literal neighbours or our fellow tribe-mates nice anymore. We had to make beautiful things with other nations, other cultures, maybe everyone! The difficulty here, of course, is that you need to persuade people to move beyond their instinctive family love, beyond their tribe's social indoctrination, towards accepting the fundamental health of universal respect. The great value of this bio-social view of morality is that it removes the issue from the discussion of religion and philosophy and places it in the realm of pragmatism. Without denying our goals as human beings 'inherently subjective nature, we may be able to agree that one reasonable goal is to

maximize happiness. The problem then is how we encourage people to understand that maintaining our natural inclination towards empathy is in all our best interests.

12.7 LET'S SUM UP

We get in-depth knowledge of ethical concepts in this unit. Ethics is the branch of philosophy which deals with morality concepts and well-defined standards of right and wrong that prescribe human character and behaviour in terms of duties, privileges, laws, social benefit, justice, etc. The morals, in other words, covers human rights and responsibilities, the way to live a good life, the concept of right and wrong, and the distinction between good and bad. Which means it's about what's right or wrong for individuals and society. The concept "ethics" is derived from the Greek word "ethos" meaning person, practice, arrangement or custom. The importer of ethics even taught "the decent man" and morals.

12.8 KEYWORDS

- Adoption - The action or fact of choosing to take up, follow, or use something.

- Ethics feminism - Method to ethics based on the conviction that traditional ethical theorisation misunderstood and/or underestimates the moral experience of men and women and attempts to re-imagine ethics by a systematic, feminist method.

- Parenthood - The state of being a parent and the responsibilities involved.

- Genetic relatedness - Relatedness is the probability that two individuals share an allele due to recent common ancestry.

12.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What are the two main types of ethics discussed in this unit?

2. State the terms Socio-biology, Feminism, and Moral Responsibility.

3. What is the main theme of "The decent of man"?

4. Explain the term of mortality

5. What are the three main Evolutionary ethics?

12.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- The Summary of the unit united from various links of Wikipedia.
- "The Decent of man" Book written by Charles Darwin
- The main subjects in Mortality collected from, https://webspace.ship.edu portal.
- Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, by Françoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod.
- "Indian Ethics: Classical traditions and contemporary challenges" book by Purusottama Bilimoria, Joseph Prabhu, Renuka M. Sharma

12.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

- It is feminism's support without saying that the supporter is a part of the feminist movement.
- Anti-feminism is Opposition in some or all of its forms to feminism. Feminists have dubbed "anti-feminists" authors such as Camille Paglia, Christina Hoff Sommers, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese. Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge suggested.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

Evolutionary theory may not be able to tell us what is morally correct or incorrect, but it may illuminate our use of moral language and cast doubt on the nature of objective moral evidence or the likelihood of moral knowledge.

UNIT-13: FEMINIST ETHICS

13.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on 'Feminist Ethics', you will get the knowledge

- What exactly the term 'Feminist Ethics'.
- The concept of female mortality in Feminist Ethics.

13.1 INTRODCUTION

A simple understanding of what 'Feminist Ethics' is exactly, feminist ethics is an approach to ethics which draws on the idea that historically ethical theorizing has undervalued and/or undervalued the moral experience of women, which is largely male-dominated, and therefore seeks to re-imagine ethics through a holistic feminist approach to transform it. Feminist ethics as an academic field of study in the field of philosophy dates back to the 1970s, when philosophical journals began to publish articles specifically concerned with feminism and sexism more frequently (Korsmeyer 1973; Rosenthal 1973; Jaggar 1974), and after curricula of Women's Studies in some universities began to be established (Young 1977; Tuana 2011). Readers interested in themes evident in the 50-year philosophical feminist ethics will find this discussion in section (2) below,' Themes in Feminist Ethics.' Before

1970,' there was no recognized body of feminist philosophy' (Card 2008, 90). Philosophers have, of course, tried to understand the roles that gender can play in moral life throughout history. These thinkers were, however, probably addressing male readers, and their accounts of the ethical potential of women were not generally aimed at undermining women's subordination. Philosophical studies that consider gender are rarely found in the history of philosophy to critique and correct the historical advantages of men or to challenge the social orders and practices that restrict groups to gender dimensions. It is important for, but not appropriate for, feminist ethics to recognize that gender matters to one's moral theorizing in some way. Nevertheless, in almost every century, many thinkers and authors were precursors to feminist ethics. Representative writers published in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries discussed below specifically what they consider to be moral wrongs arising either from sexual oppression or from metaethical mistakes by public intellectuals in assuming ideal modes of moral reasoning to be within the capacities of men and not women. At the same time as feminism became a more popular term in Europe and the Americas in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, more scholars argued influentially to end unfair sex discrimination. Concertedly, some scholars suggested that philosophers and thinkers erred in interpreting what seemed to be gaps in ethical and moral reasoning between the sexes. Some public intellectuals published treatises in the seventeenth century arguing that women were as logical as men and that education should be given to allow them to improve their moral character. They argued that their unequal access to education was unethical and unjustifiable because women are reasonable. We addressed meta-ethical questions regarding morality's preconditions, including what kind of agents can be moral and whether morality is equally possible for different genders. For example, the first edition of Mary Astell's a Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their Real and Greatest Interest, promoting access to education, was published in 1694. It was controversial enough that three years later Astell published a sequel, A Serious Proposal, Part II, criticizing' such profound philosophical and theological myths that deny women the ability to develop their minds '(Springborg,' Introduction,' in Astell 2002, 21). At the time, it seems that some attributed the first

Serious Proposal not to Astell, but to Damaris Cudworth Masham, John Locke's one-time friend, as Masham was familiar with such critiques of the inequality of the lot of women and the historical perceptions that sustained their subordinate condition (Springborg,' Introduction,' in Astell 2002, 17). While Masham strongly disagreed with aspects of Astell's research, she would also later be credited with' explicitly feminist arguments,' including objections to' women's inferior education granted' (Frankel 1989, 84), especially when such obstacles were due to' men's ignorance' (Masham 1705, 169, cited in Frankel 1989, 85). Masham also deplored' the double standard of morality put on men and women, in general.the argument that the' virtue' of women consists primarily of chastity' (Frankel 1989, 85). A century later, in her Vindication of Women's Rights (1988), Mary Wollstonecraft revived attention to the lack of access to education for women. Criticizing the theoretical constructs that underpinned behaviours that denied adequate education for girls, Wollstonecraft expressed an ethic of equality of women's social and ethical rights as equal to men. Wollstonecraft also expanded her criticism of social structures to include moral philosophy, especially in opposition to prominent men's claims that women's values are different from men's and appropriate for perceived feminine duties. Wollstonecraft asserted:' I here throw down my gauntlet and deny the existence of sexual virtues,' adding that' I allow women to serve different duties; but they are human duties, and the values that should govern their discharge must be the same' (51). The Enlightenment Era movements inspired many men and women to rethink educational inequities at a period when universal human rights ideas were gaining popularity. As Joan Landes states, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet was an excellent advocate for women's rights in France during the same time, arguing in 1790 for' admission of women to citizenship rights' and' fair dignity to women on the grounds of reason and justice' (Landes 2016). Like many thinkers of their time and place, including Catherine Macaulay (Tomaselli in 2016), Olympe de Gouges, and Madame de Stael (Landes in 2016), Wollstonecraft and Condorcet accepted material gender differences, but developed moral arguments against ethical double standards based on universal humanism. Nevertheless, the notion of universal humanism tended to

emphasize values that were typically regarded as male. For example, Wollstonecraft argued against assumptions that women lacked the morality skills of men, but praised logic and' masculinity' as prerequisites for morality (Tong 1993, 44). In the fifty years since feminist ethics was the focus of philosophical research for (initially) Western and (increasingly) foreign discussion, philosophers have addressed methical, theoretical, and practical questions. Questions that occupied scholars in previous centuries, especially those concerning the natural (and gendered) capacity of moral agents for moral deliberation, were critically reconsidered in the debates that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. One main area of inquiry is whether and why significant differences in female and male care and justice preferences in normative theory can occur. There is and continues to be controversy about feminist forms of articulating moral concepts during this period. Such controversies can be found in intersectional scholarships, radical black thought and female colour feminism, transnational feminism, queer theory, disability studies, and feminist ethics analyses of the 21st century. If feminist ethicists tend to support rigid and superficial conceptualizations of women as a class, they are of particular concern. Questions about the flaws of conventional ethical theories, what values constitute morally good character in situations of injustice, and which kinds of ethical theories can alleviate gendered oppression, and which evils produce important scholarship in every decade.

13.2 THE CONCEPT OF FEMALE MORALITY

The views of Beauvoir that women are characterized by men and in terms of men, that ethical philosophy should address the social situation of women and their capacity to be moral decision-makers, and that the oppression of women impedes their self-knowledge and affects their status represent the concerns of many precursors of feminist ethics. The work of Beauvoir profoundly influenced the development of feminist ethics as a subfield of philosophy at a period when more broadly philosophers had moved away from the trends of the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries to describe women as lacking morally acceptable intellectual ability. Alternatively, many prominent philosophers in Europe and the Americas had shifted towards methods by the mid-twentieth century that often contributed to the definition of both gender and ethics as secondary to philosophical discourse. Unlike Wells-Barnett, anarchist and radical authors, some of them from working-class backgrounds, advanced frank claims with their own moral agency to consider women's talents and impulses differently as sexual beings. Emma Goldman, whose anarchism was developed in response to Marx and Marxism, was among the leaders (Fiala 2018). Goldman called for a broader understanding of marriage, sexuality, and family because she claimed that conventional morality codes culminated in the corruption of the sexual self-understanding of women (112). Unlike Wells-Barnett, Goldman mixed claims against female sexual purity with exposure to sexual exploitation and trafficking in women who were not protected by the state (Goldman 2012). Goldman was repelled by some suffragists 'focus on female ethics. Nevertheless, although she dismissed the claim that women are morally superior to men, she also emphasized that women should be allowed and encouraged to freely express their' real' femininity (Marso 2010, 76). Although postfeminists in the early twentieth century varied in their belief that men and women are fundamentally different in character, they generally shared a belief in progressive ideals of morality. Pragmatists of the progressive era, including Wells-Barnett, Charlotte Perkins-Gilman, Jane Addams, and Alice Paul, 'seen the social environment as malevolent, capable of change through human action and critical thought' (Whipps and Lake 2016). Even on the part of more progressive thinkers who understood the profound harms of oppressive social institutions, strikingly positive thought characterized the beginning of the century. Most of this era's Progressive activists and suffragists never identified themselves as' feminist' with the new term, but as the direct precursors of feminism, they are now described as feminists. Although it seems widely shared belief in the possibilities of change, feminists in the Progressive era have not always shared common ground with regard to the ethical nature of women or how to achieve moral progress as a country. For example, both Goldman and pro-suffrage Charlotte Perkins-Gilman argued for

individual self-transformation and self-understanding as essential to better moral characters for women (Goldman 2012), while maintaining that the actions of a person are best supported by a less individualistic and more social and political context (Gilman 1966). While Goldman listed greater access to birth control and reproductive choice among the morally imperative routes to female self-discovery, Gilman and many feminists argued for women's access to contraceptives in ways that mirrored ever more common eugenics policies in North and South America and Europe (Gilman 1932). Eugenic-friendly white women's contributions to feminist ethical arguments to overturn patriarchal pronatalism or avoid observable parenting costs in sexist cultures have often taken the form of expanding other types of marginalization, including those based on race, disability, and class (Lamp and Cleigh 2011). In the U.S., during the Progressive Era, the centrality of sex and gender problems in public ethics reached a high-water mark, leading one newspaper to write to 1914 that' the time has come to define feminism; it can no longer be ignored' (Cott 1987, 13). Sadly, with the start of World War I and the consequent collapse of positive faith in human rationality forces to give moral progress, this attitude will decline. Nevertheless, as economic difficulties, military conflicts and wealth disparities fluctuated globally throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, women's groups and feminist activists in many countries would promote, with some success, feminist and moral demands for workplace, academic, electoral and educational access, for the liberalization of abortion, marriage and divorce laws, and again. Some of their advances in greater access to citizenship, education, and wealth may have led to the broad audience that was responsive to the publications of Simone de Beauvoir in Europe and in North America after translations had been published. Beauvoir first described himself as a feminist in 1972 (Schwarzer 1984, 32) and repeatedly denied a philosopher's mark while teaching philosophy courses (Card 2003, 9). Nevertheless, beginning in the 1950s, her Ambiguity Ethics ([1947] 1976) and The Second Sex ([1949] 2010) were widely read and quickly recognized as important to feminist ethics (Card 2003, 1). We emphasized as works of existentialist ethics that we are not only merely subjects and individual choosers, but also entities created by oppressive forces (Andrew 2003, 37). As mentioned above by

the postfeminists, Beauvoir focused on women's embodied interactions and social situations. She advanced the argument in these seminal works that embodiment and social circumstances are not only relevant to human life, but are also the material of human existence, so critical that philosophy should not neglect them (Andrew 2003, 34). She claimed in The Second Sex that some men in philosophy tended both to disregard their own sex-situation and to characterize women as the Other and men as the Self. Since men are paradigmatically human in thought and take it upon themselves to describe the essence of womanhood as separate from men, Beauvoir said men are socially constructing woman as the other. Famously, Beauvoir said,' one is not born, but becomes woman,' that is, one may be born a human female, but' the role that the human female assumes in society,' the figure of a' she,' is the product of' the mediation of another[that] may constitute a person as an Other' (Beauvoir[1949] 2010, 329). The human embodied female may be a product of her own experiences and perceptions, but' being a woman would mean being an artefact, the Other' (83), that is, the objective recipient of men's speculations and perceptions. Beauvoir described a woman who would transcend this situation as' hesitating between the position of object, of Other offered to her, and her claim for freedom' (84), that is, her freedom to assert her own subjectivity, to make her own choices as to who she is, particularly when she is not specified in relation to men. Therefore, the role of a female is so deeply ambiguous, one of negotiating' a human condition as described in her relationship with the Other' (196) that if one is to philosophize about women,' it is essential to understand the economic and social system' in which women aspire to be authentic or ethical, requiring' an existential point of view, taking into account their total situation' (84). In other words, philosophers speculating about women must take into account the obstacles created by those who developed an oppressive environment for women to navigate to women's opportunities for subject hood and selection.

Check your Progress-1

1.What is meant by feminist ethics?

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13.3 JUSTICE, CARE, AND GENDER BIAS

Ethics for social justice is a feminist view of morality that aims to deal with conventional normative approaches to ethics and eventually change them. Feminist justice ethics, like most forms of feminist ethics, looks at how gender is left out of moral standard criteria. It is argued that traditional morality is male-oriented. Feminist philosophy of justice, however, differs significantly from other feminist values. A standard collection of values is an important part of the philosophy of social justice. By separating 'thick' morality from 'soft' morality, feminist justice ethics is straightforward. Certain ethical strategies which are characterized by differentiating groups from each other by culture or other phenomena are known to be 'thick' morality accounts. Feminist justice ethics argues that 'thick' morality accounts are fundamentally vulnerable to eroding objective feminist criticism as opposed to 'soft' morality accounts. Feminist philosophy for justice is part of a number of moral feminist viewpoints. Feminist ethics and postmodern feminist ethics are other popular feminist approaches to ethics. Implementing a patriarchal care ethic also attracts skepticism from the values of social justice. Feminist care ethics is based on the idea that morality is influenced by our self's interpersonal versions. Our spiritual ties prevail. Through chastising such a view for its rejection of universal values, feminist justice ethics differs from feminist treatment ethics. Unless a standard collection of ethics is used, fair moral critique cannot be rendered in social justice ethics. Whereas, a completely different interpretation is given by postmodern feminist ethics. In many aspects of life, including epistemology, a feminist postmodern viewpoint would experience androcentricity. At the same time, the presence of objectivity within our culture will be denied by feminist postmodernism. This argument is based on the notion of subjectively constructing awareness. As a product of this masculine-dominated society, a feminist postmodern

scholar has inferred the moral implications of modern business norms. On the theory of universality, there is tension between social justice ethics and patriarchal postmodern ethics. The latter supports the idea of universal values, while the latter denies the existence of such values because they lack objectivity. Some of the following characteristics are listed:

- Life – capability to stay out an herbal lifespan.
- Bodily Health – ability to have true health including reproductive fitness, ok nourishment, refuge.
- Bodily Integrity – freedom of motion, safety from bodily violation, sexual and reproductive autonomy.
- Senses, Imagination and Thought – potential to use all of those absolutely in an educated way.
- Emotions – capacity that allows you to be connected to others, to have an ability for love and affection.
- Practical Reason – that allows you to replicate rationally, discover one's own idea of the best existence and plan for it.
- Affiliation – capacity to live with others in non-public relationships and social communities.

Carol Gilligan, an American ethicist and psychologist, was the author of Ethics of Care (EoC). Gilligan was a graduate of Lawrence Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist. Unlike her mentor's theory of phases of moral development, Gilligan created EoC. Care ethics is a normative theory of ethics that holds that moral action as a virtue relies on interpersonal relationships and care or benevolence. EoC (Care Ethics) is one of a number of normative ethical concepts founded in the second half of the twentieth century by feminists. While reliability and ethical theories of deontology emphasize universal standards and impartiality, care ethics emphasizes the importance of individual response. The distinction between the general and the individual is reflected in their different moral questions: 'what is just?' versus 'how to respond?' Gilligan criticizes the application of generalized standards as 'morally problematic as it creates moral blindness or indifference.' Some feminists have criticized care-based ethics to reinforce the traditional

stereotypes of a 'good woman' others have. Care-focused feminism, or gender feminism, is a branch of feminist thinking that is primarily informed by care ethics as developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Nodding. This theory body is critical of how care is generated socially, assigned to women, and therefore devalued. 'Care-focused feminists perceive the desire of women to care as a human strength' that both men and women can and should be taught and predicted. Nodding implies that ethical treatment has the potential to be a more practical form of moral dilemma analysis than a philosophy of justice. The care-focused feminism of Nodding requires practical application of relational ethics based on care ethics. Health ethics is also a framework for health-focused feminist maternal ethics theorization. Such ideas consider compassion as a question of moral interest. Critical of how culture engenders caring work, scholars Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held, and Eva Feder Kittay propose that caring should be performed and caregivers respected in both the public and private spheres. The suggested moral paradigm shift supports the idea that the social responsibility of both men and women is an ethic of love.

Care, in feminist ethics

Caring itself is inherently a challenge to the notion that individuals are fully self-supporting and autonomous. Tronto and Berenice Fisher propose a general definition of care:' On the general level they say that caring is seen as an operation of a community that encompasses everything we do for preserving, continuing and restoring our environment so that we can survive in it as well as we can. Thisworld comprises our bodies, ourselves and our surroundings, all of them interwoven in a deep, life-sustaining web"(Tronto, 1993:103). Caring is an ongoing practice and disposition that is broadly culturally defined and willing among different cultures. The concept tends to be all-embracing. Any human activity is not, however, concerned: it warrants this name only when it seeks to protect, continue and rehabilitate the earth. It is an interaction focused on the desires and needs of the other person which forms the basis of action. Treatment requires some kind of continuous relation. But one reason we are all independent and self-sufficient is to

avoid the difficult issues arising from realizing that not all people are equal. Inequality leads to unequal relationships of power, superiority and subordination. Every society exists without those relationships, but if these disparities exist neither democratic order will thrive"(Tronto, 1993:135). This is a dilemma that a feminist philosophy of care wants to address. The four phases of care characterize a positive care action: (1) caring; (2) caring; (3) caring; (4) care receiving. Caring means recognizing that care is necessary; care is about responsibility for and how to respond to defined needs; care defines the immediate satisfaction of care needs; and care invokes experience relevant to care. This method leads to certain moral abilities and attitudes. Caring is considered to be an attitude of focus. Careful attention stops caregivers from giving into what is apparent. Acts when done appear to become routines and nurturing behaviors and thus lose sight of the true needs of the recipient. A dementian called a run-off, though physical activity may be his real needs. He's been married to his wife for years, but no one seems to know if it can verbalize his real needs. Attentiveness requires the breaking out of one's own patterns and presuppositions and the mapping of the true desiderata of the careeper. It is the product of joint efforts of multiple carers. They take care of the burden and act accordingly. Cooperation between different areas of responsibility remains a difficult area. Power relationships between doctors and staff for instance could obstruct good care. In this scenario, the doctor will not be entertained when the daughter takes care of her dad without consulting him. Mapping roles can be difficult as accountability is incorporated into a variety of implicit cultural practices. You don't know tacit expectations, but you act accordingly.

The 3rd step of care is the ability of competence: the purpose of providing care, taking only responsibility for it and then failing to provide good care means that, at the end of the day, the need for treatment is not fulfilled. Often treatment is inadequate, as the resources available for care are insufficient. Responsibility must be shown to do the job competently. Of example, caregivers, who are short of time to respond to all alarm bells, can not do their work competently. It requires provisions for the services given. How well is the person who needs

cares? Being in a situation where treatment is required means being in a vulnerable position. Be attentive to the response of recipients to the insecurity and injustice requirements. ATTENTIVENEST This general description of treatment raises several concerns that must be answered in the case of the 87-year-old man. AnalysisThe uneven distribution of power is a necessary element of caring. The old man who remains unnamed in the description is at first sight, surrounded by people and structures that respond to his needs: his daughter, his municipal residence and staff, and his geriatric clinic. I will focus primarily on awareness as an ability to achieve an appropriate situation definition. "It is appropriate for us to look more closely at what is and to envision more critically and more Creatively what may be important for our lives as a group and our lives as individuals" (Lindemann Nelson and Lindemann Nelson, 1999:290). Capacity evaluation is always done in a specific situation; therefore the situation should be carefully defined. The terms in which the scene is presented prepare the way the argument is to evolve. The relationship strategy preferred by a care ethic is critical of the previously drawn up dominoid of independence for it is inherently individualistic and rationalist (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Conditions such as autonomy and individual choice can be interpreted in many ways. Is a woman's desire to look after her demented father's independence and individual choice, or is her society, her environment, her or her religion? It seems that neither daughter nor dad can be regarded as the excluded fromeach, nor the society in which they belong. A great shift from general expectations is taking account of the family as a legal partner (Lindemann Nelson and Nelson, 1995). An illustration of the autonomous individual expressing, in splendid isolation, the kind of life she wants to lead and the acts that she wants to take in the face of the female 2. The social relationship.will obey and stick to the notion that she is a master (sic) of herself. Many independence concepts— and even more so the watered-down interpretations of actual practices— tend to accept the picture of a lonely person pursuing an autonomous course of life. Linda Barclay, for example, warns us of the purely procedural concept of autonomy which says that "it is the exercise of the capacity, the exercise of certain skills, which enables one to reflect on one's objectives, aspirations and choose ends and purposes by such a reflexive

process" (Barclay, 2000:53). The individual is viewed as a closed box of deliberative power. This concept of procedural autonomy denies the social impact on the self. This ignores the impact of others and social structures and processes on who we are (Fig. 2). "The social mechanisms of superiority and subordination affect who we are— what we are like and how we think and act." How a career receiver acts and thinks is influenced by his position, his life history and the social circumstances in which he lives. The culture in which he receives treatment will be a variable in his independence. "Self-reliance works in situ, autonomous persons need to work with whatever material is at hand" (Tietjens Meyers, 2000: 159) (Fig. 3. Autonomy skills are not something we possess, but something we build in dialog with others over and over again. It is an ongoing process in which new circumstances pressure people to examine what they value and how they want to live. People gain autonomy by juggling the material they receive in special situations. Many people are aware of the course of their lives and typically do not take steps that vary greatly from the path their lives have gone before. Unconsciously many people have been trained in Feminist Ethic of Care: the Third Alternative Method 323Fig. 3. Independence in situ.in the formation of their own identity and independence. For health care, for example, patients and consumers use the caregiver as a mirror to check whether the path to be followed is not different from who they want to be. Donchin characterizes freedom as being related to reciprocity and collabo-rativity as its main features (Donchin, 2000:239). Becoming autonomous is adequate communication between interdependent individuals who participate in lives that sometimes encounter and influence each other. "We owe our autonomy to others" (Barclay, 2000:58). That means that others play an important role in enabling people to become autonomous, an ascollaborative role. The feminist approach as discussed here promotes a shift in perspective. The main problem is not: how competent or autonomous is this individual, but how can this woman or man achieve autonomy and therefore advance his ability to practice autonomy? The change from a so-called inept caretaker to a caretaker who is one of the players in superporting, supporting and encouraging the caretaker. As a result, assessment of competence will not only target certain individuals whose rivals are in

question, it will also focus on the means to improve competence. Competence assessment is contextualized in that the meaning may be reduced

Gender Bias, which is the view that there are only two genders, male and female, and that all are just one of them (Dea 2016a, 108), is assumed by the majority of feminist ethicists in the 1970s and 1980s (Jaggar 1974; Daly 1979). Some of these feminists criticize the supremacy of men without preferring the supremacy of women (Frye 1983; Card 1986; Hoagland 1988). They argue that while the categories of 'men' and 'women' are physiologically distinct, feminism's potential to liberate both men and women from oppressive gendered social arrangements suggests that men and women do not have different morals or separate realities, and that we do not need to articulate separate ethics capacities (Jaggar 1974; Davion 1998). Other feminist ethicists offer different views radically. For example, Mary Daly argues in Gyn / Ecology: Radical Feminism's met ethics that women have traditionally been defined as subversive of rationality, impartiality, and morality as traditionally conceived throughout intellectual history. Daly argues that women should embrace some of the very qualities that she says men have attributed to women as essential to the nature and evil of women as essential to the nature of women. Daly suggests that both women's childbearing and birth capacities (as opposed to war and killing capacities) and women's emotionality (as opposed to rationality) should be valued (Daly 1979). Radical feminists and bisexual feminists who disagree with Daly as to whether the moral character of women is innately better than that of men, agree with Daly in either arguing for essentialism (Griffin 1978; cf. Spelman 1988 and Witt 1995) or for the separation of women from men (Card 1988; Hoagland 1988). Many claim that separatism creates an atmosphere in which alternative ethics can be developed, rather than simply responding to the male-dominated ethical theories usually debated in the academy. Critics also argue that separatism fosters a better relationship between women and refuses men access to women than men would expect (Daly in 1979; Frye 1983; Hoagland 1988). Philosophers like Alison Jaggar, in profound disagreement, argue against separatism as successful in any form of a

new and morally better society. 'What we must do then, Jaggar insists, is to create a new androgynous culture that combines the best elements of both personal relationships and performance, both emotional and logical. No sexual separation can achieve this result '(Jaggar 1974, 288). Similar claims for androgynous approaches to ethics shape arguments that favour androgyny, sex bending and gender mixing in the 1990s (Butler 1990; Butler 1993) and gender-eliminative and humanist approaches to feminist ethics and social philosophy in the 21st century (LaBrada 2016; Mikkola 2016; Ayala and Vasilyeva 2015; Haslan 2015; One gender bias critique is that its implication marginalizes non-conforming people. Some feminists argue in initiatives identified as fostering an alliance between trans activists and non-trans feminists that we should explore the gender privilege inherent in accepting a binary that better reflects one's own experience than others 'experiences (Dea 2016a; Bettcher 2014). In addition, however, these 'beyond-binary' solutions have been cautioned against as well-intentioned, but at times invalidating trans identities, 'by invalidating the self-identity of trans people who do not find their genitals to be correct' or 'by portraying all trans people as having a problem with the binary' (Bettcher 2013). Recognition of 'fact regulation' and its interconnection with racist and sexist inequality will help defray the harms of a binary gender normalization.

2 Explain in short feminist ethic of care.

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13.4 LET'S SUM UP

Feminist ethics is an approach to ethics which draws on the idea that historically ethical theorizing has undervalued and/or undervalued the moral experience of women, which is largely male-dominated, and therefore seeks to re-imagine ethics and turn it through a holistic feminist approach. Carol Gilligan and Nel Nodding's are exponents of a feminist

care ethics that condemn conventional ethics for ignoring, disregarding, trivializing or challenging the cultural values and virtues of women. Feminist ethicists developed a number of care-focused feminist approaches to ethics in the 20th century compared to non-feminist care-focused approaches to ethics, feminist approaches tend to appreciate more thoroughly the influence of gender issues. Feminist care-focused ethicists note patriarchal societies 'tendency not to recognize the importance and advantages of the way women love, feel, work, and read, and tend to view women as subordinate. Therefore, many social studies make a conscious effort to follow feminist ethics rather than the conventional ethics of studies alone. An example of this was the report on micro aggressions against the LGBTIQ family by Roffee and Waling in 2016. Although it has concentrated on the LGBTIQ family, the feminist principles have been better suited as they are more responsive to the participants 'limitations and needs. Health sciences often fail to recognize that in the LGBTIQ culture, morality frequently plays a negative role in how they seek care and what services they obtain as choices. Note, how women are treated in medical fields as well. Ethics for social justice is a feminist view of morality that aims to deal with conventional normative approaches to ethics and eventually change them. Feminist justice ethics, like most forms of feminist ethics, looks at how gender is left out of moral standard criteria. It is argued that traditional ethics is male-oriented. Feminist philosophy of justice, however, differs significantly from other feminist values. A standard set of ethics is an important part of feminist justice ethics, but depending on the geographic location, such as the disparity between the Global North and Global South, it may vary in how justice is implemented and may alter what is considered justice. By separating 'thick' morality from 'soft' morality, feminist justice ethics is straightforward. Certain ethical strategies which are characterized by differentiating groups from each other by culture or other phenomena are known to be 'thick' morality accounts. Feminist justice ethics argues that 'thick' morality accounts are fundamentally vulnerable to eroding objective feminist critique as opposed to 'soft' morality accounts. Feminist ethicists claim that there is a responsibility to consider the different viewpoints of women and then to build from them an inclusive vision of consensus. The aim of feminist

ethics is to try to achieve this and move for gender equality with men together. In modern times, addressing these problems is important due to changing points of view as well as what has been considered 'moral' in terms of treatment and how women, in general, should be handled with women's bodies. 'The aim of feminist ethics is to change communities and circumstances in which women are affected by violence, subordination and exclusion. If such injustices are visible now and, in the future, after careful consideration and reflection, radical feminist feminists should continue their work of protest and action.' It is becoming less socially acceptable in today's culture, the twentieth century, to commit violence against women. Feminist ideas and that of ethics widen the reach of International Relations' largely masculine domain. This is particularly important for private realm concerns to take the stage in the public which includes topics such as children's rights, sexual violence and discrimination, gender relations in war-torn societies, and other similar issues that remain hard to be central in the mainstream ethics debates of international relations. The feminist dialogs of ethics are almost invariably present in the private realm and are exposed only in the public realm to shadow-dominant' male' ethics paradigms. In general, this is a fact in the discourse of ethics in international relations where it is primarily focused on a language of violence, technology and economics and what are considered to be the male topics of discussion. At the end of the overview we summarized 'FEMINIST ETHICS,' Feminist Ethics is an effort to update, reformulate, or reinvent all elements of traditional Western ethics that depreciate or depreciate the ethical experience of women. Feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar, among others, fails traditional western ethics in five similar ways for failing women. Second, as opposed to the desires and rights of men, it shows no concern for women. Second, the issues that occur in the so-called private sphere, the environment in which women cook, wash, and care for the young, the elderly, and the sick, are ignored as morally uninteresting. Third, this suggests that women are not as established socially as men on average. Fourth, it overestimates cultural male traits such as freedom, sovereignty, isolation, mind, purpose, religion, transcendence, battle, and death, and undervalues cultural feminine traits such as interdependence, family, body, emotion,

existence, immanence, peace, and life. Fifth, and finally, it favours culturally masculine ways of moral reasoning that emphasize laws, universality, and impartiality over culturally feminine ways of moral reasoning that emphasize relationships, particularity, and discrimination (Jaggar, 'Feminist Ethics,' 1992). Feminists has developed a wide variety of feminist approaches to ethics, including those called' feminine,'' maternal,' and' lesbian.' Each of these approaches to ethics emphasizes the disparities in life-biological and social circumstances between men and women; offers methods to resolve issues that arise in both private and public life; and provides guidance for action. The overall objective of all feminist approaches to ethics, regardless of their particular names, is to create a gender-equal ethics, an ethical philosophy that creates non-sexist moral principles, policies and practices.

13.5 KEYWORDS

- Feminist - A person who supports feminism.

- Ethics- Moral principles that govern a person's behaviour or the conducting of an activity.

- Justice - Behaviour or treatment

- Gender Bias - Inclination towards or prejudice against one gender.

13.6 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What is meant by Feminist ethics?

2. According to you, what is the role of Justice, Care, and Gender Bias in Feminist ethics?

3. Explain the concept of female mortality.

4. Feminist developed which type of approach towards women mortality?

13.7 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- The canter of female mortality information collected from https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/ feminism-ethics.

- Justice, care sections covered from Wikipedia/Feminist ethics.com

- Feminist ethics, Philpapers.org.

- Global Feminist Ethics, Whisnant Des Autels.

13.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

Feminist ethics is an approach to ethics based on the conviction that conventional ethical theorization underestimates and/or underestimates moral experiences of women who are mainly men and thus reconsider ethics in a whole-feminist way.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

Feminist ethics are an ethics of opposition to patriarchal injustice, a mixture of treatment and care for women and not for people, a feminization of healthcare, a subordinate provision of justice, special duties and personal relationships.

UNIT-14 THE CHALLENGES OF DETERMINISM TO MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

STRUCTURE

14.0 OBJECTIVES

After learning this unit based on "The Challenges of Determinism to Moral Responsibility", you will be familiar with:

- The moral responsibility.
- Free will in moral responsibility.
- Determinism in moral responsibility.

14.1 INTRODUCTION

Historically, most of the solutions proposed to the ethical obligation dilemma have tried to establish that people have free will. But what's the free will? Typically, as people make decisions or act, they feel as if they choose and act freely. For example, a person might decide to buy apples instead of oranges, remain in France instead of Italy, or call a sister in Nebraska instead of a Florida friend. On the other hand, there are at least some situations where people do not seem to be behaving voluntarily as if they are physically forced or controlled mentally or emotionally. One way of formalizing the implicit idea of free action is to suggest that if it is true, he might have acted otherwise, a person acts freely. Apple buying

is generally a free practice because you can purchase oranges instead in ordinary circumstances; nothing forces you to buy apples or prohibits you from buying oranges. Yet a person's actions are the product of his preferences, and his desires are dictated by his circumstances, past experiences, and characteristics of psychology and personality— his relationships, interests, temperament, intellect, etc. Circumstances, perceptions and characteristics are clearly the product of many factors beyond the control of the individual, including his childhood and perhaps even his genetic make-up. If this is right, then in the end, the actions of a man may not be the result of free will more than the colour of his skin.

The idea of moral responsibility seems to presuppose the nature of free will. Many people will agree that a person can't be morally responsible for actions he can't help but do. Furthermore, moral praise and blame, or reward or punishment, appear to make sense only on the basis that morally responsible is the person in question. Such arguments seem to suggest a choice between two implausible alternatives: whether (1) people have free will, in which case the actions of a person are not decided by their circumstances, past experiences, and characteristics of psychology and personality, or (2) people have no free will, in which case no one is ever morally responsible for what they do. This dilemma is the moral obligation challenge.

Determinism is the view that, given the state of the universe (the complete physical properties of all its parts) at a given time and the laws of nature operating in the universe at that time, the state of the universe is fully determined at any subsequent time. Any subsequent universe condition can be anything other than what it is. Because human actions are part of the universe at an appropriate level of definition, it follows that humans cannot act differently than they do; it is impossible to have free will. It is important to distinguish determinism from pure causation. Determinism is not a theory that every occurrence has a cause, since causes do not always necessitate its consequences. Instead, it is a thesis that every event is causally unavoidable. If an event has occurred, it is unlikely that it could not have happened, given the universe's previous state and the laws of nature. Since moral responsibility tends to entail

free will, hard determinism suggests that no one is morally responsible for his actions. While the conclusion is clearly counterintuitive, some hard determinists have argued that it must be embraced by the weight of philosophical argument. There is no choice but to improve liberty and social obligation intuitive values. Other strong determinists, acknowledging that such change is barely feasible, argue that experiencing and expressing positive emotions may have social benefits, even though the emotions themselves are based on fiction. According to these philosophers, these benefits are justification enough to hold fast to pre-philosophical convictions regarding free will and moral responsibility. The radical alternative to determinism is indeterminism, the belief that at least some events do not have a deterministic cause but happen by chance or spontaneously. Work in quantum mechanics advocates indeterminism to some degree, which means that certain events at the quantum level are unpredictable (and therefore random) in theory. It is not to be confused with the school of political philosophy called libertarianism by philosophers and scientists who claim that the world is deterministic and that human beings have free will. Although it may be argued that the world is deterministic and yet human actions are decided, this view is supported by few contemporary philosophers. Libertarianism is susceptible to the so-called challenge of "intelligibility." This criticism points out that a person cannot have more power over an action that is purely random than he has over an action that is deterministically inevitable; neither does free will enter the picture. Therefore, if human actions are deterministic, there is no free will. The German enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), one of libertarianism's earliest advocates, tried to overcome the challenge of intelligibility and thereby make room for moral responsibility by advocating a kind of dualism in human nature. Kant believed in his Critique of Practical Reason (1788) that people are free if reason controls their behaviour. Reason, here what he often called the "noumenal self" is independent of the rest of the agent in some way, allowing him to make moral choices. The philosophy of Kant demands that rationality be separated from the causal order in such a way as to be able to choose or behave alone and, at the same time, to be associated with the causal order in such a way as to be an intrinsic determinant of

human actions. Kant's view descriptions have been the subject of much debate, and whether it is consistent remains unclear. Although libertarianism was not popular among philosophers of the 19th century, in the mid-20th century it experienced a revival. The so-called "agent-causation" ideas were the most popular of the modern libertarian accounts. First suggested in his seminal paper "Human Freedom and the Self" (1964) by the American philosopher Roderick Chisholm (1916–99), these ideas argue that free acts are triggered by the individual himself rather than by some prior occurrence or state of affairs. While the theory of Chisholm retains the principle that the ultimate cause of an action and therefore the ultimate moral obligation for it lies with the agent, it does not explain the details or process of agent-causation. Agent-causation is a simplistic notion that cannot be analysed; it cannot be reduced to anything more fundamental. Not unexpectedly, the theory of Chisholm was considered unsatisfactory by many philosophers. What is wanted, they objected, is a theory that explains all freedom is and how it can be achieved, not one that simply puts forward liberty. The theories of agent-causation, they maintained, leave a blank space where there should be an interpretation. As the name suggests, compatibilism is the belief that the presence of free will and moral responsibility is consistent with determinism's reality. Compatibility in most situations (also known as "soft" determinists) seeks to accomplish this compromise by implicitly revising or undermining the notion of free will. Compatibilism has an ancient history, and it has been advocated in one way or another by many philosophers. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) wrote in Book III of Micromachine Ethics that individuals are responsible for the actions they choose to do voluntarily, i.e. for their voluntary actions. Although acknowledging that "our relations are not voluntary in the same way as our acts are," Aristotle believed that people have free will because they are free to choose their actions within the limits of their natures. In other words, people are free to choose between the (limited) alternatives that their structures pose to them. In fact, people also have the special ability to shape their structures and grow their moral characters. Human beings thus have independence in two senses: they can choose between the alternatives resulting from their arrangements, and they can modify or improve the arrangements presenting these alternatives to them. One

might argue that this kind of independence presupposes the ability to self-examine and reflect implies the presence of something outside the causal order in humans. If so, then the compatibles of Aristotle are simply a disguised form of libertarianism. Free will has been a philosophical challenge for medieval scholastic thinkers. If God is the primary mover the first cause of all world things and events, including human actions and if the universe is deterministic, then it seems that humans cannot act freely. How can people do anything other than what God has inspired them to do? How can they be morally accountable for their actions? There is an equivalent question regarding the omniscience of God: since God, being omniscient, has foreknowledge of every choice made by humans, how can humans choose other than what God knows they will choose? St. Augustine played a key role in merging Greek philosophy with Christianity in the late 4th and early 5th centuries; theologians also cite his efforts to reconcile human freedom with Christian ideas such as divine foreknowledge. According to Augustine, outside the world of time, God exists a good, omnipotent, and omniscient being. There is no external directionality for Allah, as it is for human beings. Therefore, attributing foreknowledge of human decisions to God does not make sense. Nearly a century later, the same challenges confronted St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). Unlike Augustine, he lived in Western intellectual history during a major turning point when the relationship between philosophy and religion was freshly analysed and recast. In his Summa Theologise (1265/66–73), Aquinas wrote that all "counsels, exhortations, orders, prohibitions, incentives, and punishments would be in vain" if humans do not have free will; such a statement is clearly unimaginable. In response to the apparent dispute between freedom and the position of God as the supreme mover of human will, Aquinas believed that God is the source of human liberty in reality. This is because God moves us "in accordance with our voluntary nature." Just as God does not prohibit their acts from being natural by moving natural causes, He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary by moving voluntary causes. Since human beings are created by God, their will is inherently in accordance with his will. Therefore, the position of God as the supreme mover does not need to interfere with free agency. After the rediscovery of classical learning during the

Renaissance, compatible philosophers shifted their focus back to the individual from the divine. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) concluded that the only requirement needed for free will and moral responsibility is a connection between one's choices and one's acts. He argued in his Leviathan (1651) that free will is "the man's right to do what he has the will, wish, or inclination to do." If a person can do what he wants, he is free. Another committed compatibilist, the Scottish Enlightenment thinker David Hume (1711–76), argued that the perceived incompatibility among determinism and free will rests on a misunderstanding about the essence of causation. Causation is a phenomenon that, he claimed, human beings project onto the universe. Suggesting that one thing (A) is the cause of another thing (B) is nothing more than suggesting that things like A have been constantly connected in practice with things like B, and that seeing something like A naturally brings to mind the concept or perception of something like B. There is nothing in nature itself that corresponds to the thinking of "essential link" between two causally related things.

Since there is just this it follows from the kind of regularity between human choices on the one hand and human actions on the other that human acts are caused by human choices, and that is all that is required for free will. As Hume argued in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), "According to the determinations of the will, by liberty we can only mean a power to act or not to act." The British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–73) was the major champion of conformity in the 19th. He indicated that a person should be free because "his actions or temptations are not his masters, but his own," while an unfree person is one who obeys his impulses even when he has good reason not to do so. Mill's role is situated in compatibilist philosophy at an interesting turning point. By depending on reason as the instrument of liberty, it echoes Kant, but it also anticipates contemporary continuity in its notion that a free person is one whose internal impulses are not at odds with his intent. Mill's countryman F.H. in his Ethical Studies (1876). Bradley (1846–1924) argued that neither conformity nor libertarianism comes close to explaining what he called ethical responsibility's "vulgar idea." Determinism does not allow free will

because it means that human beings are never the sole authors of their acts. Indeterminism does not do better, because it can only mean that human decisions are entirely spontaneous. Nevertheless, according to Bradley, it is intuitively obvious that people have free will, and no philosophical argument in the world can convince anyone else. Therefore, he called for a return to common sense. Since determinism's metaphysical philosophy inevitably clashes with the deep-rooted moral intuitions of people, it is easier to reject the former than the latter. Despite the claim of Bradley, compatibilism remained popular among thinkers of the 20th century. Philosopher G.E. of Cambridge. Moore (1873–1958), through a contingent study of liberty, sought to reconcile determinism and free will. According to Moore, when one says a person acted freely, one simply means he would have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. The fact that the person may not have been able to choose otherwise does not negate his free agency. But what does it mean to say otherwise one might have done? In "Liberty and Need" (1946), A.J. Ayer (1910–89) asserted that "to say that I could have acted otherwise is to say that if I had chosen that way, I should have acted otherwise." The desire to do otherwise only implies that if the experience had been different, one might have chosen otherwise. Clearly, this is a very weak notion of liberty, because it means that a choice or action can be free even if it is completely dictated by the past. Whether the account of Ayer offers a satisfactory explanation of the intrinsic notion of free will is an open question. Supporters argue that this is the only kind of freedom worth having, although detractors say it is not similar to offering the kind of free agency that humans deserve, partially because it does not mean that humans are morally responsible for their "free" acts. Certain contemporary consistency at a particular juncture challenged the argument of the strong determinist. The American philosopher Harry Frankfurt challenged in an important essay, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility" (1969), whether the capacity to do otherwise is really necessary for democracy. Suppose John is on his way to a booth for voting and is unsure whether to vote for candidate A or candidate B. Unknown to him, an evil neuroscientist implanted a device in John's brain that will trigger a signal, if needed, compelling John to vote for candidate B. Yet John decides to vote on his own for candidate B, so it

turns out that the machine is unnecessary. The gun is not shot, and John is free to act. Yet John could not have behaved otherwise: if he had shown the slightest inclination towards candidate A, the machine of the neuroscientist would have changed his mind. This counterexample of "Frankfurt-style" has proven very effective in contemporary freewill debates. This demonstrates that it is not important for free agency to be able to do otherwise. If there is no need for the skill to do otherwise, what is? Frankfurt, like Hobbes and Hume, puts liberty within itself alone. In "Freedom of the Will and a Person's Theory" (1971), he indicated that having free will is in a certain way a matter of connecting with one's desires. Suppose Jack is a drug addict interested in reforming. He has a desire for a certain substance in the first order, but also a desire in the second order not to want the drug. While Jack does not want to be successful in his first-order goal, he does the same. Jack is not a free agent because of this internal conflict. Then remember the acquaintance of Jack Jill, who is a drug addict as well. Jill has no desire for change, unlike Jack. She has a desire of first order for a certain medication and a desire of second order for her desire of first order to be effective. She doesn't have any ambivalence about her drug addiction; she doesn't just want the drug; she needs the treatment as well. In a way that Jack does not, Jill connects with her first-order need, and therein lies her independence. The British philosopher P.F. in "Freedom and Resentment" (1962). Strawson (1919–2006) developed an influential social psychology-based version of compatibles. Strawson found that in reaction to others 'actions, people display emotions such as frustration, rage, gratitude, and so on. He argued that it is nothing more than having certain feelings or "reactive behaviours" towards him to hold an individual morally responsible for an action. The question of whether the agent acts freely matters only insofar as it affects other people's feelings towards him; apart from that, there is liberty beside the point. However, when people cannot help but feel reactive behaviours, no matter how much they may try not to do, they are justified in getting them, no matter what determinism's reality or falsity. This does not mean that, for instance, the particular reactive behaviour that a person may have on a given occasion of blind rage is always justified as opposed to pure annoyance. And it is far from clear that reactive actions are always

justified by men. Relevant information can alter one's feelings towards an agent dramatically. For example, a person may become less angry with a man who ran over his cat when he learns that the man rushing with a desperately ill child to the hospital. He may even completely lose his wrath. It seems unwise to view them as objective barometers of moral responsibility, given the enormous impact that everyday factual information has on what reactive behaviours people have and whether they even have them.

14.2 MEANING OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Moral responsibility is the position of morally worthy praise, blame, compensation, or punishment for an act or omission in keeping with one's moral obligations. Deciding what is considered "morally necessary" is a major ethical issue. Philosophers refer as moral agents to individuals who are morally responsible for an action. Agents are capable of focusing on their situation, developing ideas about how they are going to act, and then carrying out that action. In the debate about whether individuals are ever morally responsible for their actions and, if so, in what context, the notion of free will has become an important issue. Incompatibility finds determinism to be at odds with free will, while consistency believes both can coexist. Moral liability does not necessarily correspond to legal liability. When a legal system is liable to penalize the person for that incident, an individual is legally responsible for an event. Although it may often be the case that the two states do not always coincide when an individual is morally responsible for an act, they are also legally responsible for it. When an individual performs a morally significant action or fails to perform it, we often feel that a particular type of response is required. Perhaps the most evident forms this reaction can take are praise and blame. For example, one who witnesses a car accident may be considered worthy of praise for saving a child from inside the burning car, or otherwise, one may be considered worthy of blame for not using one's cell phone to call for assistance. Seeing these agents as deserving of one of these reactions is seeing them to be responsible for what they have done and left undone. Therefore,

being morally responsible for something, say an event, is deserving of a specific kind of reaction praise, blame, or something close to that for having done something. While further elaboration and qualification of the above definition of moral responsibility is necessary and will be given below, this is sufficient to differentiate concern about this type of responsibility from some others commonly referred to by using the words 'responsibility' or' responsibility.' To illustrate this, we may claim that it is responsible for higher than normal spring rainfall. In the first example, we want to establish a causal link between the earlier amount of rain and the subsequently increased vegetation. In the second, we mean to say that some responsibilities, or obligations, follow when one assumes the role of judge. Although these principles are related to the principle of moral responsibility discussed here, they are not the same, because in neither case are, they directly concerned about whether it would be reasonable to respond with something like praise or blame to some person, here, the rainfall or a specific judge. There is a long history of intellectual debate on moral responsibility. One explanation for this persistent interest is how the subject continues to be associated with our perception of us as' persons.' Many have suggested that their position as morally responsible agents are a distinct feature of individuals, a status that some have placed on a different kind of power that they alone can exercise. Many who view people in this way have wondered if they are threatened with their special status if some other statements regarding our world are valid. Can a person be morally responsible for his behaviour, for instance, if that action can be explained solely by reference to the physical states of the universe and the laws governing changes in those physical states, or solely by reference to the presence of a sovereign God leading the world along a divinely ordained path? These questions have often inspired social obligation analysis. In some of the earliest surviving Greek texts, i.e. the Homeric epics (about 8th century BCE but no doubt influenced by a much earlier oral tradition), an interpretation of the idea of moral responsibility and its implementation is explicitly present. All human and supernatural agents are often seen in such texts as equal targets for praise and blame on the basis of their actions, and at other times the conduct of an agent is excused because of the existence of a force that has compromised his / her power (Irwin

1999: 225). Reflection on these factors gave rise to fatalism in the view that one's future or some aspect of it is predetermined, e.g. by gods or stars, or just some facts about reality and time in such a way as to make one's particular thoughts, choices and actions irrelevant to whether that particular future is realized (recall, e.g., the fate of Oedipus). If some particular outcome was tragic, then it would seem that the specific person could not be morally responsible for that outcome. Likewise, if fatalism were valid for all future human beings, then it would seem that no human entity could be morally responsible for anything. Although this type of fatalism has sometimes exercised significant historical impact, it has been dismissed by most philosophers on the grounds that there is no good reason to believe that our future is doomed in the sense that it will unfold no matter what particular debates we participate in, decisions we make or acts we take. Apparently, Aristotle (384–323 BCE) was the first to establish a philosophy of moral responsibility. Aristotle stops in Nicomachean Ethics III.1–5 to analyse their underpinnings in discussing human virtues and their corresponding vices. He starts with a brief statement of the principle of moral responsibility which, on the basis of their behaviour and/or dispositional character traits (1109b30–35), it is sometimes acceptable to respond to an agent with praise or blame. He clarifies a little later that only a certain type of agent qualifies as a moral agent and is therefore properly subject to assignments of obligation, namely one who possesses a decision-making ability. A decision is a particular type of desire arising from deliberation for Aristotle, one that reflects the agent's conception of what is better (1111b5–1113b3). The remainder of Aristotle's discourse is dedicated to pointing out the conditions under which a moral agent should be held accountable or praiseworthy for any particular action or characteristic. His general argument is that if and only if the conduct and/or disposition is voluntary, one is a suitable candidate for praise or blame. According to Aristotle, there are two distinctive characteristics of a voluntary action or characteristic. Second, there is a requirement of control: the behaviour or characteristic must originate in the agent. That is, it must be up to the agent that it cannot be externally compelled to carry out that action or possess the trait. Furthermore, Aristotle suggests an epistemic condition: the agent must be conscious of what they are doing or what they are

doing. In Aristotle's account of duty there is an instructive uncertainty, an ambiguity that has led to conflicting interpretations of his point of view. Aristotle attempts to define the circumstances under which to praise or condemn an individual, but in his definition of obligation it is not entirely clear how to interpret the crucial notion of suitability. There are at least two possibilities: a) praise or blame in the sense that, given its actions and/or character characteristics, the agent merits such a response; or b) praise or blame in the sense that such a reaction is likely to result in a desired result, namely a change in the behaviour and/or character of the agent. Such two possibilities can be defined in terms of two opposing conceptions of the principle of moral responsibility: 1) the merit-based view that praise or blame would be a reasonable reaction to the candidate if and only if it deserves such a reaction in the sense of' merits;' vs. 2) the consequentialist view that praise or blame would be acceptable to the candidate; Scholars disagree with which of the above views Aristotle supported, but as philosophers began to focus on a newly conceived challenge to moral responsibility, the importance of distinguishing between them increased. Although Aristotle argued against a variant of fatalism (On Interpretation, Ch. 9), he may not have understood the distinction between it and the potential causal determinism risk associated with it. Causal determinism is the belief that all that occurs or exists is induced by appropriate background factors, making it impossible for anything to happen or be other than it does or is. The appropriate antecedent conditions were defined by a range of causal determinism, empirical determinism, as a combination of the universe's prior states and nature rules. Another biblical determinism describes these circumstances as God's nature and will. It seems possible that biblical determinism developed out of the change from polytheism to belief in one supreme God, or at least one god who reigned over all others, both in Greek religion and in ancient Mesopotamian religions. The theory of scientific determinism can be traced back to the Pre-Socratic Atomists (5th century BCE), but the distinction between it and the earlier fatalistic view does not seem to be explicitly known until Stoic philosophy emerges (3rd cent. BCE). Although fatalism, like causal determinism, may tend to challenge moral responsibility by threatening the power of an individual, the two differ in the sense of human

deliberation, selection, and action. If fatalism is real, then human deliberation, selection, and behaviour is utterly otious, because what is predetermined must happen regardless of what one wants to do. Nonetheless, as a result of causal determinism, one's thoughts, decisions, and acts will often be necessary links in the causal chain bringing about something. In other words, while our deliberations, choices and behaviour are decided in themselves like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the nature or presence of other events depends on our deliberations, choices and actions in some way (Irwin 1999: 243–249; Meyer 1998: 225–227; and Pereboom 1997: Ch. 2). Since the Stoics, if true, the theory of causal determinism and its consequences has centered on moral obligation theorizing. During the Middle Ages, especially in the work of Augustine (354–430) and Aquinas (1225–1274), reflection on freedom and responsibility was frequently created by questions about versions of theological determinism, including most prominently: a) Does God's sovereignty mean that God is responsible for evil? And b) Does God's foreknowledge mean that we are not free or morally responsible because it seems we can't do anything but what God foreknows we're going to do? During the Modern Era, a transition due to the development of increasingly sophisticated mechanistic universe models resulting in the success of Newtonian physics was renewed interest in scientific determinism. It became much more feasible to offer a comprehensive explanation of all facets of the universe and human action in terms of physical causes. Some felt that if such an interpretation of human action turned out to be true, people could not be free or morally responsible. Some suggested that the reality of scientific determinism would not compromise liberty and duty. Thinkers can be categorized as one of two forms in keeping with this emphasis on the implications of causal determinism of moral responsibility:

a. An inconsistent individual with causal determinism and moral responsibility who insists that if causal determinism is valid, then there is nothing to be morally responsible for; or

b. A compatibilist who argues that a person can be morally responsible for certain things, even if it is causally determined

both who she is and what she does. In Ancient Greece, in the philosophy of Epicurus (341–270 BCE) and the Stoics, respectively, these concepts are exemplified. Above, it was highlighted an inconsistency in Aristotle's definition of moral responsibility that it was not clear if he accepted a concept of moral responsibility based on merit vs. a concept of consequence.

The moral responsibility reflection history shows that how one interprets the concept of moral responsibility strongly influences one's overall moral responsibility balance. Those who support the concept of moral obligation based on merit, for example, have proven to be incompatible. That is, most have assumed that if an agent were to actually deserve credit or blame for something, then he would have to exercise a special form of control over that thing (e.g., the ability to both perform or not perform the action at the time of the action) that is inconsistent with one's causal determination. Besides Epicurus, we can cite as historical examples here early Augustine, Thomas Reid (1710–1796), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Those who support the principle of consequentiality of moral responsibility, on the other hand, have historically argued that determinism does not pose a threat to moral responsibility because praising and punishing could still be an effective means of shaping the actions of others, even in a deterministic universe. This view, along with the Stoics, was expressed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), David Hume (1711–1776), and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Through the first half of the twentieth century, this general pattern of connecting the substantive conception of moral responsibility with compatible regarding causal determinism and moral responsibility and the idea of merit with incompatible persisted.

Check your Progress-1

1.What do you mean by moral responsibility?

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14.3 FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM

Traditionally, free will has been described as a kind of power to control one's choices and actions. When an agent exercises free will over choices and actions, it is up to her to make her choices and actions. But in what way up to her? As our historical survey will show, two specific and compatible responses are: a. Up to her in the sense that she can decide otherwise, or at least not choose or behave as she does, and b. In the sense that it is the root of her decision, up to her. There is, however, widespread debate as to whether each of these conditions is necessary for free will, and if so, how to understand the kind or sense of freedom that is required to do otherwise or origin. While some attempt to settle such disputes in part through clearly articulating our perceptions of deliberation, selection and action (Nozick 1981, Ch. 4; van Inwagen 1983, Ch. 1; O'Connor 2000, Ch. 1), others try to resolve such disputes through appealing to the essence of moral responsibility. The theory is that the kind of control or sensitivity involved in free will is the kind of control or sensitivity important to moral responsibility (Double 1992, 12; Ekstrom 2000, 7–8; Smilansky 2000, 16; Widerker and McKenna 2003, 2; Vargas 2007, 128; Nelkin 2011, 151–52; Levy 2011, 1; Pereboom 2014, 1–2). Nevertheless, some go so far as to describe' free will' as the' most important state of control— whatever it turns out to be — necessary for moral responsibility' (Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3; Mele 2006, 17). In terms of this relation, we must decide if the right to do otherwise and the power of self-determination constitute free will and, if so, in what context, consider what it takes to be a morally responsible person. On these above features of free will, understanding free will is inextricably linked to understanding moral responsibility, and perhaps even derived from it. And even those who focus on this abstract priority statement usually see a close connection between these two concepts. We therefore need to learn something about the essence of moral responsibility in order to appreciate the existing controversies concerning the concept of free will. The idea that there are different kinds of moral responsibility is now widely accepted. Distinguishing moral responsibility as accountability from moral responsibility as

attributability from moral responsibility as accountability is normal (although not uncontroversial).

Determinism is expected to remain one of both philosophy and science's most interesting issues. The determinist view is that all events occur spontaneously and ultimately from causative factors following these rules in a universe regulated by the strictest natural laws. Therefore, determinism affirms the inevitability of the present. It's hard to see how even in theory this can be conclusively disproved. As far as the real, inanimate world is concerned, the discovery of indeterminacy at the level of subatomic particles has seriously challenged the determinist paradigm. The indeterminacy remains as to what can be calculated and what can be expected, but the crucial issue is what actually happens. Refuting Einstein's famous saying that God is not playing cards, Stephen Hawking has this to say: But even this minimal predictability vanished while considering the effects of black holes. The loss of particles and data down black holes resulted in random particles coming out. One might quantify probabilities, but no definitive predictions could be made. Therefore, as Laplace believed, the nature of the universe is not entirely determined by science laws and its present state. He still has a few jacket tricks. A layman's challenging Hawking would be rashly presumptuous, but it's difficult to see how the inability to make predictions could influence what actually happens. What is actually happening is determinism. It does not seem appropriate to extrapolate from the behaviour of subatomic particles to the macro world phenomena. But it can be plausibly justified to apply indeterminism to mental events and the exercise of free will on the grounds that all mental activities include complex events at subatomic levels. The question of free will contributes to social obligation problems. And these two topics are of particular humanism concern. There are those who feel determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. As Immanuel Kant says: "When our will is decided by antecedent causes, then we are no more accountable for our actions than any other mechanical entity whose movements are internally formed." But David Hume, a leading advocate of the "compatibilist" view, believed that liberty and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. Bertrand Russell's views

(from his Elements of Ethics) on determinism and moral responsibility are worth quoting in depth. "The reasons for determinism sound daunting to me, and I'm going to be content with a brief explanation of those reasons," he says. "The question that concerns me is not the question of free will itself, but the question of how, if at all, morals are affected by the assumption of determinism." He goes on, "Between physically possible actions, only those that we believe are to be considered as possible. When several alternative actions arise, it is certain that we can both do what we choose and choose what we want to do. All the alternatives are feasible in this context. What determinism holds is that the influence of antecedents is our ability to choose this or that alternative; but this does not stop our will from being a source of other effects itself. And the context in which it is possible to make different decisions seems enough to classify some acts as right and some as wrong, some as ethical and some as immoral. Therefore, it would seem that the objections to determinism are due largely to misunderstanding its meaning. Finally, therefore, it is not determinism that has destructive implications, but free will. There is therefore no reason to reconsider the overwhelmingly strong foundations for determinism. There is another interpretation of contemporary British philosopher Galen Strawson. To him, no one is solely responsible for his actions, morally speaking, whether determinism is real or not. His so-called "Basic Argument" is: because of the way you are, you do what you do in any given situation. To ultimately be responsible for what you do, you ultimately have to be responsible for how you are— at least in some crucial mental aspects. But ultimately, you can't be responsible for the way you're at all. And basically, you can't be responsible for what you're doing. Opinion on determinism seems to be divided among humanists. The fourth point in Corliss Lamont's "10 Points for Humanism" listed in his book The Philosophy of Humanism is: "Humanism, contrary to all theories of universal determinism, fatalism, or predestination, believes that human beings, while conditioned by the past, possess genuine freedom of creative choice and action and, within certain objective limits, are the shapers of their own destiny." She argues in her book Humanism: Believers in a benevolent and all-powerful deity usually believe in human freedom of will, for how else could human beings be blamed for

their "sins," let alone for the world's evils? But most humanists are determinists insofar as the old argument of "free will / determinism" lingers on. This does not mean that we deny all human freedom and responsibility, but it does mean that we are less free than we think that we are because our acts were dictated (caused) by the genes of which we were born (heredity) and the things that happened to us in life (environment) because what else is there to cause them? The statement of Straw son that there is a "fundamental meaning" where free will is unlikely. By this he probably means that by objective criteria it is impossible to establish free will. Recognizing the inherent subjectivity of free will is the important thing. A person is persuaded that his actions obey his own decisions and impulses; he is not aware of any forces that drive him. For situations where he behaves "for spite of himself," he cannot be said to exercise his free will in cases of compulsive disorders. Ultimately, without taking a view of the nature of time, no serious discussion of determinism can be complete. In this picture of the universe Einstein and the block world of Murkowski, the past, present, and future, as viewed by us, exist in a different dimension together. In Einstein's words: "Physics becomes an' life' in the four-dimensional universe from a' happening' in three-dimensional space." Like the frames in a celluloid movie, the past, present and future already exist. To establish his particular experience of time, the "now" of each viewer moves along the movie. Our world is indexed inescapable. To those who see it as negating free will, this image of time is particularly repugnant. "And if I'm told that my idea of making decisions, taking action, intervening, possibly changing the future, is all an illusion," the novelist J.B argues. Priestley in his work of nonfiction, Man and Time, "then I will want to know how this block world, this frozen past, came into being, who collated it, and what is the point of this massive, idiotic trick of conjuring. A consciousness that is nothing more than the lantern of a policeman walking along a back alley and much less, because no action will come from it is not worth it. "Perhaps there is no point or it is up to us to see the point. Humanists believe in objective autonomy as rationalists. But where facts cannot be ascertained, it is necessary to make reasonable and positive assumptions. One could call it the theory regency. Since there is no evidence of either determinism or free will,

practical humanism should conclude that each individual bear moral responsibility for his or her actions. Any other path will have drastic social consequences.

Check your Progress-2

1.Explain the concept of determinism.

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14.4 LET'S SUM UP

In some of the earliest surviving Greek works, the Homeric epics, a sympathetic of the idea of test of moral responsibility and its implementation is indirectly present. All human and superhuman agents are often seen in such texts as equal targets of praise and blame depending on how they acted, and at other times the conduct of an agent is excused due to the presence of some variable that has compromised his / her power. Reflecting on these factors gave rise to fatalism in the belief that one's future or some aspect of it is predetermined, e.g., by gods or stars, or just some facts about reality and time in such a way as to make one's specific thoughts, decisions and behaviour irrelevant to whether that particular future is realized. If some particular outcome was tragic, then it would seem that the specific person could not be morally responsible for that outcome. Similarly, if fatalism were valid for all future human beings, then it would seem that no human entity could be morally responsible for anything. Although this form of fatalism has sometimes exercised significant historical influence, it has been dismissed by most philosophers on the grounds that there is no good reason to believe that our future is doomed in the sense that it will unfold no matter what concrete debates we participate in, decisions we make or behaviour we take. Aristotle claims to have been the first to develop a moral obligation theory. Aristotle stops in Nicomachean Ethics III.1–5 to analyse their underpinnings in discussing human virtues and their corresponding vices. He starts with a brief statement of the principle of

moral responsibility which, based on their actions and/or dispositional character traits, it is sometimes acceptable to respond to an agent with praise or blame. He clarifies a little later that only a certain type of agent qualifies as a moral agent and is therefore properly subject to assignments of obligation, namely one who possesses a decision-making ability. A decision is a special kind of desire arising from deliberation for Aristotle, one that reflects the perception of what is best by the participant. The remainder of Aristotle's discourse is dedicated to pointing out the conditions under which a moral agent should be held accountable or praiseworthy for any particular action or characteristic. His general argument is that if and only if the conduct and/or disposition is voluntary, one is a suitable candidate for praise or blame. According to Aristotle, there are two distinctive characteristics of a voluntary action or attribute. Second, there is a requirement of control: the behaviour or characteristic must originate in the agent. In Aristotle's account of duty there is an instructive uncertainty, an ambiguity that has led to conflicting interpretations of his point of view. Aristotle attempts to define the circumstances under which to praise or condemn an individual, but in his definition of obligation it is not entirely clear how to interpret the crucial notion of suitability. There are at least two possibilities: a) praise or blame in the sense that, given its actions and/or character characteristics, the agent merits such a response; or b) praise or blame in the sense that such a reaction is likely to result in a desired result, namely a change in the behaviour and/or character of the agent. Such two possibilities can be defined in terms of two opposing conceptions of the principle of moral responsibility: the merit-based view according to which praise or blame would be a fitting reaction to the nominee if and only if it merits in the context of' merit 'such a reaction; vs. the consequentialist view according to which praise or blame would be acceptable if such a reaction were to occur. Scholars disagree with which of the above views Aristotle supported, but as philosophers began to focus on a newly conceived challenge to moral responsibility, the importance of distinguishing between them increased. Although Aristotle argued against a variant of fatalism (On Interpretation, Ch. 9), he may not have understood the distinction between it and the potential causal determinism risk associated with it. Causal determinism is the belief that

all that occurs or exists is induced by appropriate background factors, making it impossible for anything to happen or be other than it does or is. The appropriate antecedent conditions were defined by a range of causal determinism, empirical determinism, as a combination of the universe's prior states and nature rules. Another determinism in Christianity describes these circumstances as God's nature and will. It seems possible that biblical determinism developed out of the change from polytheism to belief in one supreme God, or at least one god who reigned over all others, both in Greek religion and in ancient Mesopotamian religions. The theory of scientific determinism can be traced back to the Pre-Socratic Atomists (5th century BCE), but until the emergence of Stoic philosophy (3rd cent. BCE) the distinction between it and the earlier fatalistic view does not seem to be clearly understood. Although fatalism, like causal determinism, may tend to challenge moral responsibility by threatening the power of an individual, the two differ in the sense of human deliberation, selection, and practice. If fatalism is real, then human deliberation, selection, and practice are entirely otious, because what is predetermined must happen regardless of what one wants to do. Nonetheless, as a result of causal determinism, one's thoughts, decisions, and acts will often be necessary links in the causal chain bringing about something. In other words, while our deliberations, choices and behaviour are themselves decided like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the nature or presence of other events depends on our deliberations, choices and actions in a certain way, since the Stoics have taken center stage in the theory of causal determinism, if valid, and its implications. During the Modern Era, a transition due to the emergence of increasingly sophisticated mechanistic universe models resulting in the success of Newtonian physics was renewed interest in scientific determinism. It became much more realistic to offer a comprehensive explanation of all facets of the universe including human action in terms of physical causes. Some felt that if such an interpretation of human action turned out to be true, people could not be free or morally responsible. Some argued that the reality of scientific determinism would not threaten liberty and accountability. In line with this emphasis on the implications of causal determinism for moral responsibility, thinkers can be categorized as one type: the one

type as an incompatible about causal determinism and moral responsibility who insists that if causal determinism is valid, then there is nothing for which one can be morally responsible; or a compatible person who believes a person could Such ideologies are exemplified in Ancient Greece, respectively, in the philosophy of Epicurus and the Stoics. Above, it was highlighted an inconsistency in Aristotle's definition of moral responsibility that it was not clear if he accepted a concept of moral responsibility based on merit vs. a consequentialist concept. The moral responsibility reflection history shows that how one interprets the concept of moral responsibility strongly influences one's overall moral responsibility balance. Those who support the concept of moral obligation based on merit, for example, have proven to be incompatible. That is, most have assumed that if an agent truly deserves praise or blame for something, then he would have to exercise a special form of control over that thing that is inconsistent with being causally decided. Besides Epicurus, we can mention as historical examples here early Augustine, Thomas Reid and Immanuel Kant. On the other hand, those who support the consequentialist interpretation of moral responsibility have historically argued that determinism poses no threat to moral responsibility because praising and punishing can still be an effective means of shaping the actions of others, even in a deterministic universe. Together with the Stoics, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume and John Stuart Mill represent this view. Through the first half of the twentieth century, this general pattern of connecting the consequentialist interpretation of moral responsibility with compatibility over causal determinism and moral responsibility and the principle of merit with incompatible persisted.

14.5 KEYWORDS

- Moral responsibility - Status with moral worth for reward, blame, remuneration or retribution in compliance with one's moral obligations for an act or omission committed or ignored.

- Determinism - Determinism is the philosophical belief that all events are fully determined by existing causes

- Scepticism - The theory that certain knowledge is impossible.

- Compatibility - it is a state in which two things are able to exist or occur together without problems or conflict.

14.6 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Define the term moral responsibility.

2. What are the challenges faced by the moral responsibility?

3. State the determinism.

4. What is meant by "Free will" in moral responsibility?

5. What is meant by Libertarianism?

14.7 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Determinism-free-will-and-moral-responsibility, https://thehumanist.com/magazine/november-december-2014/philosophically-speaking/determinism-free-will-and-moral-responsibility.
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- The moral of ethics, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminist_ethics.
- "Against Moral Responsibility" book by author Bruce N. Waller.
- "Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts" book by well-known Tracy Isaacs.

14.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. (Answer for Check your Progress-1 Q.1)

Moral responsibility is the position of morally worthy praise, blame, compensation, or punishment for an act or omission in keeping with one's moral obligations.

2. (Answer for Check your Progress-2 Q.1)

Determinism is the philosophical belief that all things are entirely decided by current causes. Deterministic ideas have come from various and sometimes conflicting motivations and concerns throughout the history of philosophy.